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ABSTRACT
The information revolution has brought forth new and improved capabilities to rapidly
disseminate and employ information in decision-making. These capabilities are critical to the
civilian and military infrastructures of the United States, and act as force enhancers and enablers
for the Armed Forces. These capabilities, however, often rely upon systems interconnected
throughout the world, resulting in potentially increased vulnerability to attack. To add to this
problem, elusive, threatening forces (national and transnational) originating from anywhere on
the globe are likely to offer opponents less reliant on information technology an asymmetric
advantage over information-reliant nations like the United States.
To date, effective methods and measures to specifically value information and
information systems are lacking. This thesis develops a first cut methodology facilitating the
identification of key information, generating information assurance strategies and implementing
measures to assess them.

XI

MODELING INFORMATION ASSURANCE:
A VALUE FOCUSED THINKING APPROACH
1. Introduction

1.1. Background
The tremendous worldwide increase in reliance upon information technologies (IT) reaps
huge benefits for their users but also threatens significant drawbacks. These technologies afford
decision-makers with the capability to quickly fuse data from multiple sources, make informed
decisions, and disseminate those decisions to necessary units and personnel at nearly the speed of
light. Such IT capabilities have become necessary for day-to-day operations for many agencies
(government and civilian), and offer tremendous military advantages over opponents during
times of crisis.
Research and development of information technologies began with the Advanced
Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET), which has evolved into today's Internet.
However, the "ARPANET protocols (the rules of syntax that enable computers to communicate
on a network) were originally designed for openness and flexibility, not for security."
[Longstaff, Ellis, Hernan, Lipson, McMillan, Pesante, and Simmel, 1997] The initial approach
that permitted "unrestricted insiders" to easily share information is no longer appropriate for
today's commercial and government use. [Longstaff, et. al., 1997] Organizations often deal
with the subsequent vulnerabilities that develop on an after-the-fact basis, or worse, not at all,
leaving the United States' national security exposed to a variety of threats.
Such threats employ widely available tools and easily obtainable technology to seek out
and capitalize upon these vulnerabilities. The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure
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Protection (PCCIP) addressed these vulnerabilities on a national scale by identifying five sectors
of industry that share common characteristics. In particular, the Commission highlighted the
interconnectedness of these key sectors and their heavy reliance upon information technology.
The five sectors include
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Information and Communications
Banking and Finance
Energy (Including Electrical Power, Oil and Gas)
Physical Distribution
Vital Human Services [PCCIP, 1997:2]

The information and communications infrastructure (the Internet in particular) has
evolved from serving primarily Department of Defense (DOD) and academic institutions to
interconnected systems vital to the existence of many of today's organizations. The Internet now
effectively spans the entire globe. This expansion resulted from an increased availability and
improvements in information technologies, allowing nearly all sectors an opportunity to
streamline current operations via more efficient allocation of resources, while simultaneously
creating completely new industries. Information systems now monitor and control many of the
operations of various other infrastructures. These systems are often an ad hoc mixture of
components, processes and software, which were not often designed to inter-operate in a secure
fashion. The resulting interdependencies and relatively easy access for a number of threats puts
all sectors at risk.
The Persian Gulf War saw an unprecedented use of information technologies in support
of combat operations and revealed the "effectiveness and power of Information Age technologies
and weaponry." [Gumahad, 1997:15] It also demonstrated that information warfare (IW)
attacks on any information-advanced state might devastate its national infrastructure through the
destruction or interruption of its financial, communications, electrical or transportation sectors.
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[Gumahad, 1997:15] Within the United States, such sectors are interconnected and oftentimes
heavily reliant upon similar information technologies.
The lessons offered by the Gulf War, as well as those encountered by numerous "Red
Team" exercises (wargame-like activities that seek out and exploit system vulnerabilities in order
to evaluate readiness or provide training), have provided military leadership with many new
ideas and concerns with regards to information operations (10). Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010), for
example, foresaw the necessity of Information Superiority, defined as "the capability to collect,
process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an
adversary's ability to do the same." [JV 2010, 1996:41] Information Superiority, coupled with
advances in technology, provides the foundation of all other aspects of future Joint combat, and
allows the possibility of full spectrum dominance. [JV 2010, 1996:46]
Information Operations
Relationships A cross the Peace-Conflict Cycle

Peace

■*■ Crisis —► Conflict

► Return to Peace

Figure 1-1: IO Relationships [JP 3-13,1998:1-4]
Figure 1-1 depicts the realms of Information Operations as defined by Joint Doctrine.
Joint Publication 3-13 defines IO as "actions taken to affect adversary information and
information systems while defending one's own information and information systems." [1998:11] This definition alludes to offensive and defensive postures within IO. Joint doctrine cites
four interrelated processes as the elements of defensive IO: information environment protection,
1-3

attack detection, capability restoration, and attack response. Offensive capabilities can also offer
defense through deterrence of adversary intentions or eliminating their 10 capabilities altogether.
Through technology and training, "defensive 10 processes integrate all available capabilities to
ensure defense in depth." [JP 3-13, 1998:111-1]
Information Warfare (IW), defined as "10 conducted during time of crisis or conflict
(including war) to achieve or promote specific objectives over a specific adversary or
adversaries," is subsequently a component of 10. [JP3-13, 1998:1-1] Special information
operations (SIO) are defined as "10 that by their sensitive nature, due to their potential effect or
impact, security requirements, or risk to the national security of the United States, require a
special review and approval process." [JP 1-02, 1999:414] Figure 1-1, which illustrates the 10
relationships across the time spectrum of conflict, shows a third subset of 10 that occurs on a
continual basis—Information Assurance.
Joint doctrine offers this definition of information assurance (IA).
IA protects and defends information and information systems by ensuring
their availability, integrity, identification and authentication, confidentiality, and
non-repudiation. This includes providing for the restoration of information
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. IA
employs technologies and processes such as multilevel security, access controls,
secure network servers, and intrusion detection software. [JP 3-13, 1998:111-1]
The rationale behind the ceaseless vigilance of IA stems from the growing number of
threats with their increasing capabilities to inflict damage upon information systems. Those
techniques that provided the United States an advantage in the past now pose a threat to not only
our national infrastructure, but to the current and future capabilities of the Armed Forces.
Molander, Wilson, Mussington, and Mesic called such an effort "to hold at risk (not for
destruction, but for large-scale or massive disruption) key national strategic assets such as
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elements of various key national infrastructure sectors, such as energy, telecommunications,
transportation, and finance)" strategic information warfare (SIW). [Molander, et. al., 1999:1]
To further justify a need for continuous information assurance, these authors also noted
that SIW weapons "may find their highest utility in the near-term in asymmetric strategies
employed by regional adversaries... that seek to avoid directly challenging U.S. conventional
battlefield superiority...." [Molander, et. al., 1999:2] SIW has several advantages offered to
potential adversaries. These include:
•

The cost of entry is low compared to conventional attack methods.

•

Intelligence on 'electronic' threats is difficult to gather.

•

Attacks may be difficult to detect, allowing the perpetrator time to either complete the
mission prior to discovery, or disengage without being discovered at all, allowing
them an increased probability of success with follow-on engagements, due to
knowledge gained from system experience.

•

Weapon or attack effects may be uncertain, for both the attacker and defender. It is
oftentimes difficult to assess the objectives of an attack, which may be vulnerable or
continue to be so. [Molander, et. al., 1999:14]

Figure 1-2 illustrates the increasing trend in incidents handled by the Computer
Emergency Response Team (CERT). Noting the fact that these incidents are only those that
were detected and reported implies that a much larger number of attacks have actually occurred.
Military exercises like "Eligible Receiver" have demonstrated, with relative ease, hackers'
ability to "cripple U.S. military and civilian computer networks...." [Gertz, 1998] These attacks
frequently go unreported for either security or financial reasons.
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8,268

Number of Incidents Reported to CERT
Source: http://www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html
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Figure 1-2: Security Incidents [CERT, 2000]
These increasing trends show that IA is a vital strategy for thwarting threats to U.S.
national economic and military security. As time and technology continue to advance,
maintaining normal day-to-day operations and the capability to employ military force at any
given moment will hinge on the continuous development, implementation and improvement of
the level of I A. There has been work detailing the nuances of offensive IO, which provides some
insight into what decision-makers value of their own systems by highlighting the adversary's
systems chosen as targets. [Doyle, 1998; Doyle, et. al., 2000]
1.2. Problem Statement
To provide information assurance, the important aspects of the information system, and
the information within it, must first be determined. That is, what elements of information and
information system (IS) capabilities require assurance based upon the associated risks of
compromise, corruption or loss of use. Additionally, the level of assurance attained must often
be balanced with potential reductions in operational capability and the consumption of valuable
1-6

resources (e.g. time, money and people). This thesis proposes advancements in the risk
assessment methodology and develops a decision support tool to facilitate a three-dimensional,
quantitative tradeoff analysis between the level of IA gained by a collection of capabilities, the
resulting effect on operational capability, and the resources required for their implementation.
1.3. Problem Approach
Over time, the new technologies (means) offer new opportunities in communication and
organizational efficiency; however, new vulnerabilities may also be introduced. Focusing on
what aspects of information and information systems are valued by the decision makers can be
used to evaluate current performance and proposed improvements to information systems, and
even facilitate the development of previously unforeseen alternatives.
Keeney suggests values, not alternatives, should be the primary focus of decisionmaking. [Keeney, 1994:33] He further defines values as "(fundamental) principles that define
all that you care about in a specific decision situation... which are used to evaluate the
desirability of any possible alternatives or consequences." [Keeney, 1994:33] Keeney coined
the phrase value focused thinking (VFT) to refer to this approach.
A VFT approach analyzes complex problems that have "multiple competing objectives
that require consideration of tradeoffs among these objectives." [Kirkwood, 1997:1] In the case
of IA, potential tradeoffs exist between the level of assurance attained, how readily available the
information or information services are made to the user, and the subsequent implementation
costs. Typically, expertise and preferences from owners and stakeholders of the information
system would be captured and integrated into the model. However, for this proof of concept
phase of study, these inputs were taken primarily from Joint- and Service-specific doctrine.
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1.4. Research Scope
The overall perspective of this thesis is from the war-fighter's viewpoint. It is realized
that although the governmental and commercial sectors share many common concerns with
respect to IA, there are fundamental differences in some areas that may not be captured within
the current model.
The growing concerns over the protection, detection and reaction to wide-scale attacks
are valid but beyond the scope of this thesis. Considering the 'weakest link' approach, if each
individual organization attains the highest level of information assurance possible, then widescale protection may be implied. The framework for this effort, however, will bear in mind the
follow-on requirement of wide-scale information assurance.
Finally, due to the classification levels of some counterattack capabilities, the scope of
retaliatory actions against attacks is limited to the pursuit of legal remedies.
1.5. Assumptions
The methodology utilized in this thesis assumes the following tasks have been
accomplished prior to implementation of the decision support tools:
•

A vulnerability assessment has been accomplished and results are available;

•

Risks have been prioritized based upon their impact and likelihood by a detailed risk
assessment, types of which are discussed in Chapter 3; and,

•

Countermeasures have been proposed to mitigate the risks identified. These will
serve as a starting point in IA strategy development. An IA strategy is defined as a
combination of technical (hardware and software) and non-technical (policy and
procedure) means to achieve Information Assurance objectives.

1.6. Overview and Format
The structure of this thesis begins with a literature review pertinent to I A, as well as the
basic elements of VFT, in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 discusses the value of information, the
1-8

quantification of this value using VFT, and the integration of the resulting value model into the
risk management process. Chapter 4 builds upon the output of this process by outlining the
development of a triad of models that evaluate the effectiveness of IA strategies, their impact
upon operational capabilities, and the resources required to implement them. Chapter 5 presents
conclusions derived from the proof of concept research and recommendations for future efforts.
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2. Literature Review
There exists a large collection of documents dealing with what IA should be, methods on
achieving assurance, and suggested strategies ('defense-in-depth' for example). The following
review intended to serve three main purposes:
•

Identify the value of information in current and future military endeavors;

•

Identify a 'gold standard' (taken primarily from joint and service-specific doctrine) that
revealed the true values of military decision makers with respect to information, its uses
in military operations, and the assurance of information and information operations; and,

•

Provide appropriate background information required to apply value focused thinking to
the IA problem.

2.1. Existing Doctrine and Information Assurance
Doctrine, both Joint- and Service-specific, provide an excellent source of objectives
critical to senior decision makers. For example, "Air and space doctrine is a statement of
officially sanctioned beliefs and warfighting principles that describe and guide the proper use of
air and space forces in military operations." [AFDD 1, 1997:1] This generally holds true
regardless of the source of doctrine. Encompassed within all levels of doctrine includes the
objective of I A, reflecting the senior leaders' perspectives and experience on the relationship
between IA and national security. These serve as a potential source of values, from which an
overarching model may be constructed.
2.1.1. Cornerstones of Information Warfare
In 1995, the Secretary of the Air Force and the USAF Chief of Staff presented the
Cornerstones of Information Warfare. The document focused on the strengths and weaknesses
of information technologies within Air Force operations. They concluded, "as the Air Force
becomes more technologically sophisticated, it becomes more technologically dependent... and
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these dependencies represent potentially crippling vulnerabilities." [Cornerstones, 1995:15] The
authors also defined Defensive Counterinformation (DCI) as "actions protecting our military
information functions from the adversary." [Cornerstones, 1995:Definitions] This white paper
served as a prelude to the growing interest of protecting friendly information systems and
assuring their future use; the development of Joint doctrine to address these issues followed.
Figure 2-1 illustrates two categories of attacks currently requiring defensive measures:
Direct and Indirect Information Warfare. Direct implies an attack upon our information or
information systems, changing data in the pursuit of changing perceptions of those using the
targeted information. Indirect refers to enemy actions taken to deceive information collection
efforts (building a fake runway, for example). Computer, Operations and Communications
Security were, at the time, the measures taken to fulfill this mission. It was recognized that
advances in information technology required equal advances in these measures, and perhaps
warranted new ones.
Defensive Information Warfare

Indirect Attacks
(Deception to Influence Information)
1

Direct Attacks
(Modifying Information)

Computer Security

Prevent

Detect

Subvert

Operations Security
1
Prevent

Detect

1
Subvert

Communications Security

Prevent

Detect

Subvert

Figure 2-1: Defensive IW [extracted from Cornerstones, 1995]
2.1.2. Joint Publications (JP) 3-13
JP 3-13, entitled Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, discusses both offensive and
defensive information operations, stating both are equally important to ensure successful military
operations. JP 3-13 offers the following, widely accepted, definition of IA.
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IA protects and defends information and information systems by ensuring
their availability, integrity, identification and authentication, confidentiality, and
non-repudiation. This includes providing for the restoration of information
systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. IA
employs technologies and processes such as multilevel security, access controls,
secure network servers, and intrusion detection software. [JP 3-13,1998:111-1]
Restated, IA ensures that information and information systems are available to decisionmakers when needed, that the information is as accurate and complete as possible, and that
control over both the information and the information systems is maintained. In the event that
control is lost, the capabilities to detect a loss of control, to regain control, and to restore the
information systems to its original state must exist. These objectives are achieved by taking
proactive measures (to protect) and allowing for detection and reaction capabilities (to defend)
through the integration of secure technologies and best practices into the information system.
For further clarification, specific definitions of these IA requirements are shown in Table 2-1.
Table 2-1: Definitions of IA Objectives

Availability
Integrity
Identification
Authentication

Definitions of IA Objectives
Assured access by authorized users1
Protection from unauthorized change1
• 2
Process an information system uses to recognize an entity.
Verification of the originator; Security measure designed to establish the
validity of a transmission, message, or originator, or a means of verifying
an individual's authorization to receive specific categories of
information.
Protection from unauthorized disclosure1
Undeniable proof of participation1

Confidentiality
Non-Repudiation
1. JP3-13
2. Air Force Manual (AFMAN) 33-223

The extent of the measures taken to provide IA for information systems and informationbased processes is dependent upon the value of the information contained within and the
consequences associated with their compromise or loss of access. Although information has
been an important contributor to success in battle, information is now regarded as "a strategic
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resource vital to national security." [JP 3-13,1998:1-18] To complicate matters, the value
placed upon information often changes over time, based upon its usefulness (or lack thereof)
during the changing levels of conflict and phases of an operation. [JP 3-13,1998:1-5]
The objectives of defensive 10 include information environment protection, attack
detection, capability restoration, and 10 attack response. [JP 3-13,1998:ix] Table 2-2 describes
the elements that comprise the information realm.
Table 2-2: Elements of the Information Realm
Information
Facts, data, or instructions in any medium or form. This includes the meaning that humans
assign to data by means of known conventions used in their representation
Information-Based Processes
___
Processes that collect, analyze, and disseminate information using any medium or form, that adds
value to the decision making process by performing designated functions or provide anticipated
services
Information System
The entire infrastructure, organization, personnel, and components that collect, process, store,
transmit, display, disseminate, and act on information. The information system also includes
information-based processes.
[JP 3-13, 1998:1-9-1-11]

Figure 2-2 illustrates the sub-objectives and related concerns for the four areas within
defensive 10. Information assurance, as implied in Figure 1-1, encompasses defensive 10 in the
context that our systems are under continuous scrutiny by varying levels of threats. Although the
concepts of defensive 10 and IA are similar, the definition of IA is used to develop a hierarchy of
main objectives. These objectives, defined in Table 2-3, include Information and Information
System (IS) Protection, Detection, and Reaction capabilities.
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Defensive 10

Information Environment Protection

- Education & Training
-Risk Management
- Intelligence Support

L,

■ Threat Analysis
- Public Affairs
-Command Information
- Security
Personnel
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Industrial
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— External
— Accidental Sources
— Natural Phenomena
-Monitoring Processes
-IA Support
— INFOSEC
COMPUSEC
L- COMSEC
Electronic Protect (EP)

10 Attack Detection

X

1

Capability Restoration

10 Attack Response

- Pre-established Procedures

- Timely Detection
— Service Information Warfare Centers
— Information System Developers
Designs Mitigate Vulnerability
Designs Incorporate Detect &
Report Mechanisms
— Information System Providers/SysAdmin

— Backup/ Redundant Links
Alternative Means of Transfer
Automated Restoration
Computer Emergency Response Teams
Technical Restoration Capabilities
— Automated Intrusion Detection Systems
Inventory of Systems Resources
I— Post-Attack Analysis

- Identify Actors & Intent
- Establish Cause and Complicity
-Apply Deterrent Options
Law Enforcement
— Diplomatic Actions
— Economic Sanctions
Military Force

— Recognize & Report Attacks
Initiate Mitigation Process
Periodic Risk Assessment
— Users

L,

Recognize & Report Abnormalities
Law Enforcement Support
L- Intelligence Support

L,

• Indicator & Warning Processes
-Timely Reporting

L

Reporting Structure
— Continuously Functioning
— Adequately Linked

Figure 2-2: Defensive IO [Doyle, Deckro, Jackson and Kloeber, 1997:36, JP 3-13,1998]

Table 2-3: IA Objective Definitions
IA Objective Definitions
Information and IS Protection: includes those measures taken to afford protection to
information and IS, and ensure their availability, confidentiality, and integrity.
Detection: includes measures taken to provide detection of impending or ongoing attacks against
an information system or the residing information.
___
Reaction: includes the measures taken to (1) appropriately respond to an identified attack and (2)
restore the information and IS capabilities to an acceptable state, their original state, or an
improved state. [Modified from the definition of IA in JP 3-13]
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These capabilities provide value in the sense that if one is missing, any level of assurance
cannot be demonstrated. Figure 2-3 shows the top tier of an IA hierarchy, which is developed
further in Chapter 4.
Information Assurance

X
Information & IS Protection

Reaction

Detection

Figure 2-3:1A Value Hierarchy
2.1.3. JP 3-13.1
JP 3-13.1, entitled Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (C W), primarily
deals with the offensive aspects of information warfare, which is illustrated in Figure 2-4.
However, it does provide some insights into why measures must be taken to protect information
systems. In particular, the interconnectedness of information infrastructures and the role that
information and information systems serve in the decision-making process are discussed.
Elements of C2W
(Areas that directly support friendly information C2 systems)

X
Operations Security
(OPSEC)

Psychological Operations
(PSYOP)

- Protect Critical Information
L

Electronic
Warfare (EW)

Military Deception

Counter Propaganda
•- Mislead Adversary
Threaten Counterattack
Target Intel and C2 Nodes

Electronic
Attack (EA)
—Jamming
Electromagnetic Deception
• Directed Energy Weapons

Electronic
Protection (EP)

Physical
Destruction
Electronic Warfare
Support (ES)

— Prevent exploitation of - Monitor for impending attack
friendly systems
<— Signal Security
■— Frequency decontiiction

Figure 2-4: Elements of C2W [Extracted from JP 3-13.1,1996; Doyle, et. al., 1997:43]
The information infrastructures of today may be categorized into three areas: the Global
Information Infrastructure (Gil), the National Information Infrastructure (Nil), and the Defense
Information Infrastructure (DII). The Gil is "the worldwide interconnection of communications
networks, computers, data bases, and consumer electronics that make vast amount of information
available to users." [JP 3-13.1, 1996:1-2] The Nil is "the nation-wide interconnection of
communications networks, computers, databases, and consumer electronics that make vast
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amounts of information available to users" and pertains to those assets that reside within the
national boundaries. [JP 3-13,1998:GL-8] Finally, the DII is defined as "the shared or
interconnected system of computers, communications, data applications, security, people,
training, and other support structures serving the United States' Department of Defense local,
national and worldwide information needs." [JP 3-13.1,1996:1-2] In reality, the boundaries
between these infrastructures are merely conceptual, since they are "inextricably intertwined."
Thus, an adversary often has a direct, electronic path, to virtually any information system,
regardless of its physical location. [JP 3-13.1,1996:1-3]
The Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop, in the context of command and control, is
also discussed in JP 3-13.1. (Figure 2-5) The loop, or decision cycle, begins with Observe—
comprised of the gathering of information from multiple sources. The second step, Orient,
requires the decision-maker to assess the perceived reality of the operational area based upon the
information provided. The accuracy of the decision-maker's perception of reality compared to
the actual reality is subject to imperfect processes and systems, as well as adversary actions.
Once the decision-maker is oriented and actually makes a decision {Decide), those directions are
(typically) communicated to subordinate forces. [JP 3-13.1,1996:A-1; Boyd, 1982]
^Observe
Act

ooDA
Loop

Orient

4

Decide*

Figure 2-5: OODA Loop [JP 3-13.1,1996:A-2; Boyd, 1982]
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This cycle ultimately results in "the commander's decisions [becoming] actions that
impact the reality of the operational area." [JP 3-13.1,1996:A-1] Essentially, all of these phases
are subject to threats. For example, information gathered in the Observe phase could potentially
be altered, changing the Orient and Decide results to the enemy's advantage. In addition, the
information systems that are relied upon for communication could be denied, resulting in a
breakdown in the decision cycle altogether.
Information is necessary in supporting decision-making. The potential for an adversary
to affect any part of the OODA loop, or the information infrastructures, upon which the military
heavily relies, further justifies the need for information assurance.
2.1.4. AFDD 1 - Air Force Basic Doctrine
Building upon the principles of war discussed by J. F. C. Fuller (Offensive, Mobility,
Surprise, Concentration, and Protection), Air Force Basic Doctrine shapes the manner in which
the Air Force operates, and provides a common set of understandings and principles upon which
airmen make military decisions. [AFDD 1,1997:1; Fuller, 1992:48-52] This document,
fundamental to the US Air Force, illustrates the importance of the role that information
operations and technologies play within the context of modern and future warfare, particularly
within the air and space power functions and the principles of war, through the concept of
Information Superiority.
"Information superiority is the ability to collect, control, exploit, and
defend information while denying an adversary the ability to do the same and, like
air and space superiority, includes gaining control over the information realm and
fully exploiting military information functions. Information superiority was the
first function of the Air Force. Early balloons and airplanes became spotters for
Army commanders who wanted information in order to gain an advantage over an
adversary and improve their decisions on the battlefield. Today, the Air Force is
the major operator of sophisticated air- and space-based intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance systems and is the Service most able to quickly respond to the
information they provide." [AFDD 1,1997:31]
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Figure 2-6 illustrates the main functions of information superiority. Information and
information technologies are playing greater roles in the accomplishment of national, and
subsequently military, objectives.
Information Superiority

X
Information of Enemy Forces

Information of Friendly Forces
Defend

I

I

Exploit

Control

1
Deny

Collect

1

l

Destroy

1
Corrupt

1
Manipulate

Figure 2-6: Information Superiority [Extracted from AFDD 1,1997]
Information and information technology pervade the principles of war, listed in Table
2-4, and promises new and improved capability, efficiency, lethality, and deterrence.
Table 2-4: Principles of War [AFDD 1,1997:12; Fuller, 1992:48-52]
Principles of War
Economy of Force
Unity of Command
Security
Objective
Surprise
Offensive
Simplicity
Mass
Maneuver
Today's forces rely heavily upon information and information technologies to enhance
their capability to exercise these principles of war and to achieve military objectives. A
summary of the relationships and the impact of the 'Information Age' upon these principles
follow.
Unity of Command, Objective & Offensive
As noted above, information has historically played an important role in improving the
decisions made on the battlefield and gaining advantages over a less aware enemy. Information
that is accurate, usable, and not overwhelming increases the speed and quality of one's Observe-
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Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) loop. If one protagonist has an advantage in timely and accurate
decision-making, the other will suffer, due to reactive stress. To further the advantage, if one can
degrade the timeliness and quality of an enemy's decision process, there also exists the capability
to shape the adversary's perception and subsequent actions. [AFDD 1, 1997:32]
Mass
This principle requires the proper concentration of combat power at the decisive time and
place. [AFDD 1,1997:15] In the past, mass involved enormous barrages that dropped tons of
explosives on or around a potential military target. Today, information technology provides
precision guided weapons and "superior battlespace awareness," replacing brute force tactics,
and presents "new opportunities to attack critical targets... with precision, stealth, and the speed
of light, affecting a variety of functions and capabilities." [AFDD 1, 1997:15-16]
Maneuver & Economy of Force
Information and communications systems facilitate the management of massive volumes
of force deployment and shifting supply inventory data. The resulting efficiencies have become
essential to maintaining support operations with today's smaller force and support structures.
[AFDD 1, 1997:34]
Security
The principle of security "conceals friendly capabilities and intentions while allowing our
forces the freedom to gather information on the adversary." [AFDD 1, 1997:19] Once again, the
heavy reliance upon information technology now requires that securing the information realm is
equally important to that of maintaining physical security. The forces with "the best ability to
gain, defend, exploit, attack information, and deny the same capabilities to an opponent, has a
distinct strategic advantage." [AFDD 1, 1997:19-20]
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Surprise
Information technologies, when combined with stealth and situational awareness superior
to that of the enemy's, can provide shock and surprise to avoid unnecessary exposure of friendly
forces. [AFDD 1, 1997:20]
Simplicity
Information technologies support the eventual goal of information superiority to allow
faster, and more effective command and control capabilities than the adversary. However, this
does not imply more information, but instead suggests information that is accurate, usable, and in
the appropriate context and amount. [AFDD 1, 1997:31-32]
Summary
The nature of the threats, and the methods to counter them, are evolving. Endeavors to
gain global awareness, to facilitate command, control and communication rest on the ability to
provide security and guaranteed access to information and information systems. [AFDD 1,
1997:44]
2.1.5. Information Technology for the 21st Century (United States Navy)
This article summarizes the revolutionary approach the United States Navy is taking with
information technology, particularly in the area of command and control. Communications
within the naval forces has evolved from "flags and flashing lights to secure radios to e-mail."
[Clemins, 1997:67] The initiative "Information Technology for the 21st Century," nicknamed
IT-21, plans to "shape warfighting capabilities, support systems, and information processing. In
fact, information sharing (and knowledge sharing) already dominates the relationship of the
Navy with the Army, Marines, Air Force and allies." [Clemins, 1997:67] Not unlike the other
branches of the Armed Services, the Navy's shrinking force levels and budgets necessitate a
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greater reliance upon joint operations to fulfill national objectives. The Navy foresees a future
with fewer sailors operating systems that are more capable and subsequently performing a
greater number of missions. [Clemins, 1997:68] IT-21 is a method to identify opportunities for
greater efficiencies and force enablers, and is based upon seven precepts.
(1) Leadership must lead the implementation of new technology, and be aware of its benefits
and disadvantages before allocating already scarce resources.
(2) Integrate tactical and tactical support areas; explicitly, fight and run ships from a single
PC-based system.
(3) Rely heavily upon industry standards to stay abreast of technology and avoid incurring
research and development costs.
(4) Drive everything to a single PC, utilizing a client-server environment using off-the-shelf
software.
(5) Use commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products for almost everything, and streamline the
way these products are purchased and managed.
(6) Seamless transition from shore to sea; "A ship in San Diego, connected via fiber-optics
on a pier to the metropolitan area network, must get underway and switch to satellite so
that it is completely transparent to the user."
(7) Focus on software applications to comprise the C4I architecture instead of the tailored
hardware and software used in the past. "Buy icons, not hardware." [Clemins, 1997:68]
During a 1997 test of IT-21 concepts (Fleet Battle Experiment ALFA), "web pages and email were used to rapidly and routinely transmit information and knowledge—classified and
unclassified, tactical and tactical support. This dramatically increased the speed of command
and compressed the time required for coordinating events." [Clemins, 1997:69]
This approach to taking total advantage of current IT has formed the concepts of virtual
command posts and enhanced data fusion capabilities, and offers tremendous potential in
methods of disseminating information. However, IA of these systems is crucial in maintaining
these systems, their function, and the capability of the United States Navy.
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2.2. Other Government Studies
2.2.1. RAND - Defensive Information Warfare
This text clarifies areas of defensive operations within IW, an approach closely related to
tackling the problem of IA. This approach formulates the defensive IW problem as
"... the possible environments that may be faced, one's options, and the
objective that is being sought. This requires an identification of the variables that
are relevant, that is, those that can significantly influence the outcome as well as
the subset of these relevant variables that are controllable, which form the basis of
designing options." [Alberts, 1996:19]
This formulation connotes a vulnerability assessment of systems of interest.
Alberts notes that understanding the threats applicable to a system is a crucial first step in
developing an effective defensive IW strategy. A threat topology is developed and is comprised
of a multidimensional threat with varying abilities to impose varying consequences. Three
categories were defined as Everyday, Potentially Strategic, and Strategic, ranging from the
potential for isolated/limited interruptions to catastrophic amounts of damage. In order to
counter these threats, Alberts discusses the 'defense in depth' method of protecting information.
Defense-in-depth is "a strategy that involves a series of successively stronger or 'higher'
defensive barriers that work together to decompose the spectrum of threats into manageable
pieces." [Alberts, 1996:39] The "lines of defense" are directly correlated to the categories of
threats discussed earlier. As the level of threat increases, so does the sophistication of the
defensive barriers. The depth also provides a means to "concentrate intelligence and monitoring
efforts on a smaller population, which in turn increases the chances of successful defense."
[Alberts, 1996:40]
System defense extends beyond the proper implementation of design and software quality
assurance. Alberts contends that defensive capabilities include "system operations, methods, and
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procedures employed to limit the attractiveness of an attack and/or the consequences of an
attack," some of which are shown in Figure 2-7. [1996:70] These dimensions are 'tuned'
according to system-specific circumstances and operational considerations, resulting in a desired
level of more (or less) protection. The author noted, "More protection always comes at a
price..." either costing more to build a system or exacting "costs in terms of overhead or in loss
of functionality." [Alberts, 1996:70-71]
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Figure 2-7: Dimensions of Defense [Alberts, 1996:72]
Finally, Alberts noted five challenges to defensive information warfare capabilities that
remain strong today. These included:
•

A better understanding of the nature of the threat must be achieved;

•

A deterrent strategy against digital attacks must be developed;

•

Timely notification of indicators and warning regarding impending attacks;

•

Methods for successfully defending against attacks that do occur; and,

•

The development of "appropriate and effective responses to attacks." [Alberts,
1996:59-62]

2.2.2. RAND - Securing the US DII: A Proposed Approach
Anderson, Feldman, Gerwehr, Houghton, Mesic, Pinder, Rothenberg, and Chiesa define
the minimum essential information infrastructure (MEII) as a process, rather than a structure. A
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methodology to attain a feasible MEII is proposed, and the concept is described by the following
four principles. The MEII...
•

Does not guarantee security but is instead a type of information system insurance
policy by which risks are managed at some reasonable cost while pursuing
information age opportunities;

•

Is not a central system responding to multiple threats but a set of systems defined
locally to respond to local vulnerabilities;

•

Is not a fixed, protected entity, but a virtual functionality on top of the existing
infrastructure; and

•

Is not a static structure, but a dynamic process—a means to protect something,
instead of a thing that has to be protected. [Anderson, et. al, 1999:xiv]

The focus is on military organizations, and it is assumed that as more organizations
complete this process, an MEII will evolve, thus securing the defense information infrastructure
(DII). This is in agreement with the 'weakest link' approach to security in general.
The process they define has six steps shown in Figure 2-8.
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

Determine what information functions are essential to successful execution of the unit's
missions.
Determine which information "systems" are essential to accomplish those functions.
For each essential system and its components, identify vulnerabilities to expected threats.
In analyzing the system, it could (and perhaps should) be viewed in various ways: as a
hierarchical set of subsystems supporting each other at different levels, or as a collection of
functional elements like databases, software modules, hardware, etc.
Identify security techniques to mitigate vulnerabilities.
Implement the selected security techniques.
Play the solutions against a set of threat scenarios to see if the solutions are robust against
likely threats. It is critical that the success of security enhancements be testable.
Figure 2-8: Six Steps of the MEII Process [Anderson, et. al., 1999:xiv-xv]
Generic sources of vulnerability are identified to facilitate analysis. In addition, a matrix

tool is developed to ascertain the effectiveness of certain countermeasures against identified
vulnerabilities, as well as any additional vulnerability that may be incurred due to using the new
countermeasure. The 'ranking' used is a color-based scale that indicates both the level a
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countermeasure addresses an existing vulnerability and the level of new vulnerability a
countermeasure may impose if implemented.
The overall process is similar to other risk reduction or risk assessment processes. With
the exception of identifying 'essential' functions and systems, there appears to be no direct
connection between the value of information and the 'value added' by implementing a
countermeasure. However, categories of security techniques, shown in Table 2-5, may illustrate
desirable attributes of an information system in the context of information assurance.
Table 2-5: MEII Security Technique Categories [Anderson, et. al., 1999:xvii]
Heterogeneity

Static resource
allocation
Dynamic resource
allocation
Redundancy
Resilience and
robustness
Rapid recovery
reconstitution
Deception
Segmentation,
decentralization,
and quarantine
Immunologie
identification

May be functional (multiple methods for accomplishing an end), anatomic
(having a mix of component or platform types), and temporal (employing
means to ensure future admixture or ongoing diversity).
The a priori assignment of resources preferentially, as a result of
experience and/or perceived threats, with the goal of precluding damage.
According some assets or activities greater importance as a threat
develops; this technique calls for directed, real-time adaptation to adverse
conditions.
Maintaining a depth of spare components or duplicated information to
replace damaged or compromised assets.
Sheer toughness; remaining serviceable while under attack, while
defending, and/or when damaged.
Quickly assessing and repairing damaged or degraded components,
communications, and transportation routes.
Artifice aimed at inducing enemy behaviors that may be exploited.
Distributing assets to facilitate independent defense and repair; containing
damage locally and preventing propagation of the damaging vector.

Ability to discriminate between self and non-self; partial matching
algorithms (flexible detection); memory and learning; continuous and
ubiquitous function.
Valuable defensive properties emerging from a collection of autonomous
Self-organized and
collective behavior agents interacting in a distributed fashion.
Personnel security clearances and training, design of human interfaces to
Personnel
reduce vulnerability of systems to human frailties.
management
Centralized management of information resources
(Self explanatory)
Establishment
of
a
hierarchy
of
increasing
information attack threat levels
Threat/warning
and concomitant protective measures to be taken.
response structure
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2.2.3. RAND - Countering the New Terrorism
Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla, Ronfeldt and Zanini discuss the evolution of terrorism,
particularly its improving lethality and the implementation of information technologies to
organize and enhance traditional and new forms of hostile acts. Netwar "refers to an emerging
mode of conflict and crime at societal levels, involving measures short of traditional war, in
which the protagonists use network forms of organization and related doctrines, strategies, and
technologies attuned to the information age." [Lesser, et. al., 1999:47] This prospect of
network-based conflict and crime is expected to become major phenomena in the decades ahead.
"Various actors across the spectrum of conflict and crime are already evolving in this direction.
Examples include... the Middle East's Hamas, Mexico's Zapatistas, and the American Christian
Patriot movement, to name a few." [Lesser, et. al., 1999:47]
Not unlike the Air Force's ability to control and conduct coordinated attacks from
multiple geographic locations, terrorist organizations using similar information technology to
their advantage poses a major problem in "correct identification of the enemy." [Lesser, et. al.,
1999:xii] Even if the adversary is identified, the authors note that the 'effectiveness' of military
force as a deterrent is problematic due to the potential for unintended consequences (e.g. friendly
casualties or damage to world opinion). [Lesser, et. al., 1999:xii]
2.2.4. The Cyber-Posture of the National Information Infrastructure
"Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) is that portion of the national infrastructure
which is considered most critical to national interests and, therefore, requires protection against
cyber- and other attacks." [Ware, 1998:5] Ware offered several actions that would aid in
strengthening the cyber posture of the Nil, four of which are directly applicable to this research.
These include:
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•

The US government should organize to improve its information security posture
expeditiously, directing agencies to bring the security status of their information systems
up the be best current practice; agency response and progress should be monitored. This
implies that organizations and their information systems require a certain level of
compliance.

•

Assess the physical vulnerability of the infrastructure, especially the telecommunications
and computer system dimensions. It was noted that telecommunications redundancy
tends to mitigate, but not eliminate, physical weaknesses.

•

Assess the present level of computer/network security throughout the private sector.

•

Develop a roster of currently existing "early warning mechanisms" that could contribute
to a national alerting and monitoring center. [Ware, 1998:34-35]
Ware argues that increasing levels of automation results in fewer people who know how

to run systems "the old way," thereby increasing the vulnerability associated with cyber attacks
due to the potentially inadequate preparation or non-existent backup procedures. Tradeoffs must
be made regarding the advantages of automation and the potential for "accidental and deliberate
failures in automated systems." [Ware, 1998:9]
Sources of such failures were categorized as disruptive phenomena, infrastructure noise,
moderate and low-level CIP attacks and intrusions, extremely high-level attacks and intrusions,
and physical attacks. [Ware, 1998:11-14] Disruptive phenomena are defined as natural
phenomena, carelessness, accidents and oversights that "cause disruption to smooth system and
overall operation, dislocation of delivered services, or force annoyances on end-users." [Ware,
1998:9] Infrastructure noise, a similar concept to engineering noise, is defined as "unintended
spurious events that occur daily throughout the national infrastructure." [Ware, 1998:10] This
noise, however, may potentially mask deliberate offensive attacks—"a nuisance for the defense;
and an exploitable feature for the offense." [Ware, 1998:11] Ware defines low-level attacks as
those that approximate the infrastructure noise level, and are remedied by in-place measures.
Medium-level attacks are those that "exceed the consequences of routine events, [where] the
response mechanisms that have been developed and have evolved can be stretched and
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supplemented by ad hoc arrangements and actions." [Ware, 1998:12] Extremely high level
attacks and intrusions as those "extensive enough to disrupt or destroy the functioning of very
large geographical areas or bring down most of a major industry." [Ware, 1998:13] Finally,
physical attacks are those actions taken against the physical components of any part of the
infrastructure. [Ware, 1998:14]
The interconnectedness of infrastructures means that sectors can support others by
providing services, computing support and computer-based functions, data, utilities, and perhaps
combinations of these (directly and indirectly). [Ware, 1998:15] The failure of one sector could
have tremendous impacts upon all subsequently reliant sectors. This indicates the need for not
only evaluating an organization's physical and cyber posture, but the related organizations upon
which it sustains and relies upon.
However, Ware asserts that the inherent resilience built into our infrastructure (as a result
of the size of the country, the preparedness of individual organizations, the artifacts of the coldwar build-up and military readiness) can offer some capability to mitigate infrastructure noise
and low-level attacks. [Ware, 1998:23-24] In addition, "it follows that, for limited spans of
time, the country can make do without—or with impaired—sector(s) of the normal
infrastructure." [Ware, 1998:25] Nonetheless, this should not foster complacency. The
increasing openness of computer systems in the pursuit of enhanced service and improved access
exposes them to a broader threat spectrum and an increased likelihood of suffering a cyber
attack. [Ware, 1998:30]
2.3. New World Vistas
The USAF Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) addressed the potential requirements
necessary to achieve a set of goals for 21st century aerospace power. These goals included:
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•

Get the right knowledge, to the right place, at the right time for all aerospace missions;

•

Protect all Air Force computers, software, and data, regardless of platform or location,
particularly those involved in warfighting;

•

Achieve global communication between the air, ground, and space assets of the AF, as
well as those with whom we operate;

•

Maximize the speed and quality of AF coordination, planning, and execution;

•

Dominate the information battlespace; and,

•

Develop doctrine needed for the use of information in dynamic command and control of
joint forces.
The omnipresent element of information and information technologies will enable and

enhance the accomplishment of these goals. However, the study also noted that the Information
Revolution is accompanied by new threats to the Air Force and the cyberspace relied upon for
mission execution.
The authors noted that cyberspace is essential to Air Force mission execution and
therefore requires protection. This protection, however, goes beyond "normal security
considerations... not only including the AF assets, but also its access to commercial
infrastructure and in some cases protect the infrastructure itself." [SAB, 1995:17] This
protection was thought to be required in two dimensions: data and control.
Data, "a sequence of bits to which meaning may be assigned, must be protected from
unauthorized disclosure and from corruption or loss." Control, "the process that has execution
authority of a computer system, must be protected from unauthorized users and from automated
attacks." [SAB, 1995:20] The authors further stated that these dimensions must be protected in
bounded and unbounded systems, differentiated by the existence or nonexistence of a "central or
distributed authority (common administrative control) over all components of the system"
respectively. [SAB, 1995:21] The intermingling of these types of systems opens up potential
vulnerabilities, due to the lack of a full understanding of the relationships between them, and the
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lack of protection between the two. Table 2-6 summarizes the threats discussed and the potential
countermeasures to mitigate them.
Table 2-6: Threats and Countermeasures [SAB, 1995:22]
Dimension/System
Data/Bounded
Data/Unbounded

Control/Bounded

Control/Unbounded

Threats
Disclosure
Loss of integrity
Disclosure
Disclosure in transit
Loss of integrity
Exploitation of traffic analysis
Trojan Horse
Viruses
Exceeding authority
Worms
Corrupted agents
Intrusions

Countermeasures
Data encryption & access control
Crypto checksums
Authorization & authentication
Data encryption
Data encryption
Future capabilities
Strong policy & procedure
Limited detection prevention
Accounting & logging
Limited detection prevention
Docking protocols
User proxy firewalls

Other threats that were acknowledged, but not discussed included denial of access
attacks, the exploitation of communications links, and Trojan Horses embedded within
commercial products in defense systems—all of which are in existence today. [SAB, 1995:29]
Recommendations made by the SAB included the requirement for impenetrable core
systems, an Information Warfare bias toward protection and not attack, and multidimensional
protection all maintain the need for an effective IA strategy.
2.4. Relationships of Information to IW
"The bad news is that all of the hype [about information warfare] could
impede sensible policy analysis, cloud objective resource allocation decisions,
and mask real technical and operational risks and vulnerabilities. In the scramble
for turf and budget shares, clear thinking about the relative value of information,
in all of its various dimensions and implications for the U.S. military, has too
often been a casualty. That could lead to unfortunate structural changes in
organizations, inadequate analysis of critical issues, and a failure to prioritize
effectively in applying information technology to warfare and broader national
security concerns." [Buchan, 1996]
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As Buchan stated, "the relative value of information" to its government and civilian
owners lacks explicit definition. Many studies and programs address the underlying issues of IA,
commonly citing a 'defense-in-depth' approach to achieving a reasonable level of I A, given
some tradeoffs in performance (speed in particular) and accessibility to information, and
assuming that known vulnerabilities are remedied. A 1996 study by the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Technology recommended the following steps in
evaluating the area of defensive IW (which generally also apply in times other than crisis).
•

Identify the information users of national interest who can be attacked through the shared
elements of the national information infrastructure.

•

Determine the scope of national information interests to be defended by information
warfare defense and deterrence capabilities.

•

Characterize the procedures, processes, and mechanisms required to defend against
various classes of threats to the national information infrastructure and the information
users of national interest.

•

Identify the indications and warning, tactical warning, and attack assessment procedures,
processes, and mechanisms needed to anticipate, detect, and characterize attacks on the
national information infrastructure and/or attacks on the information users of national
interest.

•

Identify the reasonable roles of government and the private sector, alone and in concert,
in creating, managing, and operating a national information warfare-defense capability.
[Andrews, 1996:i]
This study generated a 'laundry list' of steps to take during times of hostile activities. It

is important to note that many of these actions are required well before the initiation of
hostilities, due to the time and fiscal investments required, further justifying the need for the
ever-present information assurance.
2.5. Risk Management
The Accreditor 's Guideline written by the National Computer Security Center (NCSC)
provides guidance on the certification and accreditation process required for DOD information
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systems. Within this document, the risk management process is described. This process allows
decision-makers to focus on the elements of their systems that require the most information
assurance. Risk is "something bad that might, or might not, actually come to pass." [Kirkwood,
1997:136]
The notion of risk avoidance—"the view that all risks to the information of an
information system or network ought to be removed entirely before that system was allowed to
operate"—was once supported by security professionals. [NCSC, 1997:3-1] Eventually, it was
recognized that some level of risk will always remain, and therefore, tradeoffs between security
and functionality must be made. [NCSC, 1997:3-2] The current process of risk management
approximates the current level of risk within a given system, and relies upon rational decision
making to determine if it is at an acceptable level. This guidance identifies two fundamental
activities that comprise this process:
•

Identification of the security posture (i.e., threats and vulnerabilities) of the system; and,

•

Evaluation of the non-technical aspects of the operational posture (i.e. the need for the
system to be operational). [NCSC, 1997:3-2]
The security posture helps to identify the likelihood of a vulnerability being exploited;

whereas, the operational posture essentially evaluates the value of the information contained
within the system, as well as the value that information system capabilities provide to the
decision making process. The overall objective is to facilitate the cost-effective placement of
countermeasures to mitigate the identified risks.
2.6. Assessing the Value of Information Technology
Of the correlations between business and military organizations, the limited availability
of resources, particularly money, is the most common.
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"The increasing complexity and magnitude of investments associated with
enterprise-wide computing and higher levels of organizational integration.
Complex and expensive systems frequently involve lengthy approval cycles and
greater difficulty in evaluating the benefits of such investments." [Materna,
1992:2]
This study examined the evaluation processes of "next generation Information
Technology investments..." and found that a variety of measures existed, but few ascertained the
contributions that the investment made to the "business needs of the firm, however they are
defined." [Materna, 1992:2]
The difficulty lies within the measurability of the benefits (and possibly the indirect
costs) an IT investment may yield. Two types of benefits "Hard" and "Soft" are discussed and
are differentiated by their ease of quantification. Hard benefits "refer to those benefits that can
be readily quantified using standard measurement techniques," which includes dollars saved or
generated, as well as time saved. [Materna, 1992:3] Soft benefits "refer to those benefits which
are often less obvious or difficult to quantify such as worker empowerment, flexibility, or the
multifarious aspects of competitive advantage." [Materna, 1992:3] These are also referred to as
financial and operational benefits, respectively. Three general approaches to measuring these
benefits of IT investments are discussed: Economic, Cost Reduction, and Strategic.
Economic approaches include the time-honored analyses such as Net Present Value,
Internal Rate-of-return, Return on Investment, and Breakeven/Payback. Unfortunately, these
lend themselves to short-term and financially oriented assessments of stand-alone systems, but
pose significant weaknesses when applied to long-term, interdependent systems that may involve
intangible cost or benefits. [Materna, 1992:4]
The cost reduction approaches discussed include cost displacement/avoidance, work
value analysis, and the cost of quality. Cost displacement (or cost avoidance) compares "the cost
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of the proposed system to the cost it will displace and avoid." [Matema, 1992:4] Work value
analysis assumes that the workload currently placed upon the organization exceeds its
capabilities and that "profitable business opportunities are not being exploited for lack of
available time." [Materna, 1992:5] Therefore, the work functions are restructured for improved
efficiency and effectiveness, allowing the appropriate level of work to be accomplished "faster,
better, and cheaper." [Materna, 1992:5] The last cost reduction approach discussed, the cost of
quality, asserts that the most effective way to increase profitability is by cutting the costs
associated with poor quality processes. [Materna, 1992:6]
Strategic approaches evaluate complex IT investments with wide-ranging influences. Of
particular interest are the option value and technical importance measures. Option value takes a
decision-tree approach to determine the options a decision-maker has in the future, given the
choices she or he makes now. Analyses of the available positions and their relative advantage, or
disadvantage, can be used to pick the best long-term strategy. Technical importance evaluates
potential investments by their ability to support the achievement of long-term objectives.
Although there may be no return on the investment, future operations may be impossible without
it. [Materna, 1992:7-8]
In the context of this article, these methods focus on justifying the acquisition of a
particular IT investment based upon its advantages and costs alone, and does not include issues
regarding information assurance (or the lack thereof). However, these "cost" concepts may be
applied to evaluation measure development and provide insight regarding similar tradeoffs
between human efficiency, technological efficiency, and today's restrictive hold on resources.
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2.7. Value Focused Thinking
2.7.1. Introduction
"Operations research is intended to improve decision making; and values, indicating what
one wants to achieve, are essential for guiding decision making." [Keeney, 1994:793] Keeney
contends that people want".. .better, rather than worse, consequences and better and worse are
based on values. Values are what we fundamentally care about in decision-making. Alternatives
are simply means to achieve our values." [Keeney, 1994:793]
This focus on values aids in the evaluation of complex decisions—how to achieve an
acceptable level of IA, with a minimum operational impact, at a reasonable cost is the complex
decision addressed in this thesis. This value focused thinking (VFT) approach "essentially
consists of two activities: first deciding what [the decision maker] wants and then figuring out
how to get it." [Keeney, 1998:4] However, Keeney defines the typical approach used by most
organizations as "alternative-focused thinking," which consists of evaluating the alternatives
available and choosing the best one. [Keeney, 1998:4] Even in the alternative-focused
approach, the effort of choosing an alternative involves the underlying values of the decision
maker, and the best alternative is chosen based upon "the relative desirability of consequences
[which] is a concept based on values. Hence, the fundamental notion in decision making should
be values, not alternatives." [Keeney, 1998:3] Because of this focus on values rather than
alternatives, VFT has been used in this study.
2.7.2. Overview of Value Model Development
A value model is a hierarchical collection of a set of fundamental objectives applicable to
the decision problem. These objectives are broken down until they can be measured, allowing

2-26

the decision-maker (DM) to quantitatively assess the degree to which these objectives are met.
The desirable properties of these objectives are shown in Table 2-7.
Table 2-7: Properties of Fundamental Objectives
Desired properties of the set of fundamental objectives
To indicate consequences in terms of the fundamental reasons for interest in
Essential
the decision situation
To address consequences that are influenced only by the choice of
Controllable
alternatives in the decision context
To include all fundamental aspects of the consequences of the decision
Complete
alternatives
To define objectives precisely and to specify the degrees to which objectives
Measurable
may be achieved
To render the collection of information required for an analysis reasonable
Operational
considering the time and effort available
Decomposable
To allow the separate treatment of different objectives in the analysis
To avoid double-counting of possible consequences
Non-redundant
To reduce the number of objectives needed for the analysis of a decision
Concise
To facilitate generation and communication of insights for guiding the
Understandable
decision making process
Source: [Keeney, 1998:821
The objective hierarchy begins with top-level objectives, and breaks them down into subobjectives. This process, called specification, "subdivides objectives into lower-level objectives
of more detail, thus clarifying the intended meaning of the more general objective." [Keeney
and Raiffa, 1993:41] These lower level objectives "may be thought as the means to an end, the
end being the higher-level objective." [Keeney and Raiffa, 1993:41] The process continues until
the objectives (or sub-objectives) are broken down such that attributes can be identified to
measure achievement. Bottom-up analysis ensures lower-level objectives are correctly specified
and support the overall objective of the decision. Top-down analysis ensures that the attributes
have been sufficiently specified, and helps to determine "where to stop the formalization by
considering the advantages and disadvantages of further specification." [Keeney and Raiffa,
1993:43]
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2.7.3. Measuring the Attainment of Objectives
In order to assess how well an alternative does, or does not, meet a decision-maker's
objectives, a "measuring scale for the degree of attainment of an objective is developed"—
defined as an evaluation measure. Kirkwood defines four categories of scales, each with
advantages and disadvantages, as a combination of either natural or constructed and either direct
or proxy methods of measurement. [1997:24]
Generally accepted scales with a common interpretation are natural scales and typically
take the least time to develop. An example would be measuring cost with dollars. Constructed
scales are those developed for particular decisions. An example related to information would
include classification levels (i.e. unclassified, secret, and top secret). Constructed scales fill the
void where natural scales are unavailable or inappropriate. "A direct scale directly measures the
degree of attainment of an objective, while a.proxy scale measures the degree of attainment of an
associated objective." [Kirkwood, 1997:24] Natural-direct scales are generally the least
controversial, whereas constructed-proxy scales must be explicitly defined in order for them to
be useful in correctly scoring the attainment a particular alternative may contribute.
Once the scales are developed, the ranges of evaluation must then be defined. This
information will permit the logical quantification of the relative importance, and allow the
development of the single dimensional value functions. [Keeney, 1994:797]
2.7.4. Single Dimensional Value Functions
Once the ranges and a scale have been determined, the assessment of value for that
dimension must be assessed. A single dimensional value function is a monotonic (increasing or
decreasing) function, that captures the value a particular score represents to the DM, and is

2-28

denoted by v(x). These functions may be discrete, piecewise linear, or continuous, as shown in
Figure 2-9 and Figure 2-10 respectively. [Kirkwood, 1997:64-65]
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Figure 2-9: Discrete and Piecewise-Linear Value Functions
The degree to which the DM prefers a higher score to a lower score level, termed a value
increment, is elicited to build the form of discrete or piecewise linear functions. However, the
infinite number of scores on a continuous function may require an approximation of the
functional form. This procedure relies upon the exponential mathematical function, and one
value—the mid-value point—is elicited from the DM. The mid-value point essentially
determines the exponential constant, p, which is then used in one of the following equations,
given by Kirkwood. [1997:65-66]

<*>■

1 - exp[- (x - Low) I p]
P* 00
1 - exp[-(High - Low) I p]
x - Low
,otnerwise
High - Low

Equation 2-1: Monotonically Increasing Exponential Single Dimensional Value Function
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«M=

1 - exp[- (High - x) I p]
1 - exp[-(High - Low) I p]
High - x
,otherwise
High - Low

Equation 2-2: Monotonically Decreasing Exponential Single Dimensional Value Function
Decreasing Preferences

Increasing Preferences

Evaluation Measure (Score)

Evaluation Measure (Score)

Figure 2-10: Exponential (Continuous) Value Functions
Close inspection of either Equation 2-1 or Equation 2-2 reveals that no closed form
solution is available to determine p. Therefore, spreadsheet implementation of 'goal seek' was
used to determine the value of/? that would make the appropriate equation, given a value of x
and the ranges of the evaluation measure, equal to 0.5, referred to as the mid-value point.
Single dimensional value functions are developed for all evaluation measures within the
hierarchy. Once this is done, the preferences between objectives must be elicited from the DM.
2.7.5. Normalized Additive Value Function
A multi-objective value analysis requires a value model that "combines the multiple
evaluation measures into a single measure of the overall value of each alternative" under
consideration. [Kirkwood, 1997:53] This model is comprised of two main concepts: (I) Single
dimensional value functions—specified for each evaluation measure; and, (2) weights—specified
for each single dimensional value function. [Kirkwood, 1997:53] The weights are assessed
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locally through pair wise comparison of value tradeoffs between evaluation measures, and then
are converted to a global perspective by multiplying the local weights down the hierarchy. A
notional example highlighting the difference is shown in Figure 2-11.
LOCAL

GLOBAL
0.6
o.i ; 0.06
0.5

0.3

0.4

0.24

0.024

Sum(AH Global) = 1
Figure 2-11: Local versus Global Weights
In order to normalize the resulting overall score, the sum of the weights must equal to
one. The resulting model, given in Equation 2-3, is defined as the additive value function.
n

v(x) = J^Äivi(xt)
i=l
Equation 2-3: Additive Value Function
Where,
•

Z^A; =1 is the requirement for normalization;

•
•
•
•

n is the number of objectives (or the number of single dimensional value functions);
X\ is the global weight for the ith objective;
Vi(Xj) is the value of the alternative with respect to the ith objective; and,
v(x) is the overall value of an alternative.

This methodology assumes that the outcomes of each alternative, with respect to their
appropriate evaluation measure scores, are deterministic. However, similar to Doyle's
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methodology pertaining to offensive 10 evaluation, the expected value, and projected high and
low scores may offer an alternative to uncertainty analysis. [Doyle, 1998; Doyle, et. al., 2000]
2.7.6. Sensitivity Analysis
To evaluate the underlying assumptions of the value model, sensitivity analysis may be
performed. One of the assumptions often of interest is the weighting of the model. "These
weights represent the relative importance that is attached to changes in the different evaluation
measures, and this is sometimes a matter of disagreement among the various stakeholders for a
particular decision." [Kirkwood, 1997:82] This analysis process is accomplished by varying the
weight of interest, while keeping the original ratios of relative importance of the other weights
intact, and maintaining the condition that the sum of all weights equal to one. The result shows
how the weights affect (or fail to affect) the order of the alternatives, indicating either a sensitive
(or insensitive) model.
As an example, using the IA value model shown in Figure 2-12, let the sets (w°p, w°d, and
w°) and (w , wd, and wr) represent the original and new weights for Information and IS
Protection, Detection and Reaction respectively.
Information Assurance

1_
Information & IS Protection

Detection

Reaction

Figure 2-12: Top Tier of IA Value Hierarchy
Suppose the assessed weight for protection was in question—this will be the varied
weight. The other weights will change, but must retain their original relative importance. The
adjusted weights are determined by the following formulas, described in Kirkwood. [1997:8384] The weight for protect, wp, ranges from 0 to 1, or a specified interval of interest.
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The adjusted weight for detect is then given by
(

...»
W

\

J

yW°d+W°rJ

Equation 2-4: Adjusted Weight for Detection
The adjusted weight for react is then given by
wr=(l-w„)x
Equation 2-5: Adjusted Weight for Reaction

2.8. Summary
The documents and topics discussed provide a foundation for understanding some of the
relevant Joint- and Service-specific concerns with respect to Information Assurance and the
related concept of defensive information operations. Risk management is a process to facilitate
the cost-effective implementation of countermeasures to mitigate risks inherent in employing
information systems. Other issues concerning the tradeoffs between functionality and security
must be addressed when selecting these countermeasures are also emphasized.
The next two chapters will begin by providing an approach to further the focus of the risk
management process by constructing a VFT model to quantitatively evaluate the impact of risks
based upon the value of the information and information system capabilities. Using this as a
basis for identification of countermeasures, a triad of models to address the tradeoffs between JA,
Operational Capability, and Resource Costs are developed.
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3. The Value ofInformation and the Risk Management Process
"Little minds try to defend everything at once, but sensible people look at
the main point only; they parry the worst blows and stand a little hurt if thereby
they avoid a greater one. If you try to hold everything, you hold nothing."
Frederick the Great, quoted in Foertsch, The Art of Modern War, 26 June 1996
[Joint Publications 3-13, 1998:111-15]
3.1. Introduction
As Frederick the Great noted, it can be self-defeating (if not technically and fiscally
impossible) to attempt the elimination of all known vulnerabilities. An information system that
is invincible against threats such as hackers, viruses, and electromagnetic weapons is likely one
that is unplugged and contributes little to the decision making process. As discussed earlier, JP
3-13 requires the information realm to be protected commensurate with the value of the
information contained within it. The information itself, particularly its value to decision-makers
in making decisions, suggests a starting point to identify what information, information systems,
and information processes require assurance, and to what degree that assurance should be
provided.
Risk is "something bad that might, or might not, actually come to pass." [Kirkwood,
1997:136] This implies two elements of risk: an undesirable event and the likelihood (or
probability) ofthat event occurring. This chapter discusses the application of value focused
thinking (VFT) to provide a method to enhance the risk analysis process by using the value of
information as a quantitative proxy—capturing the magnitude of a specified 'undesirable event.'
This is a paradigm shift from methods that rely upon general, categorical measures such as high,
medium, and low, methodologies that may regard the classification level of information to be
only determining element of risk, and methodologies that do not adhere to the principles of
measurement theory.
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3.2. The Value of Information
What makes information important? There are many attributes of information that may
be measured, and many that depend upon the context of the situation and the prior knowledge of
the decision-maker.
3.2.1.

Role of Information in the Military

Due to the increasing reliance upon information technology and the ubiquitous nature of
information in military operations, achieving and sustaining information superiority will enhance
all other operations. Figure 3-1 compares the increasing levels of access, speed, and amount of
information available to war fighters.
INCREASING ACCESS TO INFORMATION

Increasing Speed in Flow & Processing of information

Figure 3-1: Access to Information over Time [JP 3-13,1998:1-12]
Better information, gathered from large, reliable arrays of sources, processed, and
delivered with high fidelity processes and systems, provides an advantage over adversaries by
knowing the status of friendly, adversarial and allied forces, and reducing uncertainty in the
battlefield.
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3.2.2.

Modeling the Value of Information

Overview
Figure 3-2 illustrates the Value ofInformation value model developed with the help of
high-level decision-makers and technical experts. The individuals, assigned to the Air Force
Institute of Technology (AFIT), included the designated approval authority (DAA), the director
of the communications and information directorate, and the chief of the systems administration
branch. During implementation of the entire set of models proposed in this thesis, involvement
of individuals with similar levels of authority and expertise will be required. [Kelso, 1999a-b;
Maynard, 1999a-b, 2000]
From the elicitations that were accomplished up to this point, it was decided in the target
context that the major contributors of value to information were the sensitivity, relevancy, data
quality, and timeliness of the information itself. [Kelso, 1999a]
The Value of Information

X

I

X

Sensitivity

Relevancy to Mission

Data Quality

National Security

Mission Element "X"

- Organizational Security

Timeliness

Accuracy
Completeness

- Number Affected
Individual Security

Resolution
Duration
L

Intensity

Note: The number ("X") of Mission Elements is determined by the Decision Maker

Figure 3-2: Information Value Hierarchy
The purpose of this model is to aid in the risk management process. This process
"anticipates needs in all defensive 10 and includes planning for both protection and response
based on a consideration of information needs, the value of information that may be
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compromised or lost if the protected information environment is breached (loss of access
control)...." [JP3-13, 1998:111-7] JP 3-13 further states "the value of information can change
from one phase of a military operation to the next and must be considered in risk management."
[1998:111-8] From these statements, aspects of information that contribute to the overall value,
directly or indirectly, include its sensitivity, its relevancy to a particular mission, its quality, and
its timeliness. These four areas relate to four areas of concern expressed by the DM. These
included: the compromise of sensitive information, the denial of access to required information
(either through destruction of the information itself or blocking the mechanisms of transfer), the
unauthorized change of information, and the intentional disruption of information transfer.
Based upon the participants' statements and documents addressed, it was assumed that these
characteristics composed a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive collection that
contributed to the value of information. While the model presented here was built on an
unclassified system, the principle can be extended to a classified system.
Sensitivity
Ascertaining the value of information may be partially accomplished by examining the
risks associated with the unintended compromise of information, accidental or otherwise. The
compromise of information has varying consequences; examples include loss of privacy, fraud,
loss of life, reduced levels of National Security, inability to maintain Information Superiority or
any combination of these items. Figure 3-3 summarizes survey results of estimated financial
losses due to a variety of computer crimes.
These losses only include those that were reported and could be reasonably estimated,
and therefore do not account for losses due to lack of confidence or weakened competitive
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advantage. Note that theft of proprietary information and financial fraud, both resulting from a
compromise in sensitive information, account for a large portion of these total losses.
Method
Theft of Proprietary Info
Sabotage of Data/Networks
Telecom Eavesdropping
System Penetration by Outsider
Insider Abuse of Net Access
Financial Fraud
Denial of Service
Spooling
Virus
Unauthorized Insider Access
Telecom Fraud
Acti\e Wiretapping
Laptop Theft
Total

1997
21
14
8
22
55
26
n/a
4
165
22
35
n/a
160

Incidents
1998
20
25
10
19
67
29
36
n/a
143
18
32
5
162

1999*
23
27
10
28
81
27
28
n/a
116
25
29
1
150

Total Losses ($)
1997
1998
1999*
42496000
33545000
20048000
4421000
4285850
2142000
562000
765000
1181000
1637000
2885000
2911700
7576000
3720000
1006750
39706000
24892000
11239000
3255000
2787000
n/a
n/a
n/a
512000
5274000
7874000
12498150
3567000
3991605
50565000
773000
17256000
22660300
20000
245000
n/a
13038000
5250000
6132200
$100,119,555 $136,822,000 $123,776,000

Source: Corrputer Security hstitute- CSI/FB11999 Computer CrirTE and Security Survey (www.gocsi.conVbsses.htm)

Figure 3-3: Estimated Financial Losses due to Security Crime
In the context of government and military information, there are several standards of
evaluating the sensitivity of information, and may be divided into National, Organizational, and
Individual categories. Overall, it is assumed that more harmful consequences of compromise
imply a higher level of value inherent within the information.
Sensitivity (To National Security)
Classified national security information requires protection against unauthorized
disclosure. [President, 1995:3] The level of classification is dependent upon the damage to the
"national security [harm to the national defense or foreign relations of the United States] from
the unauthorized disclosure of information, to include the sensitivity, value, and utility ofthat
information." [President, 1995:4] The security classification guidance provides a process to
assess, in detail, the resulting loss or adverse impact to National Security if a specific item of
information is compromised. Therefore, the information's classification level is used as a proxy
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to evaluate the information's sensitivity to National Security issues. Figure 3-4 illustrates the
evaluation function elicited from the decision-makers.
Sensitivity (National Security)
1.00
a,0.75
■=j 0.50
>0.25
0.00

♦ 0.19 ♦ 0.19 ♦0.25 ♦ 0.25

♦ 0.44

ACD-DoD B-US E-DoD
XF-As
Unlimited USGA& &DoD
Govt
Only
Export Directed
KTR
KTR Agency
Control
Only

Distribution Limitations

Figure 3-4: Value Function (VF) for Sensitivity (National Security)
Note that all categories, for the test site, are levels of unclassifed information, due to
system-specific requirements. These levels were based upon categories specified in DoD
Directive 5230.24, which governs distribution limitations based upon the type of information
involved. The evaluation measure may be changed to accommodate systems employing
classified information. An example of such a scale is shown in Table 3-1.
Table 3-1: Levels of Classification [DODD 5200.28,1988:27]
Potential Evaluation Categories for Systems with Classified Information
Unclassified
Not Classified but Sensitive (Sensitive in the context that is applicable to National Security)
Confidential; Confidential with one or more categories
Secret; Secret with one or more Special Access Program (SAP) requirements
Top Secret; Top Secret with one or more SAP requirements
Sensitivity (To Organizational Security)
The operations security (OPSEC) process allows the identification of critical information
at the organizational level. This process identifies information pertaining to "friendly actions
attendant to military operations and other activities." [JP 1-02, 1999:328] For this evaluation
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measure, five categories of potentially sensitive information that would afford an adversary an
advantage against the organization (AFIT) were determined. It is assumed that the greater the
advantage presented the higher the level of value of the information. These categories, ranked in
order of importance to the DM, included administrative, financial, virtual infrastructure (i.e.
information systems connectivity), physical infrastructure, and personnel activity information.
The evaluation function is shown in Figure 3-5. Although it was felt that this set of categories
was collectively exhaustive and mutually exclusive for the sample organization, other
organization-specific categories should be developed as necessary.
Sensitivity (Organizational Security)
♦

1.00
♦ 0.78

0.75
♦ 0.55

■i 0.50

♦ 0.36

0.25

♦ 0.15

0.00
N/A

Admin

Finance

Virtual
Infr.

Physical Pers.
Infr.
Activity

Type of Information about ART
Figure 3-5: VF for Sensitivity (Organizational)
Sensitivity (To Individual Security)
The last evaluation measure for sensitivity focuses on assessing the value of information
pertaining to individuals within the organization of interest. This was accomplished by using
current legislature or guidelines (e.g. The Privacy Act of 1974). The Privacy Act of 1974
governs the control of certain facts about individuals, implying that inadvertent or careless
release may prove harmful due to fraud, loss of privacy, or other individual concerns. Personal
information governed by this act is assumed to have more value than personal information not
directly covered in the legislation.
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Sensitivity (Individual Security)
1.00
0.75
'200

^0.50
>
0.25
0.00
0

200

400

600

800

1000

Number of People Involved/Violated

Figure 3-6: VF for Sensitivity (Individual)
The ranges were based upon the number of people, on average, permanently assigned to
AFIT. The scale represents the number of people that would be affected if sensitive individual
information were compromised. This differentiates between compromises of a single or a few
individuals and databases containing sensitive individual information. A mid-value of 200
people was elicited, and resulted in the evaluation function shown in Figure 3-6.
Relevancy to Mission
The relevancy of information pertains to how important the information is to
accomplishing the mission. For this objective, the DM must first identify the mission elements
they most value, hence the "Mission X" notation seen in the hierarchy Figure 3-2. Once these
mission elements are identified, an evaluation of the tradeoffs between them is accomplished
through elicitation of weights. Using the organizational mission statement and DM preferences,
three mission elements were originally evaluated for AFIT. However, the general process is
described only once for brevity.
It is assumed that highly valued information required for mission accomplishment that is
denied to the decision-maker (either by denying access or destroying it altogether) will have a
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potentially greater impact upon mission effectiveness than information that is less valued.
Concerns that further establish the relevancy of information to an organization's mission include:
•

The number of personnel or organizations affected;

•

How long the information can be unavailable before adverse effects upon mission
accomplishment are perceived; and,

•

The intensity upon which the completion of the mission relies upon the information

Relevance (Number Affected)
The first concern is the number of personnel or organizations affected. This serves as a
proxy for the magnitude of the effects (internal to the organization) that may occur if information
is lost (i.e. deleted or corrupted beyond use) or access to data and/or the system is denied. For
each mission element, a target population is defined, based upon their level of support for that
element. This provides a method to further discriminate information of interest, and provides a
baseline for the percentage that is assessed. Figure 3-7 shows the value function. An
exponentially increasing curve, with a mid-value point at 10% of the population was elicited.
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Figure 3-7: VF for Relevancy (Number Affected)
Note that although the percentage may be difficult to estimate, the same measure could
be applied to any organization.
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Relevance {Duration)
The second concern in relevance to mission is how long the information can remain
unavailable before adverse effects upon mission accomplishment are perceived. Given that the
information is relevant to mission accomplishment to some extent, it is assumed that the more
often the information is required for decision-making processes, the more valuable it is compared
with similar categories of information. The evaluation function, shown in Figure 3-8, shows an
exponentially decreasing curve with a mid-value point at 2 days. It was assumed that
information infrequently used (i.e. once every 14 days or more) was of little value, compared to
information required on a daily (or hourly) basis.
If a system contained critical data that was infrequently accessed, but essential when
required, this measure would require revision. Again, for the test case, it captured the decisionmaker's preferences.
Relevancy (Duration)
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Figure 3-8: VF for Relevancy (Duration)
A similar concept to this approach, the accessibility factor, is discussed in the
information technology security (ITSEC) concept of system classes used in the Defense
Information Technology Security Certification and Accreditation Program (DITSCAP). These
classes facilitate the determination of minimum-security requirements for an entire system, based
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upon a profile of its characteristics. The categories for this factor, shown in Table 3-2, could be
used as an alternative evaluation measure, albeit it is somewhat vague.
Table 3-2: Accessibility Factor Categories [DOD 5200.40-M (Draft), 1999:AP2-5]
Accessibility Factor: The degree that the operation, data, infrastructure, or system needs to be
available from a security perspective.
Reasonable The specific aspect must be available in reasonable time to avoid operational
impacts.
Soon
The specific aspect must be available soon (timely response) to avoid operational
impacts.
ASAP
The specific aspect must be available as soon as possible (quick response) to avoid
operational impacts.
Immediate The specific aspect must be available immediately (on demand) to avoid
operational impacts.
Relevancy (Intensity)
The third concern regarding the relevancy of information to mission accomplishment is
denoted by Intensity. This provides subjective assessment of the role information plays in the
reduction of uncertainty. Three categories were developed—Preferred, Mission Essential, and
Mission Critical—and the elicited value function is shown in Figure 3-9.
Relevancy (Intensity)
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Figure 3-9: VF for Relevancy (Intensity)
Once again, a similar concept is seen in the DITSCAP guidance, denoted as the mission
reliance factor, and is described in Table 3-3.
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Table 3-3: Accessibility Factor Categories [DOD 5200.40-M (Draft), 1999:AP2-5]
Mission Reliance Factor: The degree that the success of the mission relies on the operation,
data, infrastructure, or system.
None
The mission is not dependent on the specific aspect.
Cursory
The mission is dependent on the specific aspect.
Partial
The mission is partially dependent on the specific aspect.
The mission is totally dependent on the specific aspect.
Total
In summary, if information is relevant to the mission it is valuable. Relevant information
that applies to a larger proportion of the organization than otherwise is more valuable. Relevant
information that decision makers can only go short periods without adverse affects upon mission
accomplishment is more valuable. Finally, relevant information that is relied upon for specific
purposes to accomplish the mission is even more valuable. It is also important to note that not
only the mission elements, but also the ranges used for each evaluation measure scale, can be
modified in order to accommodate organization-specific situations.
Data Quality
Technological advancements allow today's organizations to create, store, and process
tremendous amounts of data. As organizations increasingly rely upon this data, "it is obvious
that poor data quality may negatively affect organizational effectiveness and efficiency." [Abate,
Diegert, and Allen, 1998:1] The United States Army Field Manual (USA FM) 100-6, entitled
Information Operations, cautions that sources of information are imperfect and susceptible to
distortion and deception, requiring commanders and planners to carefully assess the quality of
the information before its use. The following six criteria are recommended.
Accuracy. Information that conveys the true situation.
Relevance. Information that applies to the mission, task, or situation at hand.
Timeliness. Information that is available in time to make decisions.
Usability. Information that is in common and in easily understood formats and displays.
Completeness. All necessary information required by the decision-maker.
Precision. Information that has the required level of detail. [USA FM 100-6, 1996]
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US Army doctrine takes a further step and prioritizes these characteristics of data quality.
As a first priority, information should be accurate and relevant. Second, it should be both timely
and in usable form. Finally, information should be as complete and precise as possible. The
following rules of thumb supports these relationships: "incomplete or imprecise information is
better than none at all; untimely or unusable information is the same as none at all; inaccurate or
irrelevant information is worse than none at all" [USA FM 100-6,1996] It should be noted,
however, that if the imprecise information is the result of enemy deception efforts, no
information might be preferred.
Of the six characteristics, relevance has been discussed. Decision-maker involvement
concluded that timeliness was a value separate from data quality, and is discussed in the next
section. Usability, within the context presented in FM 100-6, is assumed a function of the
information system and the human-machine interfaces, both of which are beyond the scope of
the model for evaluating information (although it will be considered in the Operational
Capability value model discussed in Chapter 4). The last three, accuracy, completeness, and
precision were incorporated into the value model in support of Data Quality.
Data Quality (Accuracy)
Abate, et. al, define the requirement for Accuracy as "the information must be correct,
reliable, and certified free of error." [1998:4] USA FM 100-6 defines "information that conveys
the true situation" as accurate. To ascertain the importance of information with respect to
accuracy, an indirect assessment of the information's tolerance to error is developed.
Information that can withstand large amounts of error and still positively contribute to the
decision making process is assumed to be less valuable (in the eventual context of protecting it).
This may be due to the decision context or the specific use of the information. However,
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information that can only tolerate very small amounts of inaccuracy before becoming useless to
the DM is assumed to be more valuable (and will require more protection). The evaluation
function developed is an exponentially decreasing curve, with a mid-value point at 10%
minimum acceptable error. Based on this reasoning, information that can only withstand small
amounts of error is more valuable. Information that can withstand up to 50% error essentially
may contribute more uncertainty into decision-making, and is therefore of little value.
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Figure 3-10: VF for Data Quality (Accuracy)
Data Quality (Completeness)
Completeness may be described as "sufficient breadth, depth, and scope for the task at
hand." [Abate, et. al., 1998:4] Using a similar approach to the accuracy measure, the maximum
percent of degradation allowed before the information can no longer be incorporated into the
decision making process is assessed. This suggests a level of robustness. If the information can
only withstand small amounts of missing data before it becomes useless, then it is assumed it
will require more protection, and is therefore more valuable. Figure 3-11 shows the value
function, and a mid-value point of 10% was elicited from the decision-maker.
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Figure 3-11: VF for Data Quality (Completeness)
Data Quality (Precision (referred to as Resolution))
To ensure that the intent of the model was correctly communicated, the Army's concept
of precision, "information that has the right level of detail," was restated as resolution. This
further differentiated this definition from that of accuracy. It was assumed that the higher the
level of detail within the information, the more, potential value the information could provide to
the DM. It is also important to note that higher levels of detail offer adversaries more
opportunity to affect the integrity and remain unobserved, implying the need for more protection.
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Figure 3-12: VF for Data Quality (Resolution)
Due to the many different types of information, four categories were developed to
generalize the level of detail that may be incorporated within information.
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Timeliness
To compound the problem of ascertaining the value of information, one must also
consider the time dynamics of some types of information and how quickly it becomes outdated
and of limited use. The rate of change in value over time is information dependent. Doyle
remarked "the age is best related to the potential cycles of change for a given [piece of
information]. For example, landforms change on a geologic time scale, city infrastructure
changes on a scale of decades, and the position of a targeted aircraft change on the scale of
minutes." [Doyle, 1998:D-7]
Considering that "the age of the data must be appropriate for the task at hand," the rate of
change was used as the evaluation measure. [Abate, et. al., 1998:4] If the information changed
more frequently, then it is implied to have more value than information that is changed less
frequently. Using this generalized concept, appropriate cycle times were developed and
assessed, resulting in the value function shown in Figure 3-13.
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Figure 3-13: VF for Timeliness
If, for some reason, the information flow is disrupted, dynamic information will become
outdated (and of little use) faster; therefore, this information is of high value in the context that it
will require more protection against disruption. Conversely, if the information is static, changing
only frequently, then older data will still be appropriate for decision-making; therefore, this
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information has a lower value in the context that it requires less protection against disruptions
influencing its timeliness. While these concepts may be generalized, this measure should be
revisited for specific organizations.
Weights
Figure 3-14 illustrates the local weight for each objective and evaluation measure.
The Value of Information
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Figure 3-14: Weights Elicited for Value of Information Model
Swing weighting was used to develop these weights. [Kirkwood, 1997:53] Although
these weights are organization-specific, the concept must be applied to the remaining three
models.
Summary
Threats to information may be defined as "any circumstance or event with the potential to
harm an information system (IS) [or the information within] through unauthorized access,
destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial of service." [NSTISSI4009,
1999:45] Therefore, the risk analysis process should use the value of information as an input to
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facilitate the prioritization of assessed risks, and subsequently the prioritization of
countermeasures to mitigate those risks.
3.2.3.

Risk Management Process

A risk assessment is the "process of analyzing threats to and vulnerabilities of an IS and
the potential impact the loss of information or capabilities of a system would have on National
Security." [NSTISSI4009,1999:39] The risk management process essentially takes the results
of the risk assessment, identifies shortfalls and matches appropriate countermeasures in an
economical fashion. [NSTISSI 4009,1999:39]
To develop effective alternatives for IA strategies, a risk assessment must first be
accomplished to establish a baseline of current performance and determine where inadequacies
exist. Potential impacts may be evaluated differently for civilian or commercial entities (e.g.
profit, or stockholder confidence). However, the Value ofInformation model was built to
support both types of organization's information.
The steps of risk assessment include:
•
•
•
•
•

Identify the threat
Identify the threat likelihood
Determine the type of attack or attack mechanism
Determine the vulnerabilities to such attacks
Identify the immediate and long-term consequences. [IA for Auditors &
Evaluators, 1998]

Threat Identification
Although a variety of threats to information and information systems exists, they may be
categorized into two areas, natural and human, as shown in Figure 3-15. Natural threats include
adverse weather or other acts of God that may destroy, disrupt, deny or alter information or
information systems.
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Threats to the Information Realm
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- Hacker (No Criminal Intent)
Lightning
Cracker (Criminal Intent)
Other Forces

Figure 3-15: Threats to Information [IA for Auditors & Evaluators, 1998]
Human threats are typically identified to be either internal or external to the organization.
Among these categories, both unintentional and intentional threats may exist. Unintentional
threats may range from fluid spills to poor password choice. Intentional threats, the primary
focus of security efforts, are deliberate attacks upon an information system and/or the
information that resides within it. [IA for Auditors & Evaluators, 1998]
For the purposes of this thesis, while not discounting the importance of natural
occurrences, the threats considered are "intentional acts of attempting to bypass one or more of
the following security controls of an IS: non-repudiation, authentication, integrity, availability, or
confidentiality." [NSTISSI4009,1999:3] JP 1-02 defines computer network attack (CNA) as
"operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer
networks, or the computers and networks themselves." [1999:95]
Identification of these threats is accomplished through internal assessments of practices
and procedures, as well as intelligence indicators and warnings. If a threat exists for which there
is no corresponding vulnerability (dangling threat) or vice versa (dangling vulnerability), then no
risk is assumed to exist. [NSTISSI 4009, 1999:15]
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Threat Likelihood
The likelihood of the threat is dependent upon two main factors: capability and motive.
The Air Force Information Warfare Center (AFIWC), responsible for vulnerability testing of AF
information systems, correlates the likelihood of a threat with the capability required to exploit a
known vulnerability. For example, four resources categories (shown in Table 3-4) have been
defined that signify "the amount of resources or knowledge required to exploit the vulnerability."
[Ferdman and DeNyse, (Final Draft) 2000:30] These categories may aid in estimating the
likelihood of a threat actually exploiting a specified vulnerability.
Table 3-4: Categories of Resources Required to Exploit Vulnerabilities

A
B
C
D

Resources Required to Exploit Vulnerabilities
No equipment or specialized training or knowledge required (e.g., Internet access).
Easily obtainable equipment and some knowledge or training is required (e.g., state-of-theare PC equipment, range of IP addresses, basic knowledge of protocols).
Expensive equipment but no specialized training or knowledge (e.g., sophisticated
workstations, high-speed network access).
Expensive equipment and select knowledge or training (e.g., specific network addresses,
firewall protection policies, scripts generators).

Attack Mechanisms
The Defense—Information Assurance Red Team (D-IART) Methodology describes, in
detail, vulnerability testing for Department of Defense systems. Due to the distribution
limitations of this document, the attack taxonomy is merely summarized in Table 3-5. This
summary will serve as the attack mechanisms of interest for the remainder of this document.
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Table 3-5: Attack Mechanisms [Derived from MITRE, 1999:Appendix A]
Attack
Mechanism
Virtual
(or Cyber)
Physical

Interpersonal

Description
The exploitation of vulnerabilities or weaknesses in the electronic connectivity
of information systems or the emanations resulting from their operation.
The exploitation of vulnerabilities or weaknesses allowing physical access to
information components or infrastructure supporting the information system
(IS).
The exploitation of training and/or awareness deficiencies of the individuals that
operate, maintain or use the IS and the information that resides within it.

As time and technology progress, threat capabilities evolve, developing new means of
attack; however, it may be argued that future methods will fall within one of these three general
categories.
Unintentional threat mechanisms may include human (input or judgment) error and
inadvertent disclosure. These should be considered on a system-specific basis.
Vulnerability Assessment
AFIWC describes three general approaches to vulnerability assessment. These include
the algorithmic approach, the "hacker" approach, and the privilege upgrade approach, each with
strengths and limitations.
The algorithmic approach involves a methodical and systematic evaluation of "security
features, interfaces, and known security vulnerabilities." [Ferdman and DeNyse, (Final Draft)
2000:3] This approach also encompasses a "review of overall security architecture, regulatory
compliance, user security awareness, and other factors. This approach results in a list of
potential system vulnerabilities as inputs into the risk assessment process. This method is
relatively thorough and does not necessarily require exploiting the vulnerabilities; however, it is
the most time intensive of the three. [Ferdman and DeNyse, (Final Draft) 2000:3]

3-21

The "hacker" approach (also referred to as "tiger team," "red team," or "penetrate and
patch" approaches) involves "a free-for-all attempt to penetrate the system and exploit its
vulnerabilities." [Ferdman and DeNyse, (Final Draft) 2000:3] This approach focuses on finding
vulnerabilities and exploiting them as a "hacker" would be expected to do. Based upon the
usually successful results, this approach often provides powerful incentives to decision makers
for initiating appropriate patches and remedial measures. However, the unstructured nature and
stringent rules of engagement imposed may result in other, potentially serious, vulnerabilities to
remain overlooked. [Ferdman and DeNyse, (Final Draft) 2000:3-4]
Finally, the privilege upgrade approach focuses solely on the penetrator's ability to
increase their level of privilege, going from a very limited level to the system administrator level.
Although this appears to be the most persistent modus operandi of hacker penetrations, this
approach considers the fewest areas of the information system that are potentially vulnerable.
[Ferdman and DeNyse, (Final Draft) 2000:4]
Identification of Consequences
Referring back to the elements of risk—an undesirable event and the likelihood (or
probability) ofthat event occurring—the undesirable event is based upon the value of the
information that is either disclosed, denied, lost, corrupted, or delayed. Given that a threat is
identified, a related vulnerability exists, and the threat has a mechanism and the motivation to
exploit the vulnerability, an estimated probability of such an event can be determined.
The identification of consequences, or the impact due to exploited vulnerabilities, is
where the benefits of the Value of Information model are realized. If exploitation were to occur,
the potential target, or element of information, can be ascertained and evaluated. Assuming the
methods to approximate the probabilities are appropriate, the VFT approach to estimate the

3-22

impact should provide an accurate prioritization of risks based upon the decision-maker's
preferences and the weaknesses of the system. Such an identification can highlight
vulnerabilities, suggest courses of action and be used to more effectively focus resources.
Summary
An overview of the risk management process is shown in Figure 3-16. Assessment of the
risk associated with an information system is based upon identifying the threat likelihood, the
applicable vulnerabilities that the threat could exploit, and the impact upon the system or the
overall mission capability if such an event were to occur. The actual risk is denoted by the
intersection of these three factors. Using the Value ofInformation model, the prioritization of
the system vulnerabilities by their corresponding level of risk may be enhanced. The next logical
step is to identify countermeasures (CM) or controls to mitigate these risks.
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Figure 3-16: Risk Management and the Value of Information Model
However, further tradeoffs must be made between IA, the operational impact upon the
system and the costs incurred as a result of CM implementation. The next chapter focuses on the
models developed to assist the decision-maker in this endeavor.
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4. IA Strategy Evaluation
4.1. Introduction
As discussed earlier, the overall objective of Information Assurance is, like all other
major decisions, replete with tradeoffs. The risk accepted by merely operating an information
system within today's globally connected information infrastructure, must be balanced with the
needs of the organization to accomplish its intended mission, and the costs associated with the
information technologies and practices that assure information systems and the information
within them.
This initial attempt at modeling these tradeoffs resulted in the construction of three
distinct value models, denoted by IA, Operational Capability, and Resource Costs. All of these
models are focused on a single decision context—Select the best IA strategy. For the purposes
of this analysis, an IA strategy is defined as a collection of technical (hardware, software, and
firmware) and non-technical (policies and procedures) means to achieve a desired or improved
level of I A. An overview of these models will be presented in this chapter. Specific details are
included in Appendix A.
The IA model was developed from a combination of 'top down' and 'bottom up' analysis
of Joint- and Service-specific doctrine and open literature. Establishing the fundamental
objectives was the purpose of the top down analysis. The IA model captures the benefits of
information assurance. JP 3-13, entitled Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, provided
many of the definitions and issues associated with Information Assurance for this purpose.
The Operational Capability model was developed to provide a better understanding of
the enhancements or limitations associated with implementing an IA strategy. In general, more
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secure environments are less capable compared to those with unconstrained, unmonitored access.
Values related to operational capability were derived primarily from JP 3-13.
Finally, virtually any IA strategy will incur costs, in either funding, time, or personnel.
The Resource Costs model was developed to facilitate such cost comparisons between
alternatives.
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Figure 4-1: The IA Balance
A visual representation of how the three models would be integrated is shown in Figure
4-1. Once a set of IA strategies is evaluated with respect to each model, the decision-maker must
then ascertain the tradeoffs between the three axes. This may be accomplished by weighting the
results of the three models, and comparing a single number (of overall value) from each strategy.
Another approach could be to analyze the individual tradeoffs between the hierarchies. The
following sections describe the underlying rationale used for model development. A detailed
explanation of the value model components is presented in Appendix A.
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4.2. Modeling Information Assurance
With the overall goal of achieving Information Assurance in mind, the fundamental
objectives important to this goal must be identified. Using the Joint Doctrine definition of IA
provides the basis for these objectives.
Revisiting this definition,
Information Assurance "protects and defends information and information
systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, identification and authentication,
confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This includes providing for restoration of
information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction
capabilities." [JP3-13,1998:111-1]

Information Assurance

Information & IS Protection
Defense in Depth
Compliance

Detection

Reaction
— Respond

Timely
Cyber Attacks

Properly Focused

Physical Attacks

Flexible Deterrence

Availability
Inter-Personal Attacks
Confidentiality

Restore (Information & IS)

Reliable
Integrity

Timely
Cyber Attacks

Accurately

Physical Attacks

Improved State

I— Inter-Personal Attacks

Figure 4-2:1A Value Hierarchy
The stated fundamental objectives of IA are to 'protect and defend information and
information systems.' Defense, however, implies that (1) forces must be aware of an impending
or ongoing attack [detection], and (2) forces have the capability to retaliate in some manner
against the threat [reaction]. From this, the three main values (objectives) that support IA are
derived: Information and Information System (IS) Protection, Detection, and Reaction
capabilities. Each of these contributes value to the decision-maker by taking part in assuring the
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intended information and information functions required for Information Superiority—"the
degree of dominance in the information domain which permits the conduct of operations without
effective opposition"—or simply day-to-day operations. [JCS IA, 1999:F-12]
It may be argued that taking active measures to detect and react to attacks (thus
mitigating their impact) also support the protection role. In order to clarify these values, and
ensure mutual exclusivity in the value hierarchy, the following definitions used in this analysis
are provided in Table 4-1.
Table 4-1: IA Objective Definitions
IA Objective Definitions
Information and IS Protection: includes those measures taken to afford protection to
information and IS, and ensure their availability, confidentiality, and integrity.
Detection: includes measures taken to provide detection of impending or ongoing attacks against
an information system or the residing information.
Reaction: includes the measures taken to (1) appropriately respond to an identified attack and (2)
restore the information and IS capabilities to an acceptable state, their original state, or an
improved state. [Modified from the definition of IA in JP 3-13]
These specific definitions facilitate an independent assessment of each of the IA values,
which are discussed further.
4.2.1. Information and IS Protection
The key elements from the definition (availability, confidentiality, and integrity) relate to
the desired characteristics of information and information systems in order for them to support
decision-making. Threats to information assurance, and these key characteristics, may be
defined as "any circumstance or event with the potential to harm an information system (IS) [or
the information within] through unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of
data, and/or denial of service." [NSTISSI4009,1999:45] Note that the threats seek to adversely
affect the availability (through destruction and denial of service), the confidentiality (through
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unauthorized access and disclosure), and the integrity (through modification). The motivation,
regardless of means, involves the reduction of the information and IS value to the DM.
Therefore, measures protecting these characteristics provide value to the decision-maker.
To avoid straying too far from doctrine, other key elements within the definition
(identification and authentication and non-repudiation) should be addressed. From the
definition of IA, 'ensuring' these characteristics relates to the means that accomplish the
protection of information and information systems. Therefore, the key elements 'identification
and authentication' and 'non-repudiation' will be viewed as processes that support the
confidentiality and respond objectives respectively. This is supported simply by the accepted
definitions shown in Table 4-2.
Table 4-2: Other Elements of IA
Other Key Elements of IA
Identification: The process an information system uses to recognize an entity.
[AFMAN 33-223, 1998:13]
Authentication: A means of identifying individuals and verifying their eligibility to receive
specific categories of information. [JP 1-02, 1999:46]
Non-repudiation: Assurance the sender of data is provided with proof of delivery and the
recipient is provided with proof of the sender's identity, so neither can later deny having
processed the data. [NSTISSI 4009, 1999:32]
One other value that may be incorporated into information and IS protection is Defensein-Depth. Joint Publication 1-02 defines defense-in-depth as "the siting of mutually supporting
defense positions designed to absorb and progressively weaken attack, prevent initial
observations of the whole position by the enemy, and to allow the commander to maneuver his
reserve." [1999:125] This area evaluates the cyber- and physical-hardness of a system, either of
which may contribute to protecting one or all of the values Availability, Confidentiality, and
Integrity.
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The final value contributing to Information and IS Protection objective may be termed as
Compliance, which evaluates the decision-maker's desire to minimize the potential exposure of
an information system and its information system to known vulnerabilities. Learning from
others' misfortunes is much better than experiencing a similar attack firsthand. Measures that
permit the evaluation of this objective account for the efficiency (or lack thereof) by which
known vulnerabilities, applicable to the system of interest, are reduced or eliminated altogether.
Table 4-3 summarizes the evaluation measures developed fox protection portion of the
value hierarchy. Each measure is discussed in detail in Appendix A.
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Table 4-3: Evaluation Measures Developed for Information and IS Protection
TITLE
Defense in Depth
Time to Penetrate
Essential Elements

MEASURE UNIT

MEASURE
TYPE*

UPPER
BOUND

LOWER
BOUND

Ratio: (Time required to
attack) / (Time required to
defend)
Probability of Failure

Ratio
(S-Curve)

0

4

Probability
(Exponential)

0

1

Percentage of applicable
patches installed
Maximum age of known
vulnerability
Time since last vulnerability
assessment

Percentage
(Linear)
Months
(Linear)
Years
(Exponential)

0

100

0

6

0

3

Percentage Availability of
Essential Services
Percentage Availability of
the Overall System
Number of Data Sources

Percentage
(S-Curve)
Percentage
(S-Curve)
Quantity

90

100

75

100

1

4

Category
Category

Packet
None

Hybrid
Combination

Supporting Policy

Filter Type
Identification and
Authentication (I&A)
Method
I&A Support

Category

Encryption Strength

Encryption Generation Used Category

NoPolicy
None

PolicyAutomated
State of the
Art

Category

None

Percentage
(Exponential)

0

AutomatedFull
100

Physical Security
Compliance
Patches Installed
LatencyImplementation
Latency-Assessment
Availability
Essential Service
Uptime
(Overall) System
Uptime
Information
Redundancy
Confidentiality
Filter Technology
Authentication
Strength

Integrity
Data Integrity

Implementation of AntiMalicious Code
Percentage of Validated
System Integrity
Components
* (Shape) of value fun(;tion, if applicable.
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4.2.2. Detection
"History has shown the value and need for reliable, adequate, and timely
intelligence, and the harm that results from its inaccuracies and absence." [JP 313,1998:111-5]
In light of the historical perspective of'detecting' enemy actions, Joint doctrine also
emphasizes, "timely attack detection and reporting are the keys to initiating capability restoration
and attack response." [JP3-13,1998:111-10] In addition to timely detection, effective defense
against 10 is "... predicated on how well the intelligence processes function and on the agility of
[those involved] to implement protective countermeasures." [JP 3-13,1998:111-2] This suggests
that a certain level of reliability is required to ensure that threats are indeed identified—
maximizing the probability of detection and minimizing the probability of false alarms.
Additionally, an effective IA strategy must also be robust in that it exhibits timeliness and
reliability, regardless of the type of attack (Reference Table 3-5).
As stated earlier, regardless of the type of attack, the earlier an attack (or intrusion) is
detected, the quicker an appropriate response can be initiated. Because of the speed at which
cyber attacks may be accomplished, timeliness is a vital factor. In addition, due to the nature of
available countermeasures, a distinction between internal (or "insider") attacks and external
attacks must be made.
The timely detection of physical attacks is dependent upon the level of sophistication of
the controls in place as well as the level of awareness of authorized personnel. More
sophisticated controls rely less upon human ability to detect an intrusion.
Social Engineering is defined as "a deception technique utilized by hackers to derive
information or data about a particular system or operation." [JCS IA, 1999:F-17] There are a
number of methods to accomplish this, all of which focus on the lack of awareness or lack of
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training that authorized users possess (or both). Timely detection in this context is assumed to
rely upon the awareness of the users.
The reliability of intrusion detection systems (IDS) determines how often they fail to
detect a valid intrusion, and how often an anomalous event is construed as an intrusion (false
alarms). High false alarm rates can consume valuable resources, and could potentially be used to
an adversary's advantage. However, failing to detect a valid intrusion is assumed the more
serious of the two possibilities.
The detection reliability of physical attacks is assumed to be dependent upon a combination of
the organization's physical controls and the level of user awareness. The scope of this model
currently appraises those areas under the control of the organization—the information system of
interest. However, the connectivity and interdependence of today's systems will eventually
require addressing a larger scope, to include the infrastructure supporting the IS. User Training
evaluates the effectiveness of training programs designed to provide authorized users with the
knowledge to recognize (detect) a potential inter-personal attack. Table 4-4 summarizes the
evaluation measures developed for the detection portion of the value hierarchy.
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Table 4-4: Evaluation Measures Developed for Detection

TITLE

MEASURE UNIT

LOWER
BOUND

MEASURE
TYPE

UPPER
BOUND

Timely
Internal Cyber Attacks

Detection Capability

Category

None

External Cyber Attacks

Detection Capability

Category

None

Physical Attacks

Time to Physical
Intrusion Detection
User Awareness

Hours
(Exponential)
Percentage
(Exponential)

0

Real-Time
(Off Duty)
Real-Time
(Off Duty)
72

0

100

Time Between
Configuration
Time Between
Configuration
Control Sophistication
Training Effectiveness

Days
(S-Curve)
Days
(S-Curve)
Category
Category

0

30

0

30

Presence
Not
Addressed

Automated
Trained &
Evaluated

Interpersonal Attacks
Reliable
Internal Cyber Attacks
External Cyber Attacks
Physical Attacks
Interpersonal Attacks

4.2.3. Reaction
Joint doctrine addresses the importance of response and restoration capabilities. [JP 3-13,
1998:111-10] In this analysis, respond and restore comprise the sub-objectives for reaction, since
both are dependent upon either attack detection, attack warning, or some other, perhaps natural,
event that has caused or has the potential to cause some level of disruption. The overall
objective of an effective reaction capability is to provide the organization with a properly
focused response mechanism, and to restore the availability, confidentiality and integrity of
information and information systems to their original or an improved state.
Respond
The Properly Focused objective assesses the ability to correctly identify the individuals
involved, the vulnerabilities exploited and the motivation for the attack in order to form the most
appropriate response against the attacker (or attackers). This process may be accomplished
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externally or internally, measured by Indicators and Warning (I&W) Notification and ID
Accuracy, respectively.
Once an attack is detected and those responsible have been identified, the organization
must act to mitigate the risk posed to the organization. Flexible Deterrence entails taking the
appropriate action at the appropriate time. In this research, the appropriate action is either
stopping the attack, or collecting evidence to facilitate legal action, or both. Due to scope and
security considerations, more active defensive measures have not been captured. The
appropriate time required to act upon threats depends upon the type of attack, the subsequent
risks, and the capability of the organization.
Restore
The potentially damaging effects of today's attacks on information and information
systems often require that an effective reaction capability also permit their restoration. The
reliance upon these systems often requires that this process is accomplished in a timely manner,
recovers the information as accurately as possible, and results in improvements to the systems,
allowing their protection capability to evolve with the threat capability. Table 4-5 summarizes
the evaluation measures developed for the reaction portion of the value hierarchy.
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Table 4-5: Evaluation Measures Developed for Reaction

TITLE

MEASURE
UNIT

Respond (Properly Focused)
Indicator and Warning
Number of
Sources
Sources of
Warning
Identification Accuracy Granularity of
Non-repudiation
Respond (Flexible Deterrence)
Timely Initiation of
Decision Level
Required
Deterrent Options
Stop Attack
Process to Stop
Attack
Collect Evidence
Capability to
Collect Evidence
Restore Information and IS (Timely)
Time to Restore
Time Required
Essential Elements

Time to Restore to
Fully Operational
Capable Level

Time Required

MEASURE
TYPE

LOWER
BOUND

UPPER BOUND

Quantity

0

5

Category

None

Comprehensive

Category

Automatic

Higher Level

Category

No Capability

Automatic

Category

No Capability

System-Benign

Time
(Linear)

0

Time
(Linear)

0

Maximum
acceptable time
specified by
organization
Maximum
acceptable time
specified by
organization

Restore Information and IS (Accurately)
Percentage
Restoration Accuracy
Percentage of
(S-Curve)
Information
Recoverable
Restore Information and IS (Improved State)
Percentage
Percentage of
Resource Inventory
(S-Curve)
Components
Inventoried
Improved State
Are procedures in Yes/No
place?
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0

100

0

100

—

__

4.3. Consideration of Operational Capabilities and IA
Increasingly complex information systems are being integrated into
traditional warfighting disciplines such as mobility; logistics; and command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). Many of these
systems are designed and employed with inherent vulnerabilities that are, in many
cases, the unavoidable consequences of enhanced functionality, interoperability,
efficiency, and convenience to users. [JP 3-13,1998:1-11]
Functionality, interoperability, efficiency and convenience all add value to the
operational capability of an information system. Just as vulnerabilities stem from trying to
achieve these values, countermeasures to eliminate them often detract from the information
system's value. The Operational Capability hierarchy accounts for the changes that may result
from IA strategy implementation. This hierarchy attempts to measure these effects, and assumes
that the DM wants to minimize any adverse impact upon the existent system at a reasonable level
of information assurance.

Figure 4-3: Value Hierarchy for Operational Capability
4.3.1. Functionality
Functionality is defined as the usefulness offered to system clients by providing
information and information-related capabilities. Attributes that describe the value of the
information system regarding functionality are desired and essential capabilities. Essential
capabilities are those services that an organization currently relies heavily upon to accomplish
their stated mission. If these services are no longer made available, it is assumed that other
4-13

means must be found to enable the organization to accomplish mission objectives. Desired
capabilities are defined as those capabilities that offer enhanced mission effectiveness, but are
not required to perform their stated objectives. To ascertain the changes corresponding with an
IA strategy, two constructed measures are developed: Impact on Essential Capabilities and
Impact on Desired Capabilities. These assess any impact (good or bad) an IA Strategy may have
upon services and information currently accessible to authorized users. This focuses only on
those services (or supporting services) that are of value to the DM or the majority of authorized
users.
4.3.2. Interoperability
Systems that are interoperable and can be easily integrated with current and future
systems provide immediate and cost-effective value to the DM. In the context of ascertaining the
value of an IA strategy, Interoperability issues are measured with the two attributes Upgrade
Potential and Risk Factors. These measures focus on the potential impact on future maintenance
and/or the possibility for upgrades based upon the uniqueness of the components. Risk Factors
evaluate the additional risk that may be associated with implementation of certain types of
countermeasures within a strategy. This risk applies to the likelihood of new vulnerabilities
being introduced into the system, to include the possibility of incompatibility. It is assumed that
the level of this risk is contingent upon the maturity of the technology, which serves as a
constructed proxy for these types of risk.
4.3.3. Efficiency
The efficiency of an information system is dependent upon many factors (e.g. bandwidth,
throughput, processing capabilities, routing algorithms, and so forth). Currently, the quality of
service (QoS) that an information system provides is predominantly system-specific, based upon
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the architecture and operating system employed, and is dependent upon the workload at any
given time. Therefore, the degradation of QoS due to the addition of components
(countermeasures) may not be perceived consistently throughout the IS, if at all. For these
reasons, a categorical assessment of the impact that an IA Strategy may have upon information
system's QoS is offered.
4.3.4. Convenience
Convenience relates to the level of complexity involved in the human interfaces designed
into the information system of interest. The tradeoffs involved include buying more security at
the expense of preventing users from employing the IS and its information in an operationally
effective, or timely, manner. Attributes of a system that measure its convenience includes the
requirements a user must fulfill in order to gain authorized access, and the demands placed upon
the user to employ and benefit from the IS once access is gained. These are captured by
Requirements of User and Impact on Common Operating Environment, respectively.
Table 4-6 summarizes the measures used to evaluate IA strategies with respect to
Operational Capability considerations.
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Table 4-6: Measures Developed for Operational Capability Model
TITLE
Functionality
Impact on Essential
Capabilities
Impact on Desired
Capabilities
Interoperability
Upgrade Potential
Risk Factors

Efficiency
Quality of Service
Convenience
Requirements of
User

Impact on Common
Operating
Environment

LOWER
BOUND

MEASURE UNIT

MEASURE
TYPE

Net Change in
Essential Services
Net Change in
Desired Services

Quantity
(Linear)
Quantity
(Linear)

-3

3

-3

3

Component Source
Technology Type

Category
Category

One-of-a-kind
Never been
used

COTS
Previously used on
a similar system
with similar
configuration

Impact on Network
Performance

Category

Unacceptable
Performance

Improved
Performance

Time to Access
System

Time
(S-Curve)

0 (seconds)

Impact based upon
previous system

Category

Negative
Impact

Maximum
acceptable time
designated by
organization
Positive Impact
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UPPER BOUND

4.4. Consideration of the Cost of IA Strategies
"Technology that affects an adversary's information and information systems and
protects and defends friendly information and information systems will be pursued at every
opportunity to ensure the greatest return on investment." [JP 3-13,1998:1-5] This statement
emphasizes the fact that, in an environment of shrinking budgets, costs associated with
implementing an IA strategy must be considered. However, in addition to the acquisition costs,
implementation costs must also be taken into account. Figure 4-4 illustrates the cost hierarchy
addressed in this research.
Resource Costs
SL
Finite-Resource
Consumption

Fiscal Resources

Time to Effecti\eness
■(^Installation J^)
Personnel Training~~~^>
Human Resources

Total Hardware
Unacost
Total Software
Unacost

■<^~Workforce^)
(^WorkloalT^)

Figure 4-4: Resource Cost Hierarchy
For the purpose of this study, IA costs are grouped into two categories: Finite-Resource
Consumption and Fiscal Resources. Finite-Resource Consumption accounts for the tangible,
direct costs incurred in time and people that is required to implement an IA strategy. The Fiscal
Resources accounts for the dollar costs associated with acquiring an IA strategy.
It is important to note that for the evaluation of costs, low-cost alternatives provide more
value to the DM. Therefore, on a scale from 0 to 10, 0 is least preferred (high cost) and 10 is
most preferred (low or no cost). This methodology focuses primarily on the total costs in time,
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people, and money required to procure and implement an IA strategy. Opportunity costs (in
dollars), as well as any sunk costs of the legacy system, are not considered. Additionally,
salvage value of items being replaced is not directly addressed, but may be incorporated if the
appropriate accounting procedures are available. However, the salvage value of IT items is often
relatively low.
4.4.1. Finite Resource Consumption
Finite resource consumption captures the amount of time and people required to
implement an IA strategy.
Time to Effectiveness
The element of time is important due to the rapid evolution of technology, as well as the
threats against it, suggesting that an effective IA strategy is one that can be implemented quickly.
The time required in order for a particular countermeasure (CM) within an IA strategy to become
effective is a function of two things—how long it takes to install the CM, and how long it takes
the appropriate personnel to be trained in the CM. A CM that is easy to install and requires no
training for it to be effective incurs less "cost" in time than a CM that is difficult and time
consuming to install and also requires significant training time before it becomes operationally
effective. The longer a CM takes to implement, the longer the system remains vulnerable. It is
assumed that the DM prefers to minimize the time that the organization's information and
information system are exposed to vulnerabilities identified.
Human Resources
The personnel element is of importance due to the associated training, management, and
overhead costs; however, the real concern is that of technological expertise. High training costs
and turnover rates of personnel specializing in information technology and management may
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cause an organization to defer an IA strategy requiring more people. [10 Symposium, 1999]
The alternative to new workers is requiring overtime of existing personnel. Although, this
approach may potentially be cost effective, it is not without consequences and therefore must be
considered when evaluating IA strategies.
4.4.2. Fiscal Resources
Recognizing the dollar costs of IA strategies is a key concern, not only with the Defense
Department but also with the competitive commercial sector as well, it has been included in the
hierarchy. These fiscal costs were broken down into two categories (hardware and software) to
capture DM preferences for each type. Hardware Costs include the dollar costs associated with
initial procurement, operations and maintenance (O&M), and supporting training dollar costs
associated with hardware. Software Costs are considered in an identical manner to the Hardware
Costs.
The assumptions for this evaluation consideration include:
•

If salvage costs are known, they are included; otherwise, they are ignored;

•

It is assumed that funds are available, and will be procured from the appropriate
budget where applicable;

•

Any IA strategy under consideration is assumed to be within budgetary
constraints throughout its life span; and,

•

An alternative that exceeds the organization's budget will not be considered.

To account for potentially varying life spans of the components within an IA strategy, the
total discounted uniform annual costs (Unacost) are calculated. This provides a means to
facilitate equitable comparisons between the long-term monetary impacts of IA strategies.
Unlike using a net present value calculation, this method accounts for variations in useful life,
and puts "all systems (IA strategies) on a 1-year basis. Unacost converts any system lasting n
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years with a present value P„ to an equivalent 1-year cost as of the end of the year."
[Humphreys, 1983:35] If the DM does not require that the costs be broken down into hardware
and software, then all UNACOST values may be added together, while still considering only
those strategies that are within the organization's budgetary constraints. Table 4-7 summarizes
the measures developed for the Resource Costs considerations.

Table 4-7: Measures Developed for Resource Costs Model
MEASURE
TYPE
Finite Resource Consumption (Time to Effectiveness)
Days
Installation Time
Days required to install
(Linear)
all components within
the strategy
Days
Personnel Training Days required to
(Linear)
complete required
Time
training associated with
strategy.
Finite Resource Consumption (Human Resources)
Percentage
Workforce
Percentage change in
(Linear)
workforce required
Hours
Workload
Overtime hours (per
(Exponential)
week, per person)
Fiscal Resources
Dollars
Total Hardware
Uniform Annual Cost
(Linear)
UNACOST
TITLE

Total Software
UNACOST

MEASURE UNIT

Uniform Annual Cost

Dollars
(Linear)
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LOWER
BOUND

UPPER BOUND

0

365

0

365

0

100

0

20

0

Determined by
applicable budget
constraints
Determined by
applicable budget
constraints

0

4.5. Illustrative Example
Again, each of the measures and objectives are detailed in Appendix A. However, a
notional, illustrative example is offered, demonstrating how the set of models discussed to this
point may be used to support the decision-making process.
Risk Management
IA Strategy Evaluation
^/s^
Vulnerability Controls
Assessment

W
Operational Capability
Resource Costs

Value of
Information

Figure 4-5:1A Strategy Evaluation Process
Figure 4-5 shows the overall process required to implement this methodology. The initial
step is to identify system-specific vulnerabilities, and prioritize them by their level of risk,
ensuring that this 'risk level' accounts for the value of information that may be adversely
affected as a result of exploitation. This process typically identifies a set of controls (technical
and non-technical) proposed to mitigate these risks. The set identified may serve as the basis for
IA strategy development.
Using the triad of models, the organization must evaluate the levels of performance (for
each model) based upon current IA strategies that are already being implemented. This serves
two purposes. The first, it establishes a 'baseline' of demonstrated performance, which can be
compared to the estimated performance of potential alternatives. Second, this is, in itself, a
means to find weaknesses within the current IA strategy of an organization—possibly
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highlighting other areas that the risk assessment may have missed. Areas that score poorly are
potential candidates for improvement. New insight may be gained, offering the potential to find
new and potentially better controls to construct better IA strategies.
4.5.1. Achieving a Balanced IA Strategy
As seen in Table 4-8, three alternatives are offered: "Do Nothing" (which serves as a
baseline), Strategy 1, and Strategy 2. The scales, in this example, are from 0 to 10, signifying the
DM preference from least to most preferred respectively. Although the values for all alternatives
in the illustrative example were generated in a random fashion, the underlying intentions were to
demonstrate potential differences between alternatives, and the considerations (or tradeoffs) that
must be made during comparisons.
Table 4-8: Notional Results
Alternative
"Do Nothing" (Baseline)
Strategy 1
Strategy 2

IA
2.3
3.2
5.8

Operational Capability
6.5
7.2
5.0

Resource Costs
2.5
2.6
6.4

Through inspection of the table, both of the proposed strategies will yield some level of
improvement in the organization's information assurance. Strategy 1, however, will also provide
more operational capability at a slightly less resource cost (note that a score closer to 10 is
preferred) than what the organization is currently incurring. Strategy 2 provides a much larger
increase in information assurance compared to either Strategy 1 or the status quo, and requires
fewer resource costs. However, Strategy 2 will result in a decrease in operational capability,
compared to what is currently enjoyed by the organization. It should be noted that each
proposed strategy might actually be a 'basket' or portfolio of information assurance choices.
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The remainder of this section assumes that the status quo is an unacceptable option, for one
reason or another.
To gain further insight from the evaluation process, the extent to which each strategy
contributes to the decision-maker preferences can be analyzed. For example, Figure 4-6 shows
the portion of value from each strategy that is attributed to the three main objectives within the
IA value model. The 'Best Case' at the bottom of the chart shows the weights that would be
assigned to each of the objectives. In this example, these correspond to 0.5, 0.3, and 0.2 for
Protection (Information and IS), Detection, and Reaction, respectively.

Information Assurance
!■■■■
i

Strategy 1 (3.2)

-

I
I

Strategy 2 (5.8)
-

Best Case (10)

0

-M

I

I

2

1

4

6

8

10

Value
D Protection o Detection ■ Reaction

Figure 4-6:1A Results
Again, a similar approach may be taken for the other dimensions of this problem. Figure
4-7 shows which objectives each strategy meets (or more importantly, falls short of) the
decision-maker's fundamental objectives within the Operational Capability value model.
Operational Capability
Strategy 1 (7.2)
Strategy 2 (5.0)
Best Case (10)

-

I

>

1
0

. ?.■

i:. fMsswm
2

I

1—,

I -i: '-. m HH

4

1

6

8

10

Value
D Functionality D Interoperability B Efficiency ■ Convenience

Figure 4-7: Operational Capability Results
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Finally, the same type of graphical analysis is shown for the strategies with respect to the
Resource Costs value model, shown in Figure 4-8. An added benefit to this type of modeling, as
discussed in Chapter 2, is the capability to assess the sensitivity of the results to the underlying
assumptions, particularly the weights.

Resource Costs
i

n^H
i

Strategy 1 (2.6)
Strategy 2 (6.4)

i

Best Case (10)
0.0

^^^^^™
i

r

^^^^^^
!
1

1

1

2.0

4.0

6.0

8.0

10.0

Value
D Time to Effectiveness D Human Resources ■ Fiscal Resources

Figure 4-8: Resource Costs Results
According to the 'Best Case' data in Figure 4-8, the current weights are 0.25, 0.25 and
0.5 for the Time to Effectiveness, Human Resources and Fiscal Resources objectives,
respectively. Suppose that the DM noted that Strategy 2 was much more cost effective (Fiscal
Resources) than Strategy 1; however, evaluation of Strategy 2 revealed that it would take much
longer to implement (Time to Effectiveness). Unsure about the initial weight assigned to the
Time to Effectiveness objective, analysis of the sensitivity of the model results to this weight is
accomplished, and is shown in Figure 4-9.
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Sensitivity Analysis Example
10.00

v^nqiiicti vvciyni

8.00
o
3

""•■-..

^

Strategy 2 (6.4)

Preference
Change

6.00 - Strategy 1
4.00

(2.6)

'■I---^~—

2.00

--

0.00

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.75

1.00

Weight (Time to Effectiveness)
Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Figure 4-9: Sensitivity Analysis Results
At the point of the original weight for Time to Effectiveness (0.25), the values (and
subsequently the rank order) of the strategies are shown. However, as the weight for Time to
Effectiveness is extended beyond (approximately) 0.7, then the preference between the two
strategies changes. Note that this only considers changing one weight (within one model) at a
time, keeping the relative weighting of all other objectives constant.
Not only do these methods of analysis enable the decision maker to evaluate the tradeoffs
between and within IA strategies from a 'big picture' perspective, the results may be broken
down to provide information regarding the specific areas where a strategy did (or did not)
perform well and why. This further poses a potential for identifying new and improved ways to
attain the organization's objectives in each of the three areas.

4-25

Figure 4-10 shows a method to graphically compare the subsequent results for all three
models simultaneously.

Best
Case

10—I
8—

IA

6_l

Baseline Alternatives
Operational'
Capability

Resource Costs
=2 r~A-

Worst
Case
Strategy Evaluation
Figure 4-10: Notional Comparison
4.5.2. Summary
The formulation of this analytical framework not only facilitates the evaluation of IA
strategies, but the development of them as well. This is accomplished by focusing on what the
decision-maker values with respect to information assurance, operational capability, and the
limited resources available. This focus quantifies the value added for each component within a
strategy, providing a method to balancing the three in order to provide the most overall value to
the decision-maker.
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5. Findings and Conclusions

5.1. Overview
With the exception of the value of information model, no specific decision-maker
involvement was directly incorporated into the models described, due to a number of fiscal, time
and support constraints. Therefore, these models should be considered a starting point for future
analytical efforts to ensure that our country attains a desired level of Information Assurance at a
reasonable cost and continuing gains in functionality. In lieu of a detailed analysis of data,
Chapter 3 discussed the integration of the value of information into the risk assessment process, a
step that should help focus IA efforts. The outputs of this effort, a collection of countermeasures
prioritized by their assessed risk, will then lend themselves to evaluation with the triad of value
models created to address Information Assurance, Operational Capability, and Resource Cost
considerations.
In light of today's complex information systems, one can only imagine the future
applications of information technologies. The incorporation of these models and the value
focused thinking technique into the decision-making process for IA is anticipated to reap several
benefits.
5.2. Initial Objectives of the Study
A value hierarchy for Information Assurance, derived from the analysis of Joint- and
Service-Specific Doctrine was developed. In the process of this work, it was recognized that
there were two other major concerns of Joint decision-makers in addition to IA. This
necessitated the development of the Operational Capability and Resource Costs models. All
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models present an initial, deterministic, quantification of the values within this context, and are
derived from the decision-maker objectives as stated in doctrine.
Further refinement of IA strategy development was gained from the Value of Information
model, which incorporated preferences and values from the appropriate AFIT decision-makers
and information systems experts. With the exception of the Value ofInformation model, limited
feedback was received concerning the IA triad of models. This information was favorable, but
general in nature. One organization expressed concern over unintended human threats (i.e. an
accidental spill on a machine or deletion of a file) and noted that the hierarchy did not appear to
address this issue. Although it is recognized that unintentional threats should be considered, the
focus of these models was placed upon assuring information and information systems against
intentional threats. However, these points further emphasize the need for open communication
with decision-makers and technologists in IA-related fields to ensure the incorporation of all
appropriate values. Future integration and involvement of these individuals will fill the voids
that may exist due to the author's interpretations of doctrine that is intentionally general in
nature.
To evaluate alternative IA strategies, measures were developed to assess the level to
which these strategies meet (or do not meet) their objectives. This was accomplished mostly
through bottom-up analysis, focusing on how current alternatives (countermeasures) differ and
why.
The culmination of these efforts resulted in a fully functional decision support tool
(developed in Microsoft Excel ©) that enables the decision-makers and system experts to
implement the current value models. This tool is capable of accepting inputs for each evaluation
measure and the weighting criteria required, as well as providing a summary of results. Minor
5-2

modifications would allow sensitivity analyses and other presentation schema. Additionally, the
process required to incorporate new evaluation measures is semi-automated through the use of
Visual Basic © macros. All of these aspects facilitate the actual implementation of the described
methodology.
5.3. Recommendations for Future Research
First, the value models developed during this study must be reviewed with the
appropriate experts in the field. Experts originating from or designated by a sponsor
organization that also has an information system of interest is highly suggested. This
organization, and their information infrastructure, will serve as a test case to improve upon and
validate the proposed measures, and the models they constitute.
Within each of the models, particularly the Information Assurance model, several
objectives may conflict internally within the models, as well as externally between the triad, in
some specific settings. Therefore, the sensitivity of these models should be analyzed.
Additionally, through the pursuit of a mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive value
hierarchy, mutual preferential independence is assumed. However, this should be verified, once
the model has undergone further development and verification. [Reference Kirkwood,
1997:238-240] To aid in such further analysis, a series of prototype hierarchies are presented in
Appendix B.
The deterministic nature assumed for this modeling effort may not be entirely appropriate
for all circumstances. For example, some controls suggested to mitigate risks are not "100%"
solutions. The rapid evolution of not only technology, but the threats against them, also lends
the information technology environment to potential uncertainties. The eventual incorporation of
utility may prove useful for future decision-makers implementing this model, enabling the
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evaluation of alternatives "in decisions where there is uncertainty about the specific consequence
that will result from selecting a particular alternative." [Kirkwood, 1997:245]
Another potential avenue for analytical efforts involves the application of mathematical
programming techniques—linear or goal programming, in particular. This assumes that an
optimal IA strategy is sought, requiring the maximization of the levels of IA and operational
capability while adhering to any applicable resource constraints. One means of approaching this
may be accomplished by identifying potential components (technical and non-technical) that
comprise the IA strategy alternatives. Once these components are identified, the incremental
changes that occur in each of the IA 'triad of models' may be determined, serving as the
coefficients within the chosen mathematical model. In order to maintain linearity, interactions
between components must either be assumed nonexistent or be grouped to include the entire set.
This set is evaluated as either being completely incorporated into the strategy or completely
disregarded. Depending upon the possible number of components, this assumption may be
ignored in exchange for a potentially very large problem. Existent formulations of multidimensional knapsack problems with multiple-choice constraints and capital budgeting problems
may provide promising avenues in such an endeavor. [See Murty, 1995:301-305]
It is also important to note that the focus of this research was taken from an
organizational perspective. As mentioned in the very first chapter, the connectivity of today's
organizations, and their reliance upon each other (particularly within the realm of our Nation's
information infrastructures), will eventually require a broader scope. This may be accomplished
by either: (1) evaluating systems of systems (an inter-organizational perspective); or, (2) by
building upon current policy, facilitating the creation of a common mental model of the elements
that are important to everyone concerning Information Assurance.
5-4

Despite the level of the perspective, the values considered in the IA problem should
remain constant. However, the level of perspective may change the underlying motivations (and
therefore the values) concerning the benefits received from a strategy, compared to its impact on
capabilities and its cost. A strategy that is regarded as least preferred from an individual
organization's viewpoint may be the only acceptable alternative from a National perspective.
Fortunately, this is where the strengths of VFT and the set of models will provide common
ground to communicate and eliminate weaknesses in our Nation's Information Assurance
posture. Nonetheless, this potential area of concern should be considered in future studies.
5.4. Conclusion
There is still much work to be done in this area; the need for Information Assurance will
persist as long as information technologies are relied upon. The focus on decision-makers'
values will lead to the development of alternatives that have a better chance of fulfilling their IA
objectives. Through the proposed set of models, modeling Information Assurance provides a
means to accomplish this goal, and a foundation to build upon—offering insight into the difficult
and complex problem of Information Assurance.
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Appendix A - Value Model Development
Overview
This appendix details the model development using the values and preferences regarding
Information Assurance (IA) as derived from Joint- and Service-specific Doctrine, as well as
some limited interaction with domain experts. The primary purpose of the IA hierarchy is to
evaluate the effectiveness of strategies to enhance the level of information assurance offered to
the organization, by assuring its information systems (IS), and the information it handles. These
strategies are composed of any number of countermeasures (legacy or proposed), which may
consist of technical (hardware, software, and firmware) and non-technical (policies and
procedures) means to achieve a desired or improved level of IA. This model incorporates the
preferences of the primary decision-maker and stakeholders' interests concerning IA, essentially
measuring the costs and benefits due to the strategies implemented.
This methodology assumes the following tasks have been accomplished:
•
•
•

A vulnerability assessment has been accomplished and results are available;
Risks have been prioritized based upon their impact and likelihood;
Countermeasures have been proposed to mitigate the risks identified.

To complement the IA value model, a method to evaluate the "costs," with respect to the
resource and operational impacts, of implementing such strategies is also developed. This
yielded two additional models—Operational Capability and Resource Costs—that account for
the direct and indirect costs or disadvantages resulting from the implementation of any one or a
combination of countermeasures. These models were derived from interviews with SC
personnel at AFIT, high-level conferences discussing future IA requirements and open literature
on network and information technologies. [Maynard, 2000; 10 Symposium, 1999]
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The three hierarchies—IA (Figure A- 2), Operational Capability (Figure A- 3), and
Resource Costs (Figure A- 4)—are then used to perform a tradeoff-analysis, aiding in
determining the strategy that yields the most improvement in IA, the most functionality, at the
least cost. The IA hierarchy is used to determine the marginal level of improvement in the
assurance of a system, whereas the "cost" hierarchies evaluate the total costs incurred by the IA
strategy. The preferred strategy is then determined by evaluating each alternative in the threedimensional context shown in Figure A-1.
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Figure A-1: Implementation of the Models
Due to time and fiscal constraints, the ranges and values specified within the evaluation
functions are notional, and have not been elicited by a decision-maker. The underlying rationale
for the shapes, however, is discussed when appropriate to highlight the assumptions made about
returns to scale for each measure.
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Each of the models is illustrated below for the purpose of familiarizing the reader. A
detailed description of the analysis that yielded theses models follows.

Figure A- 2: IA Value Model
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Figure A- 3: Operational Capability Value Model

| Resource Costs |

Figure A- 4: Resource Costs Value Model
Scope of Study
Depending upon the perspective, the scope of computer network attack (CNA) varies.
From a computer security perspective, an attack may be defined as "intentional [acts] of
attempting to bypass one or more of the following security controls of an IS: non-repudiation,
authentication, integrity, availability, or confidentiality." [NSTISSI4009,1999:3] From a Joint
perspective, CNA is defined as "operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information
resident in computers and computer networks, or the computer and networks themselves." [JP 102, 1999:95] Note that the Joint perspective of CNA includes means beyond simply defeating
security controls (e.g. Counterinformation or munitions employment). For the purposes of this
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thesis, and the subsequent hierarchies, the scope is limited to the evaluation of attempts
(successful and unsuccessful) to intentionally bypass any security controls managed by the
organization of interest.1 Assuring information against the other means alluded to in the Joint
definition of CNA, such as Counterinformation Operations and physical destruction of
information systems, are considered beyond the scope of this thesis.
In addition to limiting the types of attacks considered, the types of responses have also
been bounded. In particular, offensive aspects of IA such as information operations (10) taken
against an adversary are not addressed (e.g. a retaliatory computer network attack against the
source of adversary attacks). On going issues such as legal ramifications, jurisdictional
dilemmas, technical complexities, and potentially classified national capabilities necessitate this
assumption. Actions that facilitate the termination of an attack, the collection of evidence for
legal action, and the restoration of the information and the information systems are included in
this study. It is important to note, however, that Joint Doctrine suggests a strong relationship
between offensive and defensive 10, which suggests that future studies may profit from
including offensive capabilities within an IA strategy to be evaluated.
Information Assurance Value Hierarchy
The IA value hierarchy shown in Figure A- 5 illustrates the areas valued with respect to
I A. The main objectives of information assurance are denoted in the top tier, and are
decomposed further until measures can be derived.

1

The potential for scalability to larger, more complex systems (e.g. the DII) is discussed in Chapter 5.
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Figure A- 5: Value Hierarchy for Information Assurance
Revisiting the definition of IA,
IA incorporates Information Operations that"... protect and defend
information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity,
identification and authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. This
includes providing for restoration of information systems by incorporating
protection, detection, and reaction capabilities." [JP 3-13,1998:111-1]
The stated objectives of IA are to 'protect and defend information and information
systems.' Defense, however, implies that (1) forces must be aware of an impending or ongoing
attack [detect], and (2) forces have the capability to retaliate in some manner against the threat
[react]. From this, the three main values (objectives) that support IA include Information and
Information System (IS) Protection, Detection, and Reaction capabilities. Each of these
contributes value to the decision-maker by assuring the intended information and information
functions required for Information Superiority—"the degree of dominance in the information
domain which permits the conduct of operations without effective opposition"—or simply dayto-day operations. [JCSIA, 1999:F-12]
It may be argued that taking active measures to detect and react to attacks (thus
mitigating their impact) also support the protection role. In order to clarify these values, and
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ensure mutual exclusivity in the value hierarchy, the following definitions used in this analysis
are provided in Table A- 1.
Table A-1: IA Objective Definitions
IA Objective Definitions
Information and IS Protection: includes those measures taken to afford protection to
information and IS, and ensure their availability, confidentiality, and integrity.
Detection: includes measures taken to provide detection of impending or ongoing attacks against
an information system or the residing information.
Reaction: includes the measures taken to (1) appropriately respond to an identified attack and (2)
restore the information and IS capabilities to an acceptable state, their original state, or an
improved state. [Modified from the definition of IA in JP 3-13]
These specific definitions facilitate an independent assessment of each of the IA values,
which are discussed further in the following sections.
Information and IS Protection
In the context of Defensive Information Operations (DIO), a subset of Information
Assurance, the major objective of Joint Force Commanders is to "provide timely, accurate, and
relevant information access while denying adversaries the opportunity to exploit friendly
information and information systems for their own purposes." [JP3-13,1998:1-10] Although JP
3-13 states that IA includes and extends beyond the realm of DIO, this definition essentially
provides the characteristics of information and IS that make these items of value to the decisionmakers: Availability (from timely and relevant,), Confidentiality (from denying exploitation), and
Integrity (from accurate^. In order to take full advantage of the force multiplying effects of
information technologies necessary to achieve information superiority (and possibly avoid total
calamity), these characteristics of information and information systems must be protected.
Historically, the means of protection have developed into security disciplines such as computer
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security (COMPUSEC), information security, emissions security (EMSEC), communications
security (COMSEC), and physical security. [AFI 33-202, 1999:3]
Threats to information assurance, and these key characteristics, may be defined as "any
circumstance or event with the potential to harm an information system (IS) [or the information
within] through unauthorized access, destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial
of service." [NSTISSI4009,1999:45] Note that the threats seek to adversely affect the
availability (through destruction and denial of service), the confidentiality (through unauthorized
access and disclosure), and the integrity (through modification). The motivation, regardless of
means, involves the reduction of the information and IS value to the DM. Therefore, measures
protecting these characteristics provide value to the decision-maker.
One other value that may be incorporated into information and IS protection are Defensein-Depth. Joint Publication 1-02 defines defense-in-depth as "the siting of mutually supporting
defense positions designed to absorb and progressively weaken attack, prevent initial
observations of the whole position by the enemy, and to allow the commander to maneuver his
reserve." [1999:125] This area evaluates the virtual and physical hardness of a system, either of
which may contribute to protecting one or all of the values Availability, Confidentiality, and
Integrity.
An additional value may be termed as Compliance, which evaluates the decision-maker's
desire to minimize the potential exposure of an information system and its information system to
known vulnerabilities. Learning from other's misfortunes is much better than experiencing a
similar attack firsthand. Measures that permit the evaluation of this objective account for the
efficiency (or lack thereof) by which known vulnerabilities, applicable to the system of interest,
are reduced or eliminated altogether.
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To safeguard that this analysis does not stray too far from doctrine, the other key
elements within the definition of IA (specifically Identification, Authentication and Nonrepudiation) are viewed as processes that support the confidentiality and properly focused
response objectives respectively. This is supported by the documented definitions shown in
Table A- 2.
Table A- 2: Other Elements of IA
Other Key Elements of IA
Identification: The process an information system uses to recognize an entity.
[AFMAN 33-223, 1998:131
Authentication: A means of identifying individuals and verifying their eligibility to receive
specific categories of information. [JP 1-02, 1999:46]
Non-repudiation: Assurance the sender of data is provided with proof of delivery and the
recipient is provided with proof of the sender's identity, so neither can later deny having
processed the data. |"NSTISSI 4009, 1999:32]
Information & IS Protection: Defense in Depth
Information & IS Protection

Increasing the defense in depth protects
information and information systems by affording the
commander more time for attack detection and reaction.
It may be argued that assessments of the virtual (i.e.

■I Compliance
\ Availability

cyberspace) and physical hardness of systems should be

] Confidentiality
J Integrity

accomplished for each of the availability,

confidentiality and integrity areas. However, Joint doctrine identifies "defense in depth" as a
valuable attribute to information systems concerning risk management as a whole, suggesting
incorporation into the model as a separate value. Maximizing the defense in depth
commensurate with the value of the elements protected is the objective. Two measures to assess
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Defense in Depth are Time to Penetrate Essential Elements and Physical Security, which
evaluate the cyber and physical hardness of the information system respectively.
Time to Penetrate Essential Elements

[informations is Protection!

This measure serves as a proxy for the virtual
hardness of the system. Essential elements are
Physical Security"^)

defined as either information or information services
\ Compliance

(functions) whereby a loss of availability, a breach of
confidentiality, or a breach of integrity would entirely

—[Availability]
—| Confidentiality |
| Integrity

prevent or seriously degrade the organization's ability to perform its mission. Obviously, these
elements are organization and system specific. To implement this measure, an essential element
must first be identified. Second, risk assessment information should be utilized to determine
what type of attack, and the time required to carry it out, may be brought against the element.
Third, the time required protecting the essential element and returning it to its intended state
must be ascertained. This time, denoted as a defense cycle, is measured from initial detection,
and must include any process, mechanical and other reaction times necessary. Dividing the time
required for a successful attack by the time for a single defense cycle scores the defense in depth.
As a notional example, suppose that an intruder was detected, but five seconds thereafter
was able to peruse and modify classified databases because no other security controls were in
place (or effective) beyond that point. In order to stop the attack, the system administrator had to
log in (10 seconds), initiate the process to deny the intruder further access (30 seconds), and then
re-boot the system in order to restore the system to its original state to protect the system from a
ongoing attack (120 seconds)—a defense cycle of 160 seconds. Clearly, the time to execute a
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successful attack (5 seconds) is much faster than the time required to remedy the situation (160
seconds); a score of 5/160 (or 0.03) and an undesirable situation.
Time to Penetrate Essential Elements
10 i
__
*
•

1

2

3

Defense Cycles

Figure A- 6: Value Function (VF) for Time to Penetrate Essential Elements
Enumeration of this function may be required to allow evaluation of multiple essential
elements with either multiple levels of threat capability (or one worst case) against them. For
example, if there were two essential elements of interest, and the organization wanted to evaluate
the capability to protect against an amateur and a professional hacker, four evaluation measures
would be developed. The weighting allocated to these four measures would then serve as a
proxy for the probability of each of these scenarios occurring.
Physical Security

Information & IS Protection

Physical Security measures the effective
level of security afforded to network components of
Physical Security~^>

an IS. Physical security prevents unauthorized
access to and tampering with IS components, which

{Compliance
{Availability

could result in a loss of availability, a breach of

{Confidentiality I
{integrityl

confidentiality, or a breach of integrity of

information and IS functions to authorized users. The scope of physical control goes beyond IS
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component accessibility. The processes that have a potential to expose information must also be
protected (e.g. copiers, faxes, and computer screens). Similar to Doyle's offensive methodology,
this measure evaluates the ease of defeating the physical hardness—"the ability of [a] weapon to
penetrate or couple with [the information system]"—of the IS of interest. [1998:D-26]
Assessments are limited to the physical assets that are within the span of control of the
organization. This still leaves other physical points of access beyond the organization's control
(e.g. transmission lines) vulnerable to physical attack. However, prior arrangements and
cooperation with organizations that controls these supporting (or connecting) infrastructures may
defend against them against physical attacks.
Typical actions taken vary from system to system and range from "nothing" to various
physical-access controls (locks, combination doors, and perimeter security systems) and enforced
manning policies (e.g. two-person integrity). [Doyle, 1998:D-26] Although these actions have
varying strengths, their weaknesses lie primarily in the amount of time and rigor that is spent
enforcing them. For example, if IS components are protected by a locked door and observed by
authorized personnel during the day, but housekeeping has unlimited access during non-business
hours, there exists a potential for unauthorized tampering that would result in a loss of
availability.
With this in mind, there are several factors that must be considered in this "weakest link"
approach: the perceived strength of the physical controls in place (or recommended), the amount
of time in which they are enforced, and the level in which they are enforced through personnel
awareness and automation. For the first consideration, it is assumed that the strength of the
physical controls has been selected appropriately, commensurate with the value of information
they are protecting. For the third consideration, it is assumed that personnel awareness
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contributes to the timely detection of attempts to bypass physical security controls and is
therefore evaluated in the Detection portion of the model. The second consideration—the
amount of time in which the physical controls are enforced—is the one that can be measured and
is directly related to the protection offered to information and information systems.
For each layer of physical protection, the probability of failure (Pfaji) to prevent
unauthorized physical access is dependent upon the type of physical control. If the physical
control is not an electronic means that provides protection on a 24-hour, 7-day a week basis, then
the time that authorized personnel enforce the controls is measured. This is based on the
percentage of the number of hours in a week (i.e. 7x24=168) when personnel are present. For
the lock and key example, if personnel authorized access to the IS work normal business hours
during workdays, the Pfaii equals 1 - (5x8)/168 = 1 - 0.238 = 76.2%. This method evaluates the
potential opportunity an adversary may have to adversely affect the availability of information
and IS to authorized users through physical manipulation of the IS itself. If the physical control
is automated, providing continuous protection, then the Pfan is denoted by the demonstrated
system reliability. Sample calculations are shown in Table A-3.
To account for layered defenses, the overall Pfan is determined by estimating the
probability of failure for each layer, and multiplying the probabilities together. For example, in
order for a physical attack against availability to be successful, all security measures must be
defeated. The probability of this occurring is the product of each layer's Pfaii- In reality, the
probability of failure of inner-layers must assume that an outer-layer has been defeated—
suggesting that conditional probabilities would be more correct. However, the assumption of
independence offers a conservative estimate of the overall Pfaji.
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Table A- 3: Sample Pfau Calculations
Scenario
BH-WD:
BH-AW:
HD-AW:
AD-AW:

Pftfi

Business Hours-Week Days (8x5/168)=23.8%
Business Hours-All Week (8x7/168)=33.3%
Half-Day (Extended Hours)-All Week (12x7/168)=50%
All Day-All Week (24x7/168)=100%

1
1
1
1

- .238 = 0.762
- .333 = 0.666
- .5 = 0.5
- System Reliability
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Figure A- 7: VF for Physical Security
Information & IS Protection: Compliance

Information & IS Protection

Longstaff, et. al. noted that

\ Defense in Depth

J Compliance
"... in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
Patches Installed
the typical intrusion was fairly
straightforward. Intruders most often
Latency-Implementation
exploited relatively simple weaknesses, such
Latency-Assessment
as poor passwords and misconfigured systems,
\ Availability
which allowed greater access to the system
than was intended. Once on a system, the
-| Confidentiality |
intruders exploited one or another well-I Integrity I
known, but usually unfixed, vulnerability to
gain privileged access, enabling them to use the system as they wished."
[Longstaff, et. al, 1997]

In an effort to impede the increasing trend of vulnerability exploitation, various computer
emergency response teams (CERTs) have been instituted. The intent of these organizations is to
disseminate information regarding vulnerabilities (and their potential impact) as well as the
means to negate them if possible. If this information is applicable to the system of interest and
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not implemented, then the system remains vulnerable. Unfortunately, a higher level of risk may
be accepted, intentionally or unintentionally, in lieu of spending the time, effort and money
involved to eliminate or reduce an identified vulnerability. Therefore, Compliance assesses the
capability of the processes in place (or recommended) to accelerate the remediation of known
vulnerabilities. These processes, automated or manual, are dependent upon an array of internal
and external factors. Internal factors may include the level of staffing available to implement
related efforts, while external factors might include how often (if at all) organizations with
similar systems provide information on exploited vulnerabilities. Overall, the level of
Compliance process provides value to the decision-maker by directly protecting information and
IS and by capitalizing upon the lessons learned by other.
The overall objective is to maximize compliance, which helps to maximize vulnerability
reduction through complying in three measures: Patches Installed; Latency-Implementation; and,
Latency-Assessment.
Patches Installed

I Information & IS Protection!

This evaluation measure determines the extent
to which any applicable known system vulnerabilities

J Defense in Depth
\ Compliance
Patches Installed

have been reduced or eliminated. Patches, in this

Latency-Implementation

case, primarily includes software installations,

Latency-Assessment
-I Availability I

software modifications, and software settings

J Confidentiality

recommended by vendors, CERTs and other agencies

\ Integrity

in order to prevent the exploitation of known vulnerabilities. Note that these patches may protect
the availability, confidentiality, integrity or all of these aspects of the information and IS. To
implement this measure, the system is scored by assessing the percentage of patches
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implemented that are applicable to the system of interest. Table A- 4 shows the magnitude to
which these types of vulnerabilities are growing. Obviously, not all of these vulnerabilities may
be applicable to the system of interest, but the lack of an efficient process to eliminate or reduce
the ones that are may be a costly mistake.
Table A- 4: Vulnerabilities Reported [CERT, 2000]
Year
1995
1996 1997
1998
1999 Total
Vulnerabilities
171
345
311
262
419
1508
Source: CERT/CC Statistics www.cert.org/stats/cert_stats.html]
It is initially assumed that the implementation of each patch contributes an equivalent
amount of value, suggesting a straight line for the evaluation function. Future studies, however,
given a system's list of known vulnerabilities are prioritized by the level of risk, may change this
evaluation measure to the percent of risk mitigated by patches installed.
Patches Installed
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% Applicable Patches Implemented

Figure A- 8: VF for Patches Installed
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Latency-Implementation
Information & IS Protection

This evaluation measure denotes the age of the
\ Defense in Depth

oldest known vulnerability (applicable to the system) that

| Compliance
Patches Installed

has not yet been implemented. This assumes that a

Latency-Implementation

countermeasure exists and is available to the organization.

Latency-Assessment
—| Availability]

This measure evaluates how well the system is being

—| Confidentiality]

maintained in the sense that the longer an IS remains open

—| Integrity |

to attack, the longer an unneeded risk prevails. Processes supporting the expeditious
implementation of countermeasures of known vulnerabilities are preferred. From Figure A- 9,
the timeliness (or lack thereof) of these processes will either reduce or extend the time the
information and information systems are vulnerable, thus shrinking or expanding the 'length' of
the figure.

Vulnerability to attack:
HIGH
MODERATE

t
Attack first
developed
and used by
a few
crackers

t
Exploit
script
becomes
widely
distributed

t

t

Exploit is
Patches
noticed by
known
systems
by some
administrators

\

LOW

t
CERT issues
advisory;
patches
widely
released

t
Some
systems
are never
patched

Figure A- 9: Vulnerability over Time [Kendall, 1999:27]
Implementation of this measure is accomplished by reviewing the list of all identified
vulnerabilities that have not yet been implemented. Of these vulnerabilities, the time elapsed
since each was first discovered is assessed. A shorter duration implies that the processes are in
place and are being effectively executed in order to reduce known vulnerabilities. Longer
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duration implies that either internal or external processes are inefficient in implementation or
reporting respectively, and must be addressed. It is assumed that a system with vulnerabilities
older than 6 months have processes of little value to decision-makers that must be reviewed and
improved.

Latency in Implementation
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Maximum Vulnerability Age (Months)

Figure A-10: VF for Latency-Implementation
Latency-Assessment
Information & IS Protection

The final measure proposed to evaluate the level of
\ Defense in Depth

Compliance is Latency-Assessment. This addresses the

\ Compliance
Patches Installed

overall state of vulnerability of an organization and its

Latency-Implementation

information and IS. For Air Force systems, current

Latency-Assessment/]^
\ Availability

regulations mandate a formal evaluation be accomplished
every three years. [AFSSI 5024, Vol.1,1997:7] However,

\ Confidentiality
\ Integrity |

the rapid growth of technology offering new and improved capabilities also brings new
vulnerabilities. Therefore, any process to more frequently update the 'list' of patches applicable
to the system, "continuously identifying and analyzing threats and vulnerabilities to the
information system and its information to maintain an appropriate level of protection" provides
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value to the decision-maker. [AFI33-202,1999:6] There are varieties of means to accomplish
this task. A report from the Information Assurance Technology Analysis Center (IATAC)
discusses a variety of tools used to facilitate these processes; a summary is shown in Table A- 5.
Table A- 5: Vulnerability Analysis Tools
Description and Types of Vulnerability Tools
Simple Vulnerability Identification and Analysis
These tools provide limited capability, performing configuration checks and automating
scanning and response functions.
Comprehensive Vulnerability Identification and Analysis
These tools provide more sophisticated and comprehensive "in terms of the scope of
vulnerabilities addressed, the degree of analysis performed, and the extent of recommendations
made to mitigate potential security risks." flATAC, 1998a:4]
War Dialers
This tool dials a range of telephone numbers in search of a modem that provides a login prompt
in order to find potential "back doors" to the system.
Password Crackers
These tools support enforcement of password selection policies.
Risk Analysis Tools
These tools "provide a framework for conducting a risk analysis, but do not actually automate
the vulnerability identification process." flATAC, 1998a:4]
Source: IATAC. IA Tools Report: Vulnerability Analysis. Spring 1998
The resulting value function is shown in Figure A- 11.
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Figure A-11: VF for Latency-Assessment
It is assumed that waiting to identify new vulnerabilities until the 3-year point provides
little or no value to the decision maker, particularly the designated accreditation authority
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(DAA), who assumes the risk associated with the operation of an information system. Frequent
assessments of system vulnerability, internal or external, and regardless of the means, will
provide more value to the DAA by affording the opportunity to reduce or eliminate new
vulnerabilities.
Information & IS Protection: Availability
The requirement for availability applies to both the

Information & IS Protection

information and information systems. For example, a threat

J Defense in Depth
\ Compliance

may destroy information while leaving the information system
intact, deny the use of the information system to authorized
users, or destroy information that renders the information
system useless. Actions to ensure access to information and
J Integrity

information systems must protect against these types of attacks. Means to ensure availability
include building extra capacity and/or capability, maintaining the system configuration to
preclude successful exploitations of known vulnerabilities, as well as physically securing
network components to avoid unauthorized tampering or destruction.
Protection of information and information system availability is of considerable concern.
Denial of service (DoS) attacks are becoming increasingly prevalent, and can be devastatingly
costly, particularly to entities such as Internet Service Providers (ISP) or military organizations
during time of conflict or heightened operational tempo. These costs may include financial
losses, lack of confidence, distrust, and most critically, loss of life. The CERT has observed a
variety of forms of attack against an array of services. These attacks fall into three basic types:
Consumption of scarce, limited, or non-renewable resources; destruction or alteration of
configuration information; and, physical destruction or alteration of network components.
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[CERT/CC, 1999] CERT also notes "physical security is a prime component in guarding against
many types of attacks in addition to denial of service." [CERT/CC, 1999]
This section discusses the first area, identifying the value of Availability through System
Resiliency and its contribution to protecting the availability from not only intentional threats, but
natural threats as well. The other areas dealing with physical security and system configuration
are already measured under Defense-in-Depth and Compliance discussed earlier.
The goal of protecting availability is to ensure that authorized users have operationally
effective access to information when required. As stated earlier, this objective assesses the
reliability built into (or added onto) the system. Reliability, formally defined as "the probability
that it will survive fully functional throughout a particular time span," denotes the overall
reliability of the information system. [Lapin, 1990:690] System reliability provides a direct
measure of the availability of the IS to authorized users. IA strategy implementation may
improve or degrade the overall IS reliability due to the addition or deletion of components or the
introduction of cutting-edge, yet immature, technologies. This assessment of the system
resiliency will serve as a proxy for the protection of Availability, which characterizes the
potential for ongoing use of the system, regardless of threat activities, through protection against
the "consumption of scarce resources" while indirectly protecting against "the physical
destruction or alteration" of network components. The evaluation measures are Essential Service
Uptime (UT), System UT, and Information Redundancy.
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Essential Service UT
This measure assesses the percent of time that
essential services are available to authorized users, under
normal conditions. Essential services are specific to each
organization and their mission. Normal conditions imply
that the system is being used in the manner for which it
was designed.

—| Integrity |

Essential Service Uptime

90

95

100
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Figure A-12: VF for Essential Service Uptime
System UT

Information & IS Protection

This measure assesses the percent of time that the
system and all its services are available to authorized users

Defense in Depth
—| Compliance]
—| Availability"

under normal conditions. Normal conditions imply that the
system is being used in the manner for which it was
—[Confidentiality]

designed.

—| Integrity |
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Overall System Uptime
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Figure A-13: VF for System Uptime
Information Redundancy

Information & IS Protection

Redundancy may be seen in the information itself
and throughout the IS. Redundancy complements

\ Defense in Depth
—| Compliance!

reliability, however it is a distinctly separate concept in
that either it exists or it does not. With respect to
information availability, information redundancy

—| confidentiality]
—| Integrity |

strengthens 'fault tolerance,' which "protects [the availability of information] by storing [it] on
several devices in different locations. This helps ensure users will be able to access important
information even if one storage device fails." [Whitehead, 1997:176] Methods of dispersing and
storing information vary, as does the subsequent level of protection. Information redundancy
also ensures that alternative locations of information are available to authorized users, in the
event that either information is destroyed or access is eliminated or severely degraded by a
threat. The number of locations of information sources will serve as the measure for information
redundancy. This measure assumes that each source is independent from and identical to all
others, within operationally acceptable limits. Such limits are dependent upon system-specific
characteristics and the criticality of the information involved. The potential range of the number
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of data sources, currently one to four, may change from system to system, depending upon its
intended use. For example, highly classified information may limit the number of backups due
to the increased opportunity for unauthorized disclosure. It is assumed that more than four
sources are neither cost nor operationally effective.
Information Redundancy
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Figure A- 14: VF for Information Redundancy
Information & IS Protection: Confidentiality

J Information & IS Protection

Confidentiality is defined as "assurance that

\ Defense in Depth
■] Compliance!

information is not disclosed to unauthorized persons,

-j Availability]
J Confidentiality

processes, or devices." [NSTISSI4009, 1999:12]

Filter Technology
Authentication Strength

Maintaining confidentiality of information and information

Supporting Policy

systems provides value to decision makers by preventing

Encryption Strength
\ Integrity

certain types of information from being used against their own
forces or by preventing the disclosure of high-value information sources.
In the context of this document, unauthorized disclosure, regardless of whom it is
disclosed to, can occur in one of two ways: through vulnerabilities or weaknesses in the
electronic connectivity or operation of information systems, or through vulnerabilities or
weaknesses in the physical access to the information system itself. Categorizing these areas as
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Virtual and physical respectively, the objectives will be to maintain control of any associated
vulnerability within either of these two areas. Security disciplines like Emissions Security
(EMSEC), Communications Security (COMSEC), Computer Security (COMPUSEC) and
physical security are examples of current practices that contribute to the level of control
maintained over these domains. [AFI 33-202,1999:3] This area focuses on preventing a breach
of confidentiality via exploitations of virtual means. Maintaining confidentiality of information
and information systems through physical means is accounted for in the Physical Security
measure of Defense in Depth discussed earlier. It is also important to note that while some
means of protecting confidentiality may contribute to the Defense in Depth of a system, it is the
overall combination of technologies and procedures that provide protection through depth. The
following evaluation measures focus specifically on protecting the confidentiality of the IS and
the information within.
Protective actions must account for system-specific vulnerabilities as well as inter-system
vulnerabilities. System-specific protection measures prevent unauthorized disclosure in two
ways: (1) by preventing individuals that have no level of authorization (outsiders) access to the
system and its information, and (2) by preventing individuals that have some level of
authorization (insiders) access to information that is beyond their intended privileges. Examples
include a number of access-control devices, various means of identification and authentication
(I&A), and vulnerability assessments to identify (and remedy) potentially damaging weaknesses
in system configuration. Inter-system protection prevents unauthorized disclosure by protecting
information in-transit, either by cable or wireless methods. Examples include encryption and
virtual private networking. The I&A process also supports inter-system protection by
establishing 'trusted' relationships between the authorized users on different systems.
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This leads to four evaluation measures that assess the level that confidentiality is
protected: Filter Technology, Authentication Strength, Supporting Policy and Encryption
Strength.
Filter Technology

J Information & IS Protection

To protect the confidentiality of a system and its
information, the typical first line of protection is some

Defense in Depth
| Compliance
Availability

method of access control. These controls comprise "a

\ Confidentiality
Filter Technology""^

component or set of components that restricts access

Authentication Strength

between an protected network and an unprotected network,

Supporting Policy

or between other sets of networks and facilitates authorized

Encryption Strength

access to protect network resources through proxies, filters,

-| Integrity |

and other mechanisms," [IATAC, 1998:1]. As far as protecting confidentiality, the
effectiveness of these systems is dependent upon the mechanism type and its configuration, as
well as the origin of the threat. The primary purpose of these controls is to prevent outsiders
from obtaining access to information and IS services. Unless these mechanisms are implemented
to specifically differentiate among users that have some level of authorization, they cannot
protect a system from an 'insider threat.'
The IATAC categorizes the filtering technologies used to build firewalls into three types,
in order of security provided: packet filtering, circuit-level gateways, and application-level
gateways. These techniques differ primarily in the level of "access control granularity"
provided, their cost and their capabilities. Currently, combinations of these techniques are being
used to improve protection capabilities—referred to as 'hybrid' systems. [IATAC, 1998:2] As
with any other network component, updates and identified vulnerabilities must be maintained,
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which are accounted for in the Compliance objective discussed earlier. Considering the
multitude of factors involved, the type of filter technology is used as a proxy for the protection
afforded to the confidentiality of the IS and its information.
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Figure A-15: VF for Filter Technology
Other factors to consider include layering of defenses, as well as the location of
information requiring confidentiality with respect to these defenses. As discussed earlier, these
issues should be accounted for in the Defense in Depth assessment. Note that a conservative
'weakest link approach' may also be used if there are multiple access points into the IS/network.
If a layered approach is taken, a probabilistic assessment of all layers failing to maintain
confidentiality may be used, as shown in the evaluation of Physical Security discussed earlier.
Authentication Strength
J Information & IS Protection

Identification is "the process where individuals identify

■| Defense in Depth |
-| Compliance]

themselves to a system as a valid user." Authentication is "the

-| Availability]
-I Confidentiality I

procedure where the system verifies the user has a right to access

Filter Technology

the system." [AFMAN 33-223,1998:2]

Authentication Strength

Currently, I&A methods can be grouped into the four
Encryption Strength

general categories described in Table A- 6. The methods are listed
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i

[integrity]

in the order of their perceived strength, or the difficulty associated with fraudulently imitating an
authorized user's identity.
Table A- 6: I&A Methods
Identification and Authentication Methods [AFMAN 33-223,101
Knowledge-Based Requires the user to provide a pre-established piece of information in order to gain
access. The authentication succeeds if the information provided by the user matches
what the system expects. This method assumes that the user is the only one who
knows what is expected, thereby identifying the individual.
Possession-Based
Requires the user to produce a physical token that the system can recognize as
belonging to a legitimate user. These tokens typically contain physical, magnetic,
or electrically coded information recognizable to the host system, thereby requiring
a threat to counterfeit or steal a valid token to gain access.
Biometrics-Based
Rely upon a unique physical characteristic to verify the identity of a user. Common
identifiers include fingerprints, voice patterns, retinal scans, and hand geometry.
This method often requires expensive hardware, but offers a very high level of
security.
Combination
Combinations of I&A techniques make it much more difficult for the perpetrator to
obtain the necessary items for access. Automated teller machines have the most
widespread use of this technique, combining the possession- and knowledge-based
methods.

Cost-efficiency and ease of implementation have led to the "user-ID" and password as
the most common I&A knowledge-based technique. Unfortunately, their "vulnerability to
interception or inadvertent disclosure" also make them the weakest method—inappropriate
passwords comprise the most common IS vulnerability. [AFMAN 33-223, 1998:2] Air Force
official guidance also notes that "passwords are only effective when used properly," suggesting
that complementary policies and practices are required. [AFMAN 33-223,1998:2]
The type of I&A method used will serve as a proxy for the strength of the system's
capability to accurately identify and authenticate users and their appropriate levels of access.
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Supporting Policy

Information & IS Protection

An additional measure that supports the strength of
authentication is that of supporting policy. This assesses

Defense in Depth
Compliance
Availability

supporting policy that may complement the I&A methods

Confidentiality
Filter Technology""^}

to ensure that the methods are being implemented

Authentication Strength

correctly. An example would be an automated policy
Supporting Policy^}

enforcing 'appropriate' passwords (i.e. includes numbers,
special characters, etc.). Points that must be considered

Encryption Strength~~^>
Integrity

include restrictions on password content and use, configuration of machines to comply with I&A,
interoperability, and other methods that enhance/ensure proper user use of the I&A methods
implemented. The four levels for this measure includes No Policy, Policy-No Checks, PolicyPeriodic Checks, and Policy-Automated Checks. No Policy means that no policy supporting the
I&A processes exists. Policy-No Checks means that supporting I&A policy exists, but there are
no checks on whether it is ignored or not. Policy-Periodic Checks means that a supporting I&A
policy exists, and manual checks for adherence to the policy are accomplished on a periodic or
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as-needed basis.

Policy-Automated means that a supporting I&A policy is in place and enforced

by automatic means.
Supporting Policy
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Figure A-17: VF for Supporting Policy
Encryption Strength

J Information & IS Protection

When information is in transit, the sender may

J Defense in Depth
J Compliance

have little or no control over where it flows en route to
-| Availability |

its destination as well as the media in which it flows.

-I Confidentiality I
Filter Technology^])

Therefore, encryption technology has provided a means

Authentication Strength

to protect the confidentiality of information if

Supporting Policy
Encryption Strength

unauthorized parties intercept it. However, this
J Integrity

technology is not without its own vulnerabilities. The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
technology is, like all other network-related technologies, rapidly growing in capability.
Therefore, instead of directly using the encryption strength as a measure of assurance against a
breach of confidentiality of information in transit, the generation of technology will be assessed.
This approach assumes that the necessary precautions are taken in order to prevent the
encryption keys from being revealed. This measure has five levels: None, Two Generations
Past, Last Generation, Current Generation, and State of the Art Generation. None means that
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no encryption is used for sending information to others. Two Generations Past (2 Past) denotes
the use of encryption that has been succeeded by two generations of encryption technology (e.g.
32-bit). Last Generation denotes the version of encryption that was widely used before the
current generation (e.g. 64-bit). Current generation denotes the use of the most current version
of encryption that is widely disseminated (e.g. 128-bit). Widely disseminated is further defined
as encryption technology used by at least 75% of the Internet population that uses encryption.
State of the Art generation denotes the most advanced version of encryption available but not
widely used for developmental, proprietary, regulatory or validation reasons (e.g. 640-bit or
higher). It should be noted that as more advanced encryption become available the definitions,
although not the illustrative example, will remain valid.
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Figure A-18: VF for Encryption Strength
Information & IS Protection: Integrity

Information & IS Protection

Integrity addresses two distinct areas: data integrity

Defense in Depth
Compliance

and system integrity. Data integrity is defined as the
Availability

"condition existing when data is unchanged from its source
and has not been accidentally or maliciously modified,

Confidentiality
Integrity
—-f^Data Integrity""^

altered, or destroyed." [NSTISSI4009, 1999:15] Whereas,
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System Integrity

system integrity is defined as "the state maintained when an IS "performs its intended function in
an unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation of the
system." [NSTISSI4009, 1999:44] It is important to note that a loss of data integrity may
contribute to a loss of system integrity. However, to achieve mutual exclusivity between these
two areas, Data Integrity will apply only to the protection of information in a virtual sense, and
System Integrity will apply only to the protection of the IS in a physical sense.
Data IntesritV

,—| Information & IS Protection]

There are several methods to prevent the loss of data

Defense in Depth
Compliance

integrity. Discretionary access control (DAC), for example,
"provides the ability to control a user's access to information

Availability
Confidentiality
Integrity

according to the authorization granted to the user," and is
administered by the individual users themselves. [AFMAN 33-

Data Integrity^J^
System Integrity

229,1997:5] DAC and its strength are dependent upon the operating system's capabilities and
whether or not it is effectively implemented by IS users. It is important to note, "all Air Force
shared (i.e., multi-user) information systems must have DAC based on the requirements levied
by Public Law 100-235, NTISSP 200, DOD Directive 5200.28, and AFSSI 5102." [AFMAN
33-229, 1997:5] Therefore, for the purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the system meets
the legal requirements with respect to this area.
Another means is that of open source software. This approach allows users to know
exactly what a software package contains and the functions it performs. This method, however,
is not a widely accepted practice. In addition, if a software package consists of millions of lines
of code, identification of one or two lines of malicious code may be a daunting task in itself.
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An additional means, the focus of this evaluation area, is the use of anti-virus software to
maintain data integrity. The strengths of which rely upon how it is used (i.e. manually or in an
automated fashion), how often the malicious code signatures are updated (to allow for detection,
eradication and notification), and the type of coverage offered to the IS as a whole. Coverage
considers the extent of protection offered against the potential sources of malicious code. Figure
A-19 illustrates these sources, which are denoted as external, internal and originating sources.
External sources of malicious code come from outside of the IS of interest, and infect the
system by passing through inadequately maintained protective barriers. This may occur directly
from source to target or from source to a target through a series of systems that are also
inadequately protected. Internal sources stem from users placing malicious code (intentionally
or unintentionally) on a computer within the IS and its boundaries to the outside world.
External
Sources

f

\;

A^
*
*»i

Internal
Sources

Figure A-19: Potential Sources of Malicious Code
Assuming the capability exists to identify the malicious code, the speed, accuracy and
ability to mitigate the code's damage are all aspects that require consideration. Due to the
multitude of factors involved, and the system-specific complexities of this area, a categorical

A-33

measure was developed, essentially measuring the protection afforded to data integrity by
assessing the strength of the Implementation against malicious code.
The five levels for this measure include: None, Manual-Partial, Automated-Partial,
Manual-Full, and Automated-Full. None means that no anti-virus (AV) or integrity-checking
software is implemented within the IS. Manual means that the AV or similar software is in place
but relies upon human intervention to implement its use, to include any updates required.
Automated means that AV or similar software is in place and does not rely upon human
intervention to implement its use, to include any required updates. Partial means that not all
points of access are monitored for malicious code; whereas, Full means that all points of access
are monitored for malicious code. The combinations for the measure are ordered by preference,
assuming that Full coverage is preferred to Partial coverage, regardless of how the protective
measures are implemented.
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Figure A- 20: VF for Data Integrity
Finally, originating sources include the intentional or inadvertent breach of integrity
through improperly evaluated hardware or software components that are added onto the IS. The
specificity to IS components resulted in evaluation in the context of maintaining system integrity.

A-34

IS Integrity
Information & IS Protection

In this analysis, protecting system integrity "from deliberate
or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation" is limited to the
protection of the physical components that comprise (or may

Defense in Depth
Compliance
A\ailability
Confidentiality

comprise) the information system of interest. Protection of the
integrity of infrastructures that directly support the IS (e.g.

Integrity
Data Integrity^^
System Integrity^)

electrical, or communication lines) is considered beyond the scope
of this thesis. However, the proposed model could allow for these considerations within the
Defense in Depth assessment.2 Therefore, this portion of the model assesses the protective
actions taken to prevent not the alteration of components, but to prevent the introduction of
altered components into the information system.
DOD Instruction 5200.40 mandates the validation of all system components (hardware,
firmware and software) to assure proper integration and that system-specific functionality and
security needs are met. [DODI 5200.40, 1997:28] The level of resolution attained by breaking
systems down into individual components is dependent upon the organization and the function of
the IS. For Air Force systems, AFISSI 5024, Volume 1 further requires security controls
(software or hardware) are "tested and evaluated to ensure they are implemented as required by
DOD and AF policy." [1997:56] Products validated by the National Security Agency (NSA) are
lists as such on an evaluated products list (EPL), which also denotes the class (or classes) of
system for which the product is approved. Products assessed by the Air Force, are listed on the
assessed product list (APL), which describes the results of testing but does not directly state on
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which systems the product may be used. In the event that system specifications require a new
product not yet tested, a test may be requested or accomplished by the organization.
Unfortunately, this process is time intensive, taking up to a year to complete. [1997:57]
From this, an IA strategy with pre-approved components is assumed preferable, at least in
the short term. Therefore, the percentage of components already validated serves as a proxy for
system integrity. Long-term acquisitions may allow long testing times in order to achieve an
improved capability. Unfortunately, time works against the decision-maker due to the rapid
evolution of information technologies, hence a dramatically reduced value for any alternative
with less than 85% of the components already validated. Although it is expected to be 100% for
the current system, the evaluation process for this measure should lend itself to verifying this as
the case.
System Integrity
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Figure A- 21: VF for System Integrity

2

Protection of supporting infrastructure is what relates information assurance directly to critical

infrastructure protection.
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Detection
Information Assurance

"History has shown the value and
need for reliable, adequate, and timely
Information & IS Protection
intelligence, and the harm that results from
its inaccuracies and absence." [JP 3-13, 1998:111-5]

Detection

Reaction

In light of the historical perspective of 'detecting' enemy actions, Joint doctrine also
emphasizes, "timely attack detection and reporting are the keys to initiating capability restoration
and attack response." [JP 3-13,1998:111-10] In addition to timely detection, effective defense
against 10 "... is predicated on how well the intelligence processes function and on the agility of
[those involved] to implement protective countermeasures." [JP3-13,1998:111-2] This suggests
that a certain level of reliability is required to ensure that threats are indeed identified—
maximizing the probability of detection and minimizing the probability of false alarms.
Additionally, an effective IA strategy must also be robust in that it exhibits timeliness and
reliability, regardless of the type of attack. The resulting value hierarchy for Detection is shown
below.
Detection
- Timely
- Cyber Attacks
- Physical Attacks
L

Inter-Personal Attacks

Reliable
Cyber Attacks
- Physical Attacks
L

Inter-Personal Attacks

Figure A- 22 - Values of Detection Capability
There are many means of accomplishing an attack upon information and information
systems. As discussed earlier, virtual (or cyber) attacks exploit connectivity or operation (i.e.
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emissions or information in transit) to gain unauthorized access (by either an authorized or
unauthorized user) and attack information and/or information systems. Physical attacks exploit
accessibility to information system components and attacks information and/or information
systems by unauthorized modification, destruction, or subversion. A third category of attack not
yet discussed—inter-personal attacks—involves the exploitation of training and/or awareness
deficiencies of the individuals that operate, maintain or use the IS and the information that
resides within it. For the purposes of this research, assessing an IA strategy's detection
capability is accomplished through quantifying its capability to detect attacks in a timely and
reliable manner in each of these three areas.
Timely (Cyber Attacks)
As stated earlier, regardless of the type of attack, the earlier
an attack (or intrusion) is detected, the quicker an appropriate
response can be initiated. However, due to the speed at which
cyber attacks may be accomplished, timeliness is a vital factor.
Detection speeds of current systems are heavily system
dependent. Kendall summarizes "some systems detect attacks in
real time and can be used to stop an attack in progress. Others
provide after-the-fact information about attacks that can be used to repair damage, understand the
attack mechanism, and reduce the possibility of future attacks of the same type." [1999:8]
Figure A- 23 depicts the four categories of intrusion detection approaches. The approach
on bottom can only identify previously demonstrated attacks, whereas the three on top are
capable of identifying new attacks. As the graph extends to the right, so does the computer
power required to successfully implement the detection approach.
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Signature verification relies upon identification of "an invariant sequence of events that
match a known type of attack." This approach can be very effective against previously
demonstrated attacks; however, "it is difficult to establish rules that identify novel types of
attacks," and may be subject to high false alarm rates. [Kendall, 1999:16]
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Figure A- 23: Strategies for Intrusion Detection [Kendall, 1999:16]
The three other approaches were developed to overcome these shortfalls. Bottleneck
verification "applies to situations where there are only a few, well defined ways to transition
between two groups of states." The transition from user to super-user3, for example, can be
identified and tracked for illegal actions, regardless of the means (new or old) that the transition
is accomplished. [Kendall, 1999:19] Specification-based detection focuses on the improper use
of system or application programs by comparing their activity to the normal intended behavior of
the programs. [1999:18] Although this approach detects a wide range of attacks at a low false
alarm rate, it requires application-specific, written security specifications that must be updated
along with the associated program. The final category of current approaches is anomaly
detection. This approach "constructs statistical models of the typical behavior of a system and

Special users who can perform control of processes, devices, networks, and file systems. [NSTISSI4009,
1999:43]
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issues warnings when they observe actions that deviate significantly from those models."
[Kendall, 1999:17] In order to minimize the false alarm rate, careful training must be
accomplished to separate anomalous behavior from attack events. This may be difficult to carry
out for all types of users. Additionally, an adept adversary may be able to slowly change the
model (undetected) over time to allow a complete and undetected attack in the future. [1999:18]
In addition to the specific components of an information system dedicated to intrusion
detection, JP 3-13 identifies other elements of 10 attack detection. These include Information
Warfare Centers, Information Systems Developers, Information Systems Providers and Systems
Administrators, Information and IS Users, Law Enforcement, Intelligence and the reporting
structure through which these entities share information regarding impending or ongoing attacks.
[1998:111-10-12] This means that the time required for detection is dependent upon the method
of detection and the organizational level of detection. The reporting of intrusion detection by the
upper echelons or cooperating agencies also relies upon their own detection capabilities, as well
as the efficiency of the reporting process. For this thesis, the scope of assessment is constrained
to the system of interest and its capability (current or proposed) to detect intrusions in a timely
manner. This evaluation measure has four levels: No Capability, Post-Attack Only, Real-Time
(On Duty), and Real-Time (Off-Duty).
No Capability means that there is no capability to detect cyber intrusions into the system.
Post-Attack Only means that the organization can only detect intrusions 'after the fact,' using
manual or automated means, accomplished during a timeframe specified by the security policy.
Real-Time (On Duty) means that the organization has the capability to detect intrusions on a realtime basis, but appropriate personnel are only notified of the intrusion during duty hours. RealTime (Off Duty) means that the organization has the capability to detect intrusions on a real-time
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basis, and appropriate personnel are automatically notified regardless of their duty status (e.g.
24-hour alert status).
This evaluation measure is applied to the assessment of the detection capabilities of both
internal and external threats. However, an independent assessment of each threat type must be
accomplished, due to the different means of detection, or the configuration of the system, must
accommodate for the detecting the different types of adversaries.
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Figure A- 24: VF for Timely Detection of Internal Threats
Timely (Physical Attacks)
Detection

The timely detection of physical attacks is dependent
upon the level of sophistication of the controls in place as well as

"Timely

\ Cyber Attacks|
■I Physical Attacks I

the level of awareness of authorized personnel. More
sophisticated controls rely less upon human ability to detect an

Speed
I— Inter-Personal Attacks
Reliable

intrusion. A low level of sophistication (e.g. doors locked during
Cyber Attacks

the night) requires users to detect unauthorized personnel and
activity during duty hours and the results of unauthorized activity
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Physical Attacks
Inter-Personal Attacks

after the fact if the breach occurred during off-duty hours. A highly sophisticated system (e.g.
electronic monitoring with 24-hour dedicated personnel) relies less upon the element of human
recognition.
The time to physical intrusion detection is evaluated in hours, ranging from 0 to 72.
Sophisticated systems will likely score well with very short time periods. Assuming a low-level
control and an intrusion occurs immediately after personnel leave on Friday derived the worstcase (72 hours). The 72-hour period accounts for a two-day weekend, and gives the personnel
until the end of the next duty day (Monday) to detect that an intrusion has taken place. Processes
that take longer than the 72-hour period are assumed inadequate in providing timely detection.
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Figure A- 25: VF for Timely Detection of Physical Attacks
Timely (Inter-Personal Attacks)
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Social Engineering is defined as "a deception
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technique utilized by hackers to derive information or

J Physical Attacks I
Inter-Personal Attacks

data about a particular system or operation." [JCSIA,
J Reliable

1999:F-17] There are a number of methods to

User Awareness
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accomplish this, all of which focus on the lack of

\ Inter-Personal Attacks
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awareness or lack of training that authorized users possess (or both). Timely detection in this
context is assumed to rely upon the awareness of the users.
Regardless of the effectiveness of the associated training programs, the human is still the
weakest link in an information system. Job demands, complacency, and the time since the last
training session may result in a decreased awareness and an increased vulnerability to interpersonal types of attacks. This measure assesses the percentage of users that are current to
evaluate the overall awareness of the user population. The meaning of'current' is dependent
upon the time period specified by the organization, as well as the amount of training
commensurate with the level of access the user retains. For example, "Air Force military,
civilian, and contract personnel will receive information protection awareness-level training
within 60 days of permanent change of station/permanent change of assignment to a new
organization." [AFI33-204,1999:3] Additionally, although both a simple user and a system
administrator may be equally susceptible, the training provided to each individual should
emphasize the required awareness due to the different levels of authority.
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Figure A- 26: VF for User Awareness
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Reliable (Cyber Attacks)
Detection

As mentioned in the Kendall's work, there are explicit

Timely
\ Cyber Attacks

tradeoffs between the false alarm rate and detection capability.

Physical Attacks
\ Inter-Personal Attacks

[1999:17] The reliability of intrusion detection systems (IDS)
determines how often they fail to detect a valid intrusion, and
how often an anomalous event is construed as an intrusion
(false alarms). High false alarm rates can consume valuable
resources, and could potentially be used to an adversary's

L_|inter-Personai Attacks!

advantage. However, failing to detect a valid intrusion is assumed the more serious of the two
possibilities. From a quality control perspective, these types of errors are defined as producer's
risk (or Type I error) and consumer's risk (Type II errors), respectively. This concept is similar
to the operating characteristic (OC) curve, which facilitates in the tradeoffs that must be made
between these types of risks, as well as the overall reliability of the controls.
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Figure A- 27: Operating Characteristic Curves [Monks, 1977:507]
Figure A- 27 illustrates the relationships between the producer and consumer risk, as well
as the acceptable quality level (AQL) and the lot tolerance percent defective (LTPD) levels.
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[Monks, 1977:507] The shape of this curve, and therefore the risk involved, is governed by the
sample size of inspected parts, which, in this context, is equated to the frequency of IDS updates.
Therefore, given that some capability is in place to detect cyber attacks—the exploitation
of system connectivity to gain unauthorized access—the 'sample size' used to improve the
power of the detection system can be seen as how frequently the system is updated to ensure
proper configuration. The configuration required, and the time between configurations, is
dependent upon the type of IDS. A notional evaluation measure is shown in Figure A- 28, where
the value provided is based upon how often IDS configuration is accomplished, thereby
influencing the reliability of their detection capability. The current range is from zero to 30 days,
denoting the time between IDS updates (e.g. policy updates, model training, or new attack
signatures). Zero days implies that it is automated and constantly updated, 30 days implies that
the system is checked on a monthly basis. Anything greater than 30 days is assumed outdated,
due to the rapid evolution of threat capabilities, and of little value to the decision-maker
concerning reliable detection of cyber attacks.
Internal Cyber Detection
(Reliable)
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Figure A- 28: VF for Reliable Detection of Cyber Attacks
Figure A- 28 shows the evaluation function for assessing the reliability of external
attacks. The function for assessing the reliability of internal attack detection is identical and
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based upon the same rationale. However, this assumes that some capability to detect
unauthorized behavior of an authorized user is in place.
Reliable (Physical Attacks)
This area evaluates the ability of an organization's

Detection
Timely

system and the level of user awareness to detect physical

\ Cyber Attacks
- Physical Attacks|

attacks upon information systems' components or the
immediate area. This measure primarily appraises those

I— Inter-Personal Attacks
Reliable
Cyber Attacks

areas under the control of the organization—the

\ Physical Attacks

information system of interest. However, the connectivity
and interdependence of today's systems will eventually

^Physical Security
—| Inter-Personal Attacks]

require addressing a larger scope, to include the infrastructure supporting the IS.
There are a number of means to detect physical attacks, to include premises alarm
systems, automated detection of unauthorized coupling of the immediate system (circuit and
power consumption analysis), breaks in connections resulting in temporary loss of capabilities,
etc. Personnel training (to increase awareness, and the probability of detection) to identify when
an attack is being perpetrated by an adversary (insider or outsider) by recognizing and reporting
behavior that may be unauthorized
Assuming some level of physical access control is in place, the reliability of the control's
detection capability is dependent upon how an intrusion is detected. Systems that require
authorized personnel to detect and notify (or fail to notify) the appropriate individuals to initiate
a reaction. The more sophisticated the control, the less reliant it is upon simple human
awareness to notice all attempted intrusions. More focused human awareness will increase the
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probability of detection, and the integration of automated intrusion detection with a dedicated
human element will increase the reliability even further.
For example, a door unlocked during duty hours and locked during off-duty hours (with
no type of guardian) relies heavily upon the people near the door to detect entry of unauthorized
personnel. If the intrusion occurred during off-duty hours, detection of the intrusion depends
upon noticing any signs of forced entry (if any) upon return. The addition of dedicated personnel
to control access can offer a more focused (and therefore more reliable) detection capability,
assuming they have the ability to differentiate between authorized and unauthorized individuals.
The reliability is negligible, however, during the times they are not present. More sophisticated
physical controls, such as electronically controlled (and monitored) doors, may have the ability
to control movement of personnel, and reliably detect intrusions (or attempted ones) through
various means.
There are five levels for this measure which denote the varying level of human focus
required for reliable detection of physical attacks: Presence, Trained, Key Personnel (DutyHours), Key Personnel (Continuous), and Automated.
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Figure A- 29: VF for Reliable Detection of Physical Attacks
Presence means detection capability is reliant upon the general awareness of authorized
personnel, implies that no substantive physical controls are in place, except the presence of
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authorized personnel. Trained indicates that the detection capability is primarily reliant upon the
awareness of authorized personnel but is improved upon by appropriate levels of training and
awareness. Key Personnel (Duty-Hours) implies that dedicated personnel are assigned to
monitor points of access and other critical areas as determined by the organization, during
regular duty hours only. This assumes that this measure is in addition to the requirement for the
general population to remain aware of detecting physical attacks. Key Personnel (Continuous)
means that dedicated personnel are assigned to monitoring points of access and other critical
areas as determined by the organization on a continuous basis. Automated assumes that physical
security controls are automatically enforced through electronic means and continuously monitor
points of access and other critical areas as determined by the organization. This level also
assumes that dedicated personnel are continuously monitoring all responses of the automated
system.
Reliable-Inter-Personal Attacks

Detection

User Training evaluates the effectiveness of
training programs designed to provide authorized users

Timely
Cyber Attacks
| Physical Attacks |
Inter-Personal Attacks

with the knowledge to recognize (detect) a potential
Reliable

inter-personal attack. Therefore, this area assesses the
training incorporated into IA Strategies that focus on

Cyber Attacks
Physical Attacks
— Inter-Personal Attacks]

allowing users to detect an attempt to elicit information

I—(^"ijser Training^)

that may be used for unauthorized activities. The levels include Not Addressed, Mentioned,
Discussed, Discussed-Illustrated, and Trained-Evaluated. Not Addressed defines training that
does not address or mention the dangers and methods of social engineering (SE) types of attacks.
Mentioned classifies training that briefly mentions the dangers of SE attacks. Discussed means
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that SE attacks are described in detail. Discussed-Illustrated defines training that describes SE
attacks in detail and portrays notional examples in order for the users to fully grasp the gravity
and potential impact of SE types of attacks. Trained-Evaluated means that individuals are not
only fully trained on this type of attack, but are periodically evaluated through random or
standardized testing during the specified time period between recurring training.
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Figure A- 30: VF for User Training
Information Assurance

Reaction
£

Joint doctrine addresses the

Information & IS Protection

,

I

,

[Detection |

|

1—

| Reaction

\ Respond
| Properly Focused |

importance of response and restoration

J Flexible Deterrence

capabilities. [JP 3-13, 1998:111-10] In

\ Restore (Information & IS)
^ Timely |

this analysis, these are grouped into the

■] Accurately]

react objective, since both are

^Improved StateI

dependent upon either attack detection, attack warning, or some other, perhaps natural, event that
has caused or has the potential to cause some level of disruption.
The requirements of reaction capabilities that support IA are generally composed of three
objectives:
•

Determine the appropriate response to an impending or detected attack by seeking an
accurate identification of the attacker (or attackers) and their intent;
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•

Quickly respond to mitigate the effects of the attack by either halting the attack,
letting the attack proceed in order to collect evidence, or taking retaliatory measures;
and,

•

Restore the information and information systems to at least the original state, but
preferably, one that is improved to prevent similar attacks from occurring in the
future.

For the purposes of this thesis, retaliatory measures will be limited to the pursuit of legal
remedy. That is, for example, offensive information operations (e.g. computer attack), physical
retaliation (e.g. bombing), or other means (e.g. embargo) are considered beyond the scope of this
research. The overall objective of an effective reaction capability is to provide the organization
with a properly focused response mechanism, and to restore the availability, confidentiality and
integrity of information and information systems to their original or an improved state.
Respond (Properly Focused)
"Timely identification of actors and their intent is
the cornerstone of effective and properly focused
response, thereby linking the analytic results of the
indicator and warning (I&W) process to appropriate
decision makers." [JP 3-13, 1999:111-14] The Properly
Focused objective assesses the ability to correctly identify the individuals involved, the
vulnerabilities exploited and the motivation for the attack in order to form the most appropriate
response against the attacker (or attackers). This process may be accomplished externally or
internally.
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I& W Notification

Reaction
—I Respond]

External identification is based upon the level of

\ Properly Focused
l&W Notification

support and communication that occurs between organizations

L>

ID Accuracy""^)

concerning ongoing or increased potential for attacks. Joint

J Flexible Deterrence

doctrine emphasizes the value of "a reporting structure linked

Restore (Information & IS)
\ Timely

to intelligence, counterintelligence, law enforcement, policy

^Accurately!
\ Improved State |

makers, and the information systems community, both

government and commercial." [JP 3-13,1998:111-12] Many methods of notification and
information sharing are available, and have varying levels of success. For this measure, it is
assumed that a larger number of indications and warning sources available to system
administrators and owners provide more identification ability than if they only acted alone. Five
potential sources of I&W used for this measure are the intelligence community, law
enforcement, policy makers, the government information systems community, and the
commercial information systems community. It is further assumed that each source is of equal
value, and that appropriate policies and procedures are in place to ensure adequate lines of
communication are available when needed. The total number of sources available, assuming
active involvement with each, provides the score for the IA strategy.
l&W Notification
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Figure A- 31: VF for I&W Notification
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Identification (ID) Accuracy
Reaction

Internal capabilities of identifying insider and
outsider attacks are accomplished through a variety of

— Respond
Properly Focused
l&W Notification J^>

means, depending upon the type of attack involved.
ID Accuracy"^)

Nonrepudiation is "assurance the sender of data is
provided with proof of delivery and the recipient is

Flexible Deterrence
1- Restore (Information & IS)
Timely

provided with proof of the sender's identity, so neither
can later deny having processed the data." [NSTISSI

— Accurately
Improved State

4009,1999:32] Although, this is generally accepted as a means of electronic verification,
nonrepudiation could be extended to the physical world (e.g. the registered mail process).
Borrowing from DOD Instruction 5200.40, the attribution mode is a measure to
"distinguish the degree of complexity of accountability required to establish authenticity and
nonrepudiation." [1997:60] This is chosen as a constructed proxy to evaluate the organization's
internal capability to correctly identify the threat parameters, and therefore facilitate a properly
focused response. Four choices include None, Rudimentary, Selected, and Comprehensive.
•

None means that no processing, transmission, storage, or data carries the ability to
attribute them to users or processes.

•

Rudimentary (Rud.) means the most basic processing, transmission, storage, or data
carries the ability to attribute them to users or processes.

•

Selected (Sei.) means some processing, transmission, storage, or data carries the ability to
attribute them to users or processes.

•

Comprehensive (Comp.) means all or almost all processing, transmission, storage, or data
carries the ability to attribute them to users or processes. [DODI 5200.40,1997:60]
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Identification Accuracy
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Figure A- 32: VF for ID Accuracy

Respond (Flexible Deterrence)
Once an attack is detected and those responsible have
been identified, the organization must act to mitigate the risk
posed to the organization. Flexible Deterrence entails taking
the appropriate action at the appropriate time. In this case, the
appropriate action entails either stopping the attack, or

1

—j Other Actions I

| Restore (Information & IS)[
—| Timely |

collecting evidence to facilitate legal action, or both. The

—| Accurately]
\ Improved State|

appropriate time required to act upon threats depends upon the
type of attack, the subsequent risks, and the capability of the organization.
Timely
It is assumed that timely initiation of the appropriate response provides fewer potential
gains to the adversary. Lower levels of authority required to initiate attack responses generally
oppose the attack sooner. This evaluation measure assesses the policy and procedures, in place
or recommended, that provides for response initiation. It is assumed that the higher level of
authority required to begin mitigating procedures, the longer the adversary will have to cause
damage to the information and information systems. The level of authority required serves as a
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proxy for the timeliness of initiating deterrence, and the types of authority provide a constructed
scale.
Timely Initiation of Deterrent Options
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Figure A- 33: VF for Timely Deterrence
There are five levels for this measure: Automated, User, SysAdmin (Systems
Administrator), DAA, and Higher Level. Automated means that attack response does not rely
upon any human intervention in order to initiate the attack response. Note that this may be the
timeliest method, but an adversary seeking to consume system resources may also exploit it.
User means that an authorized user can initiate the response. SysAdmin is defined as the lowest
authority to initiate the attack response is owned by the System Administrator. DAA will be that
the lowest authority to initiate the attack response is the individual that assumes responsibility for
the system—the designated approval authority. Finally, Higher Level indicates that the next
level of authority past the DAA must approve the initiation of the attack response.
To evaluate a variety of attack response options, this measure may be broken down into
finer levels of detail. Evaluation of how each type of attack response is initiated, and then
weighted by an estimate of the probability of each type of attack occurring would yield an
overall (average) score for the organization's timely deterrence.
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Stop Attack
Tradeoffs exist between terminating an attack and
allowing it to progress, facilitating the collection of
evidence for law enforcement officials to then take
action. Assuming that the risk posed by an attack is too
great to allow for evidence collection, the ability to stop
an ongoing attack is vital. However, the method of
terminating an attack may adversely affect the availability
of data or performance of the system. It also varies with the types of attacks. For these reasons,
a categorical measure is developed to assess the general capability of an organization to stop an
attack. The three categories are No Capability, Manual, and Automatic. Similar to other
evaluation measures, the capability to stop different types of attacks may be evaluated
individually, and then weights may be used as a proxy for the probability of each type of attack
occurring.
Stop Attack
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Figure A- 34: VF for Stop Attack
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Collect Evidence
The Collect Evidence attribute measures the
organization's ability to ensure that threatening actors' (both
internal and external) identities, intentions, methods (i.e.
identification of the vulnerabilities that were exploited) and
motivations are brought forth to facilitate the legal actions that
may be taken.
Increasing the level of complexity typically increases
the amount and types of data collected, offering a better chance to apprehend and prosecute the
offender(s). Note that this measure is not strictly limited to cyber attacks. For example, where
audit logs may serve as repositories for threat activity, cameras serve as auditing tools for
physical activity. Essentially, the capability to allow attacks to proceed facilitates the
vulnerability and attack origin identification, which provides value to the DM, regardless of
means. The question remains as to the level of risk associated with allowing a threat to continue
its activities. For this measure, a categorical assessment of evidence collection capability
includes four levels: No Capability, System-Medium, System-Low, and Benign.
No Capability means that the IA strategy has no capability to divert or control a threat
once detection occurs. System-Medium means that the capability exists to contain the threat
within the system, but the risk of allowing further penetration is assessed as medium due to other
controls and policies in place. System-Low means that the capability exists to contain the threat
within the system, and the risk is perceived as low due to the level of controls and policies in
place (e.g. a strong defense in depth exists). Benign means that the capability exists to reroute
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the threat to a benign environment, allowing for collection of evidence, with no additional risk
posed to the organization.
Collect Evidence
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Figure A- 35: VF for Collect Evidence
Other Actions
As discussed earlier, this thesis does not account for deterrent options beyond the pursuit
of legal means. This area lends itself to future analysis.
Restore
The overall objective of restoration is to minimize the disruption associated with attacks
or natural events, by restoring the availability, confidentiality, and integrity of the information
and the information systems. The ability of an organization to restore information and
information systems "relies upon established procedures and mechanisms for prioritized
restoration of essential functions." [JP 3-13,1998:111-12] The time to restore depends upon the
amount of damage done. The damage due to a logic bomb, an electronic mail bomb, or a pipe
bomb may vary, and the means to restore the damage are obviously different. Therefore, this
area evaluates the robustness of the restoration capability within an IA strategy, with the focus on
three areas:
•

The speed at which prioritized services and information sources are restored;
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The amount of accuracy or information that may be lost as a result of the restoration
process; and,
The ability to bring the IS to an improved state, reducing the probability of success
given an identical attack in the future.
Time to Restore Essential Elements

Reaction
\ Respond

There are a number of mechanisms to restore

Property Focused
) Flexible Deterrence

information and IS services, to include technical

Restore (Information & IS)

and non-technical means. These mechanisms,

— Timely
Time to Restore
Essential Elements

however, may vary in the time required to complete
the restoration process. This measure evaluates the

Time Required to FOC
J Accurately

time required to restore essential elements, which

\ Improved State |

may be comprised of information sources, IS components, or services provided by the IS.
Determining essential services is organization-specific. However, in this context, essential is
defined as an element that sustains the organization's ability to accomplish its stated objectives.
If an essential element is not available, then the organization is assumed unable to perform the
related mission.
To implement this measure, an evaluation function must be developed for each element
identified as essential to the organization. The maximum time for the range of each measure is
determined by the maximum amount of time that the element may be unavailable (or
compromised) while still allowing the organization to perform the mission associated with the
element. Prioritization between these essential elements is then accomplished through the proper
weighting of each evaluation measure.
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Time to Restore Essential
Elements

Max
Time Required

Figure A- 36: VF for Time to Restore Essential Elements
A time of 0 would indicate that the restoration process is fully automated. An alternative
would be to use the best restoration time that has been demonstrated by similar organizations.
The maximum time is determined by establishing organization-specific, operationally acceptable
times. It is assumed that simply meeting the maximum criteria attains some value to the
decision-maker.
Time Required to Fully Operational Capability (FOC)

Reaction
\ Res pond

Eventually, the system and its information must return

j Property Focused
\ Flexible Deterrence

to its original state, becoming fully operationally capable.
The intended use of the system plays a major role in the

\ Restore (Information & IS)
—| Timely

maximum allowable time that the system is not FOC. FOC
implies that all elements, essential and otherwise, are
■j Accurately]

functioning properly.

i_| improved state|
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Time to FOC

Max
Time Required

Figure A- 37: VF for Time Required to Full Operational Capability
This measure is assessed in the same manner as the time to restore essential services, with
the exception that the system cannot be in a degraded state of operation.
Restoration Accuracy
In addition to the time required for

I Reaction!
— Respond
Property Focused
Flexible Deterrence

restoration, the accuracy of the restoration

\ Restore (Information & IS)

process is critical to maintaining the intended

^ Timely |
\ Accurately]

functionality, as well as minimizing the

Recoverable Information

amount of information loss. This measure

| Improved State|

attempts to capture both areas through an estimate of the IA strategy's capability to restore the
information. Underlying issues include the methods of backing up information (particularly how
much and how often) and how and where the archive is stored.
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Restoration Accuracy
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Figure A- 38: VF for Restoration Accuracy
The methods and frequency of backup capabilities vary widely. In addition,
considerations must be made regarding the value of information over time. For example, if a
system fails and the backup information is outdated beyond acceptable use, the accuracy is
assumed negligible. Expert assessments, historical data, or testing the system (where possible)
should facilitate the estimation of this measure. The shape of the curve assumes that there is
some threshold value (%) that must be met in order for the organization to continue an
operationally acceptable level based upon information restored from backup data.
Improved State
In order to provide the most value to the DM, the restoration process must also prevent
further attacks similar in nature by returning the system and information to an improved state
from which it began. This may be accomplished by eliminating the exploited vulnerabilities,
either within the physical or cyber realms.
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Resource Inventory

Reaction

"A key step in capability restoration is to

— Respond
Property Focused

inventory systems resources to help identify

Flexible Deterrence
I— Restore (Information & IS)

surreptitious adversary implants." [JP 3-13,

Timely

1998:111-13] From this, using the percentage of
— Accurately

applicable items that have been inventoried offers a

1

— Improved State
Resource Inventory

direct and natural measure of the physical changes

Improvement Procedures

required improving the system state.
Resource Inventory
(75.6, 9.3)
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Figure A- 39: VF for Resource Inventory
Note that there is a maximum uncertainty associated with only having 50% of the items
inventoried, hence a low score is assigned when 50% or less of the system has been inventoried.
A strategy is evaluated by measuring the percentage of components that have been inventoried
within an operationally acceptable time period. The resolution to which these components are
identified (i.e. computer versus internal hard-drive) are likely system specific, and will require
time and cost tradeoffs.
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Improvement Procedures

Reaction
{Respond

"Post-attack analysis provides

j Properly Focused

information about vulnerabilities exploited

(Flexible Deterrence
J Restore (Information & IS)

and leads to security improvements. Audit

{Timely

trails such as automated recording of specific

— Accurately
1

— Improved State

attack techniques during the incident can

Resource Inventory

provide information required for analysis."

Improvement Procedures

[JP 3-13, 1998:111-13] This measure assesses the procedures that are in place or recommended as
part of an IA strategy that yield potential improvements to the system after post-attack
restoration. It is assumed that the effectiveness of these procedures are dependent upon the time
and number of people dedicated to analysis efforts, the tools available, and the expertise of the
analysts. Therefore, the existence of such procedures would provide value to the DM, and the
effectiveness would involve tradeoffs against resource costs. This measure simply captures the
existence (or lack thereof) of an improvement process, the importance of which is emphasized in
Joint Doctrine.
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Figure A- 40: VF for Improvement Procedures
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Summary of IA Hierarchy
Figure A- 41 illustrates the complete value hierarchy developed to evaluate the level of
Information Assurance provided by a given strategy. Unfortunately, these strategies typically
come with potential reductions in operational capability and costs associated with information
technology and support. The next logical step, then, is to address the changes that may occur in
operational capability.

Figure A- 41: Complete IA Value Hierarchy
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Operational Capability
Increasingly complex information systems are being integrated into
traditional warfighting disciplines such as mobility; logistics; and command,
control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I). Many of these
systems are designed and employed with inherent vulnerabilities that are, in many
cases, the unavoidable consequences of enhanced functionality, interoperability,
efficiency, and convenience to users. [JP 3-13,1998:1-11]
The Operational Capability hierarchy accounts for the changes (good and bad) in
functionality, interoperability, efficiency and convenience that result from implementing an IA
strategy. Additionally, the IA goals of DARPA's Next Generation Information Infrastructure
(NGII) are to develop security and survivability solutions that "reduce vulnerability and allow
increased interoperability and functionality." [JCS I A, 1999:A-66] These potentially conflicting
goals provide an ideal setting for the VFT methodology. This hierarchy attempts to measure
these effects, and assumes that the DM wants to minimize any adverse impact upon the existent
system at a reasonable level of information assurance.

Figure A- 42: Value Hierarchy for Operational Capability
Functionality
Functionality

The objective of Functionality is to maximize the
number of services or functions offered to the users. However,
some IA strategies may result in a loss of previously enjoyed

Impact on Essential
Capabilities
Impact on Desired
Capabilities

functionality. Two constructed measures have been developed to directly quantify the
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subsequent functionality of the IS—Impact on Essential Capabilities and Impact on Desired
Capabilities. Essential capabilities are those services that an organization currently relies
heavily upon to accomplish their stated mission. If these services are no longer made available,
it is assumed that other means must be found to enable the organization to accomplish mission
objectives. Desired capabilities are defined as those capabilities that offer enhanced mission
effectiveness, but are not required to perform their stated objectives.
Impact on Essential Capabilities

Functionality

As an initial cut at a measure, this evaluation measure
assesses any impact (good or bad) an IA Strategy may have

Impact on Essential
Capabilities
Impact on Desired
Capabilities

upon services and information currently accessible to
authorized users. This focuses only on those services (or supporting services) that are of value to
the DM or the majority of authorized users. This measure assumes that each service of interest is
equal in value; however, weights, if known, could of course be used. Therefore, if one service is
gained and another is lost, the net change in services is zero. Service in this context will be
defined as a method of transferring or access to information. For example, the capability to
access to a maintenance database remotely and the capability to move information from that
database (i.e. via file transfer protocol, or ftp) are each considered services for the purpose of this
measure.
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Figure A- 43: VF for Impact on Essential Capabilities
This evaluation measure assumes that if three or more (net) essential services are lost,
this strategy (or the countermeasure contributing to the loss) is of no value in the context of
accessibility.
Impact on Desired Capabilities
Functionality

This measure is implemented similarly to the Impact

Impact on Essential
Capabilities

on Essential Capabilities evaluation measure, with the

Impact on Desired
Capabilities

exception of the types of services and capabilities assessed.

Note that the shape of the evaluation function will likely differ from that of the essential
capability evaluation function.
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Figure A- 44: VF for Net Change in Desired Services
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Interoperability
Systems that are interoperable and can be easily integrated with current and future
systems provide immediate and cost-effective value to the DM. Interoperability assesses two
areas with respect to the changes an information system may undergo during IA strategy
implementation. These measures focus on the potential for future upgrades and additional risk
that may be incurred by using state of the art technology or promising, yet unproven, procedures.
Upgrade Potential

Interoperability

The types of components that comprise the IA strategy
may have an impact on future maintenance and/or possibility

Upgrade Potential~~^>

K^jtisk Factors^)

for upgrades. One-of-a-kind, system-specific components are not only costly, but they may not
be capable of incorporating or inter-operating with future upgrades. Component type will serve
as a natural proxy for upgrade potential.
Commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products are (typically) the easiest types of
components to obtain, maintain, and upgrade. The integration of industry standards into COTS
contributes to fewer interoperability problems and allows "immediate leveraging of the existing
IA capabilities afforded by commercial technology." [JCS IA, 1999:4-8]
Government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) products are those that have been developed and are
owned by the government and used explicitly for government purposes. Although GOTS
products may be better suited to performing government objectives with a greater level of trust
and assurance, "traditional GOTS-based implementations cannot keep pace with fast-paced
change in commercial technology." [JCS IA, 1999:4-8]
A third, potential source of countermeasures that may be included within an IA strategy
are Non-Developmental Items (NDI). These items are defined as
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"... any item that is available in the commercial marketplace; any
previously developed item that is in use by a Department or Agency of the United
States, a State or local government, or a foreign government with which the
United States has a mutual defense cooperation agreement; any item described
above, that requires only minor modifications in order to meet the requirements of
the procuring Agency; or any item that is currently being produced that does not
meet the requirements of definitions above, solely because the item is not yet in
use or is not yet available in the commercial market place. [DODI 5200.40,
1997:12]
For the purposes of this study, NDPs are broken down into two categories—NDI-Existing and
NDI-Future—which represent those in the marketplace and those not yet available respectively.
A final category is the 'one of a kind' system (hardware or software) that is developed
solely for the information system of interest. This is assumed to be the least-preferred category,
due to the developmental and supporting costs incurred, as well as the potential for interfering
with future interoperability due to its uniqueness. These categories are shown in a proposed
order of preference in Figure A- 45.
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Figure A- 45: VF for Upgrade Potential
Note that this measure lends itself to comparisons between single components. However,
in order to score an overall strategy that may include a number of each types of component, the
following approach may be used. First, the scores for each category of component source must
be determined by the decision-maker. Once these are established, the average score of all
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components may be used as the overall value of the IA strategy with respect to Upgrade
Potential. For example, if a strategy called for two COTS, one GOTS, and three NDI-Future
components, the overall score would be (10+10+7+3)/4 = 7.5 on a scale from zero to 10. This
assumes that each component is independent of each other.
Risk Factors
This measure evaluates the additional risk that may be associated with implementation of
certain types of countermeasures within a strategy. This risk applies to the likelihood of new
vulnerabilities being introduced into the system, to include the possibility of incompatibility. It
is assumed that the level of this risk is predicated upon the maturity of the technology, which will
serve as a constructed proxy for these types of risk. The categorical scale shown in Table A- 7
describes the levels of technological maturity evaluated.
Table A- 7: Description of Risk Categories
Risk
Description
Category
Never been operationally used in any information system
A
Never been used on the type of system specific to the organization
B
Has been used on the type of system specific to the organization, but
C
not with the given configuration
Has been used on a system-configuration similar to that of the
D
organization's system
As seen in the Upgrade Potential evaluation measure, an overall assessment of multiple
types of components must either be averaged, or expert opinion may score the strategy using the
worst case or the value of critical or major components.
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Figure A- 46: VF for Risk Factors

The quality of service measure will serve as a constructed proxy for the effects IA
strategy implementation will have upon the efficiency of the information system.
Quality of Service
The Next Generation Internet (NGI) initiative is a multi-sector effort that, "together with
other investment sectors, will create the foundation for the networks of the 21st century, setting
the stage for networks that are much more powerful and versatile than the current Internet."
[NGI, 1998:1] Within this effort, one of the major goals is the facilitate "the delivery of end-toend ensured Quality of Service (QoS)." This strategy will allow users to tailor the way they use
technologies according to their requirements. Negotiation of "application-specific tradeoffs
among such parameters as bandwidth, latency, precision, and reliability in order to obtain
predictable performance at a known quality level" will be possible. [NGI, 1998:10] Currently,
the QoS that an information system provides is predominantly system-specific, based upon the
architecture and operating system employed, and is dependent upon the workload at any given
time. Therefore, the degradation of QoS due to the addition of components (countermeasures)
may not be perceived consistently throughout the IS, if at all. For these reasons, a categorical
A-71

assessment of the impact that an IA Strategy may have upon information system's QoS is
offered.
This measure includes five categories: Improved, None, Slight, Substantial, and
Unacceptable. Improved means that a majority of the users perceives an improvement in the
QoS of network performance and services. None implies that any user, regardless of the overall
demand upon the system, cannot perceive any difference in the quality of service. Slight
indicates that a few to all users (10% to 100%) will notice a reduction in network performance,
regardless of the overall demand upon the system. Substantial means that all users will notice a
reduction in network performance (QoS), particularly if there is heavy demand upon the system,
resulting in decreased capability to employ the IS and its services. Unacceptable signifies that
implementation of the IA Strategy (or perhaps one of its components) will result in dramatic
reductions in the QoS, resulting in severely degraded or ineffective capability to employ the IS
and its services.
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Figure A- 47: VF for Quality of Service
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0

Convenience
The objective of Convenience assesses the impact upon the human interfaces with the
information system of interest. Interactions evaluated includes the requirements a user must
fulfill in order to gain authorized access, and the demands placed upon the user to employ and
benefit from the IS once access is gained.
Requirements of User

i—= QQ|-]iranianr*o
:
1

This measure evaluates the requirements placed upon the
user in order for them to gain (authorized) access to the IS and the
applicable information. This can include the requirements to

'

physically access the system as well as the requirements for identification and authentication.
Due to the diverse I&A methods, numerous physical access control techniques, and organizationspecific security policies, a simple time scale is developed to evaluate the average amount of
time it takes a user to log-on to the system. The time starts when the (authorized) user gets to the
outermost protective layer of the facility housing the IS and ends when the user has access. It is
assumed that the outermost layer may consist of some physical security measure that is intended
to prevent entry of unauthorized individuals into the facility housing the IS. Therefore, if the
outer doors to a facility are unlocked (during the day, for example), then the time would start
either when the user comes to another control or the computer itself.
The minimum and maximum times provide the range. Inclusion of the current state is
also required to assess degradations as well as improvements. This measure is a proxy for
requirements placed upon the user, as well as the level of difficulty. For example, requiring the
user to keep a token on their person, implementing multiple physical and virtual security controls
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and other tedious and time consuming process may buy more security at the expense of
preventing users from employing the IS and its information in an operationally effective, or
timely, manner. A notional evaluation function is shown in Figure A- 48.
Impact on User Requirements

0

Max
Time to Access System

Figure A- 48: VF for Impact on User Requirements
The S-shape denotes that up to some threshold value, there is little change in the score.
However, once the time is beyond the threshold value, the score decreases dramatically. The
range goes from zero to some maximum time limit that would be considered unacceptable and of
little value.
Impact on Common Operating Environment
The Common Operating Environment (COE) attempts to...
"Provide a familiar look, touch, sound, and feel to
the commander, no matter where the commander is
deployed. Information presentation and command, control,
computers and intelligence system interfaces are maintained consistently from
platform to platform, enabling the commander to focus attention on the crisis at
hand." [JP 1-02, 1999:91]
From this, it is important to evaluate the impact that a CM may have upon the COE of the
system of interest. This measure has three levels: Negative Impact, No Impact, and Positive
Impact.
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Impact on COE
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Figure A- 49: VF for Impact on COE
Negative Impact signifies that a number of noticeable changes have occurred that results
in a discernibly different human-system interface requiring substantial training before users can
effectively employ the system. No Impact implies that implementation of an IA Strategy and its
countermeasures are transparent to the user ('Commander'). This assumes that the current
system is appropriately designed. Positive Impact means that the IA Strategy implemented some
level of change to the human-system interface that facilitates use with a minimum amount of
training and orientation.
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Consideration of Resource Costs
"Technology that affects an adversary's information and information systems and
protects and defends friendly information and information systems will be pursued at every
opportunity to ensure the greatest return on investment." [JP 3-13, 1998:1-5] This statement
emphasizes the fact that, in an environment of shrinking budgets, costs associated with the IT to
fulfill IA requirements must be considered. However, there are additional costs associated with
some of these technologies. Figure A- 50 illustrates the cost hierarchy addressed in this research.
Resource Costs
Finite-Resource
Consumption
\

Time to Effectiveness

|

Figure A- 50 - Resource Cost Hierarchy
For the purpose of this study, IA costs are grouped into two categories: Finite-Resource
Consumption and Fiscal Resources. Finite-Resource Consumption accounts for the tangible,
direct costs incurred in time and people from procuring and/or implementing an IA strategy. The
Fiscal Resources accounts for the dollar costs associated with procuring and/or implementing an
IA strategy. It is important to note that for the evaluation of costs, a high value implies a lowcost alternative. Therefore, on a scale from 0 to 10, 0 is least preferred (high cost) and 10 is
preferred (low or no cost). This methodology only accounts for the total costs in time, people,
and money required to procure and implement an IA strategy. Opportunity costs (in dollars), as
well as any sunk costs of the legacy system, are not considered. Additionally, salvage value of
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items being replaced is not directly addressed, but may be accounted for given the appropriate
accounting procedures. However, the salvage value of IT items is often relatively low.
Finite Resource Consumption-Time to Countermeasure Effectiveness
The time required in order for a particular
countermeasure (CM) within an IA strategy to become
effective is a function of two things—how long it takes to
install the CM, and how long it takes the appropriate personnel to get any required training. A
CM that is easy to install and requires no training for it to be effective incurs less "cost" in time
than a CM that is difficult and time consuming to install and also requires significant training
time before it becomes operationally effective. The rationale behind the importance of this
measure is derived from Figure A- 9.
As time progresses, the system vulnerability to older types of attacks typically decreases
as improvements are made to the information system. Although Kendall's research was focused
primarily on (virtual) intrusion detection, the concept may apply to any type of countermeasure.
The longer a CM takes to implement, the longer the system remains vulnerable. It is assumed
that the DM prefers to minimize the time that the organization's information and information
system are exposed to vulnerabilities identified, thus 'shrinking' the length of Figure A- 9.
Installation Time

Time to Effecti\eness

Installation Time is assumed to range from
seconds (for automated updates of software) to months

-(^Installation^)
^

L

(for acquisition and emplacement of hardware). The upper limit may be subject to change,
depending upon the nature of the vulnerability or the intended use of the IS and sensitivity of the
information. The notional evaluation function shown below uses a range from 0 to 365 days,
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with a mid-value point at 30 days, and a !4-value point at 45 days. Note that the actual score will
be determined by the total time required to install all elements within an IA strategy, based upon
a reasonable schedule (which may allow installations occurring in parallel).
Installation Time
8 - i (10,7.5)

o

6

<0

4A -.

>

2
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Figure A- 51: VF for Installation Time
Personnel Training

Time to Effectiveness

Personnel Training is measured in a similar
fashion to Installation Time. This measure emphasizes

■(^Installation^)
Personnel Training

the need for efficient training programs, so that any CM employed can afford the organization
the intended level of assurance in a minimum amount of time. Note that the funded elements of
training costs (initial and recurring) will be included in the associated hardware or software costs
corresponding to the CM. The strategy will be scored on the number of days that must be
scheduled to properly train the personnel in effective implementation.
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Training Time

365
Days

Figure A- 52: Training Time
Finite Resource Consumption-Human Resources

Human Resources

The Human Resources objective assesses the costs incurred
with respect to personnel. This is accomplished by two measures:

■^ Workforce J^)
Workload

Additional Personnel and Additional Workload. This initial effort does not yet account for the
salary costs of different people (i.e. manager vs. administrative assistant) but focuses on the
relative change in workforce of the organization.
Workforce
The measure Workforce evaluates the percent increase in personnel that would be
required to carry out an IA strategy. This measure assumes that the requirement of additional
personnel is not preferred simply due to the hiring, training, and salary costs. The percentage
allows for a measure that is relative to the original size of the organization. For example, a 10%
increase would mean one person to an organization of 10, and 10 people to an organization of
100. For the purposes of this research, it is assumed that the marginal effect of either situation is
the same.
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Figure A- 53: VF for Additional Personnel
Additional Workload
Additional Workload evaluates the average number of weekly overtime hours per
individual that is required, on average, during the useful life of the countermeasure (or the total
incurred due to strategy implementation). This measure is assumed to range from zero to a
maximum of 20 overtime-hours per week, where this amount is averaged only over the current
and applicable number of employees. Based upon the additional assumption that each person
already works 40 hours a week, anything more than 20 overtime-hours (60 hours total) a week
(per individual) would be operationally unacceptable. It is assumed that strategies exceeding this
limit will either be disregarded or additional personnel would have to be acquired. A notional
evaluation function is shown in Figure A- 54.
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Figure A- 54: VF for Additional Workload
Fiscal Resources
Fiscal Resources

There are several ways that costs of alternatives may be
compared, to include the percentage of a given budget or total costs
discounted over a specified time period (e.g. net present value).

Total Hardware
Unacost
Total Software
Unacost

However, each method has several issues to overcome. Using percentages of budgets must
accommodate for the different types of budgets, their restrictions, and variation over time. Net
present value offers the advantage of discounting money over time, but accounting for strategies
with varying lengths of time can be cumbersome (e.g. using the least common multiple of time).
[Humphreys, 1991:33] For these reasons, another approach was pursued—discounted uniform
annual costs.
Uniform annual cost (Unacost) is the alternative chosen to score IA strategies. The
Unacost measure ensures that an equitable comparison between the long-term monetary impact
of IA strategies. Unlike using a simple NPV calculation, this method accounts for variations in
useful life, and puts "all systems (IA Strategies) on a 1-year basis. Unacost converts any system
lasting n years with a present value P„ to an equivalent 1-year cost as of the end of the year" and
is denoted by
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R = PiiFpR,/,,, [Humphreys, 1991:35]
Equation A - 1: Unacost

FpR,/,« is the capital-recovery factor; which "converts a single zero-time cost to an
equivalent uniform end of year annual cost, Unacost." [Humphreys, 1991:27] This factor
requires the inputs interest rate (z) and time period (ri) and is determined by the equation
^,,=/lll)"1 [Humphreys, 1991:27]
(1 + /) -1
Equation A - 2: Unacost Factor
For IA Strategy evaluation, the expected useful lives of the components are used as the
duration and an organizationally accepted interest rate is used. Humphreys also notes "Unacosts
can be added together." [1991:38] Therefore, to get an overall Unacost for an IA Strategy, the
Unacost for each element must be calculated and added to all other Unacost figures for that
strategy. An example of this process is shown in the decision support tool MIA-Hamill.xls. If
the interest rate chosen is questioned, this method should lend itself to sensitivity analysis.
The fiscal costs were broken down into the two categories (hardware and software) to
capture preferences for each type. It is assumed that funds are available, and will be procured
from the appropriate budget (types of money). Additionally, any alternative considered is
assumed to be within budgetary constraints throughout its life span. Note that the Unacost score
is only a means to facilitate equitable comparisons between strategies and may not be the exact
cost incurred on an annual basis.
Total Hardware Unacosts
Hardware Costs include the dollar costs associated with initial procurement as well as
operations and maintenance (O&M) dollar costs. To implement this measure, each hardware
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element proposed in the IA Strategy is evaluated by adding the initial (immediate) cost to the net
present value (NPV) of any subsequent costs incurred due to O&M and training. This combined
cost of each element is then converted to the Unacost value discussed earlier.
The assumptions for this measure are that the hardware and software elements will have
no salvage value, and alternatives that exceed the organization's budget will not be considered.
The evaluation measure scale will range between the minimum and maximum Unacosts of
alternatives considered, to include doing nothing. If salvage costs are known, they, of course,
could be added to the calculations. The max could also be an organizational budgetary limit if
capital rationing is present.
Hardware Costs

Min

Max
Total Uniform Annual Costs ($)

Figure A- 55: VF for Hardware Costs
A further benefit of this type of analysis is that it enables direct comparison of individual
components in addition to the overall dollar cost of an entire strategy.
Total Software Unacosts
Software costs will include considerations identical to that of hardware. The total
Unacost will include procurement, update and associated training costs.
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Software Costs

Min

Max
Total Uniform Annual Costs ($)

Figure A- 56: VF for Software Costs
As seen in the hardware costs, the maximum Unacost would be established before the
evaluation of alternatives, and may be based upon budgetary limits with an organizationally
accepted time period and interest rates as inputs to the process.
Weighting
Once the ranges, shapes and relative level of values are incorporated evaluation
functions, the DM must then evaluate the tradeoffs between each of the attributes. The process
to accomplish this and the restrictions placed upon them are discussed in Chapter 2.
Summary
Direct and exact measurement of all benefits and costs of IA strategies may remain
elusive. However, evaluation of alternatives through comparisons of how they perform with
respect to decision maker preferences (taken primarily from doctrine) should facilitate the
identification of new alternatives, leading to a cost-effective strategy that enhances functionality
and provides the level of Information Assurance required.
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Appendix B - Alternative Hierarchies
Overview
This appendix presents alternative hierarchies that were developed during this research.
Each has its merits and shortcomings, but may provide insight towards the development of an
improved value model for Information Assurance.
Information Assurance
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